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The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and
Legal-Policy Observations
Gideon v. Wainwright and Douglas v. California, the
landmark right to counsel cases of March, 1963, -may
have supplied a few answers, but they -raiseor reopen
many questions: Do these cases cover prosecutions for
"driving under the influence"? Overparking? Do they
apply to post-conviction proceedings? Probation revocation hearings? Do they require that the poor man
be furnished counsel as soon as the rich man enjoys
the advantage of his? And when should the rich -man
first enjoy this advantage? Whatever the meaning and
impact of these decisions, is the defender's office or the
court appointed system the better way to effectuate
them? Whatever the system, is the person who has no
ready cash, but a good job an "indigent"? The man
who can raise bail?
The need to gather information about the practice and
attitudes bearing on these and related matters led the
Amerian Bar Association to launch a state by state
audit of the representation of indigent defendants in
the United States. Professors Ihoper and Kamisar were
designated co-reporters for Minnesota. Between interviews with state supreme court justices, trial judges,
county attorneys and publi defenders, the Reporters
found themselves asking each other more and more
questions. This Article is the result.t

Yale Kamisar*
Jesse H. Choper**
Professor of Law, the University of Minnesota.
Associate Professor of Law, the University of Minnesota.
"[Field work for this Article was done by the authors as Reporters for
Minnesota in connection with the American Bar Association's nationwide
study of representation of indigent defendants, see 1902 A.B.A. RE. 408,
under the research supervision of the American Bar Foundation. The au*
**
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No good society can be unprincipled; and
no viable society can be principle-ridden.'
NTRODUCTION
A.

TEm MINNESOTA BACKGROUND

Historically, comparatively, the State of Minnesota has been
rather sympathetic to the plight of the indigent criminal defendant. As the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court recently
observed, "we have had some provision for the appointment of
counsel in felony and gross misdemeanor cases at least since
1869. " 2 Throughout the state every indigent who wants to be is
represented by counsel at arraignment, trial, and sentencing. Over
the years, the point at which state-furnished counsel could enter
the case has been moved back in time until, with a 1959 amendment, an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel "prior
to his preliminary examination by a magistrate."
Two years after the legislature expanded the "beginning" of the
thors drew conclusions only from field findings gathered in Minnesota. General conclusions are, thus, necessarily of a tentative character and subject
to revision in light of further statistical analysis of Minnesota data and of.
information obtained in other states. In any event, the conclusions are solely
those of the authors.
The authors are indebted to many of their colleagues for their helpful
assistance, especially Professors Maynard E. Pirsig and James L. Hetland, Jr.
They also wish to express their appreciation to two representatives of the
American Bar Foundation, Professor Harry W. Jones, Director of Research,
and Lee Silverstein, Esquire, Research Attorney, for their valuable cooperation
and encouragement.
Library research for this Article was aided by a research grant from the
Graduate School of the University of Minnesota.
1. Bicmmr, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 64 (1962).
2. Knutson, The State-Wide Public Defender System, Bench and Bar of
Minn., May 1963, pp. 11, 12, referring to what is now MINN. STAT. § 611.07
(1961).
3. MmNw. STAT. § 611.07 (1961).
Compare FED. R. CRnvm. P. 44, which entitles an indigent defendant to an
attorney if and when he "appears in court without counsel." According to an
Advisory Committee note, "the rule is intended to indicate that the right of
the defendant to have counsel assigned . . . relates only to proceedings in
court and, therefore, does not include preliminary proceedings before a committing magistrate." U.S.C.A. Rule 44, note 2 (1961). Generally, this is the way
it has worked out. See ATTORNEY GmNmAI's COMMITTEE, REPORT ON POVERTY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIINAL JUSTICE

24 (1963). A new Ad-

visory Committee on Federal Criminal Rules has recently proposed that Rule
44 be amended so as to provide that an indigent defendant "shall be entitled,
if he so requests, to have counsel assigned to represent him within a reasonable
time after such request."
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right to assigned counsel, and two years before the Supreme
Court's historic "right to counser' decisions of March 18, 1963,
the state's highest court, in a declaration of "policies and principles" designed to control and facilitate the disposition of applications for appointed counsel on appeal," extended the point at
which the appointment of counsel "ends." Expressly patterning
the new system after California's, under which, after an independent examination of the record, appellate courts appointed counsel
where it "would be helpful to the defendant or the court" and
denied such appointment only if counsel "would be of no value
to either,"' the Minnesota Supreme Court directed the trial courts
to prepare sufficiently detailed synopses in all felony and gross
misdemeanor cases so that it could "adequately determine whetherT
there is any justification for ... appointment . . .on appeal.!
Minnesota has never been content with a mere declaration of
the right to "have the assistance of counsel." 8 Since territorial
days," it has effectuated this right by "requiring not only that
defendant be informed of his right . . .but that he be asked if
he desires to avail himself of that right.'" Last year, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that this "affirmative duty . . . to alert
the defendant" applies to misdemeanor prosecutions in justice or
municipal courts as well as to felony and gross misdemeanor cases
in district courts."' The decision,'- and some language utilized by
the court in arriving at it, 3 might have presaged the extension of
the right to assigned counsel to misdemeanor cases, independent
4. Douglas v. California, 37a U.S. 353 (1963) (Douglas, 3.); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1968) (Black, J.).
5. State v. Dahlgren, 259 Mn. 307, 310, 107 N.W.2d 299, 301 (1961).
6. People v. Hyde, 51 Cal. 2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958), quoted
with approval in State v. Dablgren, 259 Mnn.307, 317-18, 107 N.W.2d 299,
306 (1961). See also the comments of the author of the Daldgren opinion in
Knutson, supra note 2, at 11.
7. State v. Dahlgren, 259 Mlnn. 307, 315, 107 N.W.2d 299, 305 (1961).
8.U.. CousT. amend. VI; MMM. CONST. art. I, § 6.
9. WMnn. Rev. Stat. [Terr.] 1851, ch. 120, § 101, now Mmi'r. Siwr. § 630.10
(1961).
10. State v. Moosbrugger, 263 Minn. 56, 59, 116 N.W.2d 68, 70 (1962).
11. -bid.
12. See The Minnesota Supreme Court 1961-1962, 47 Mmmin.
L. l~v. 255,

285 (1962).
13.
No one, least of all the defendant or the state, would disagree that this
is a criminal prosecution concerned with a most serious offense .... In
such proceedings it is elementary that the defendant has a right to all

the constitutional and statutory safeguards which would be painstakingly accorded him were he being prosecuted for a felony.
State v. Moosbrugger, 263 Mlimi. 56, 60, 116 N.W.2d 68, 71 (1962).
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of radiations from the landmark cases subsequently handed down
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Developments have also occurred in proceedings not generally
regarded as meriting the usual criminal procedural safeguards.
Until recently, in keeping with the majority view, Minnesota did
not afford a probationer even the right to be represented by retained counsel at revocation proceedings.1 4 Last year, however,
the Advisory Committee on Revision of the Minnesota Criminal
Law recommended a new provision - since adopted into law'entitling a probationer facing revocation "to be heard and to be
represented by counsel." Whether or not the new statutory requirement bestows the right to assigned counsel on indigent probationers,"8 at the very least it furnishes them an appealing argument for such counsel as a matter of fourteenth amendment
7
equal protection.
B.

TnE RECENT SUPREM COURT DECISIONS

Although Minnesota has not been standing pat, the historic
decisions of March, 1963 demonstrate that she - and her sister
states- have not been moving nearly fast enough.
1.

Potential Impact

Just how far and how fast the Court has actually moved is a
question that defies a confident answer. At the very least, Douglas v. California's necessitates the appointment of counsel for
every indigent convicted of a serious crime who wishes to perfect
14. Minn. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 391, § S. See generally Kadish, The Advo-

cate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-CorrectionalProcess, 45 MINN. L.
REV. 803, 815-17 (1961).

15. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.14(2).
16. Some of the judges interviewed believe this is the intent of the provision. See text accompanying notes 390-92 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 394-98 infra.
18. 372 U.S. 853 (1963).

Over the sharp protest of Mr. Justice Harlan, the Court, for the time being,
has declined to address itself to the question of the retroactive
"right to counsel" cases, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 82 U.S.L.
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1963). The retroactive effect of Gideon is a matter
cern in Florida, from whence Pickelsimer arose. Over half of the
ers in the Florida prison system were not represented by counsel.

effect of the
WEEK 3136
of great con8,000 prisonSee COUNCIL

OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INCREASED RIGHTS FOR DEFENDANTS IN STATE CnIM-

INAL PROSECUTIONS 28 (1962). Prior to Gideon, however, the statutes or rules in

37 states and the almost invariable practice in six others was to provide counsel for all indigent felony defendants regardless of "special circumstances." See
Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue
on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 17-20
(1962) & App. I. Thus, in Minnesota, as in most states, the more significant
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a first appeal. As for Gideon v. Wainwright, 9 it appears equally
clear, Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion to the contrary
notwithstanding, 0 that fourteenth amendment due process now
"incorporates" the sixth amendment right to assigned counsel "in
all criminal prosecutions" -whatever this clause means for purposes of right to counsel.2 1 Are prosecutions for such misdemeanors as petty larceny, simple assault, issuance of "worthless checks"
and "driving under the influence," "criminal prosecutions" for
purposes of Gideon?
Even if Gideon were limited to felony cases, perhaps Douglas
could not be similarly contained. Inasmuch as the defendant with
sufficient funds is able to appear with counsel in misdemeanor
cases, it may be that the "equal protection approach" reflected in
Douglas demands that the indigent be afforded the same advantage. Indeed, Douglas may signify that the indigent misdemeanor
defendant not only has an absolute right to counsel at the trial
level, but at the appellate level as well.
The overruling of Betts v. Brady2 2 hardly came as a surprise.
The old rule had been that in noncapital cases "exceptional circumstances" must "render criminal proceedings without counsel
so apt to result in injustice as to be fundamentally unfair."' 2 But
in the waning years of the Betts reign the requisite showing of
question is whether Douglas should be given retroactive effect.
Since the Court deemed the assistance of counsel at the trial and on the
first appeal essential to insure the reliability of the guilt-determining process,
Douglasand Gideon would seem deserving of retroactive application. Of. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 US. 214 (1958), giving retroactive effect to
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). On the other hand, a strong argument
may be-and has been-made for applying Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643
(1961) prospectively only. As Chief Justice Weintraub observed in State v.
Smith, 37 NJ. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962), Mapp does not deal with "a denial of
a right which bears upon the truth of a conviction, as for example, the right
to counsel or to appellate review." Consider, too, Justice Traynor, concurring
in In re Harris, 366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rep. 889 (1962): "The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to prevent the conviction of the innocent, but to deter
unconstitutional methods of law enforcement ... .That purpose is adequately served when a state provides an orderly procedure for raising the question
of illegally obtained evidence at or before trial and on appeal." A definitive
treatment of the retroactive effect of a holding of unconstitutionality is beyond
the scope of this Article. See generally LocmffAnT, KAMSrA &CuoPan, SUrPjPL
MENT To Domn's CAss ox CoNSTrruToNAL LAw 672-75 (1963), and authorities collected therein.
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1968).
20. 379 U.S. at 349-55.
21. See text accompanying notes 296-308 infra.
22. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
23. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948).
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"exceptional circumstances" or "prejudice" had diminished to the
vanishing point.24 When, in granting certiorari in the Gideon case,
counsel to discuss whether Betts should be
the Court requested
"reconsidered," ' 5 the old precedent already "revealed itself as
overruled by its manifest erosion." 28
Douglas v. California7 is something else again. In forbidding
a state to limit the instances in which appellate counsel will be
assigned to indigents, the Court, according to protesting dissenters, suggested that the equal protection clause "prevents the State
from adopting a law of general applicability '2 8 (at least one dealing with "applied justice") 29 "that may affect the poor more
harshly than it does the rich."5 0 Writing for a six to three majority, Mr. Justice Douglas observed:
In either case [denial of a transcript or the assistance of counsel on appeal] the evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent. For there
can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys "depends on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois [351 U.S. 12,
19 (1956)]. The present case . . . shows that the discrimination is not
between "possibly good and obviously bad cases," but between cases
where the rich man can require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the
rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's [work]
, . . while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determina81
tion that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself.
24. See, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Hudson v.
North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960). See generally Kamisar, Betts v. Brady
Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Mici.
L. REV. 219, 278-81 (1962).
25. 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
26. Cf. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LzoA INSTITUTIONs TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 54 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
27. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
28. Douglas v. California, 872 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., joined by
Stewart, J., dissenting).
29.
[B]asic legal services are not of the same order, in our theory of government, as basic medical services. The provision of applied justice is an
essential function of the state even under the most conservative political
theory. .

.

. [A] state which does no more than to provide all its citi-

zens with applied justice is not extending the role of government to
novel fields but rather only giving all men that which is the most basic
function of government, the provision of legal process.
Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoRaNun L.Q. 1, 16 (1957).
30. 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963); see also People v. Hyde, 51 Cal. 2d 152, 331
P.2d 42, 43 (1958).
31. 372 U.S. at $55, 357-58.
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If Gideon only toppled "a bridge shaky and ready to come
down," 2 Douglas may have dynamited some rather sturdylooking ones. If Gideon only raised indigent state defendants to
a point their federal counterparts had reached a full generation
earlier, 33 Douglas may have endowed state indigents with rights
not yet won in federal criminal litigation. For the Court has yet
to decide whether an indigent has an unqualified right to counsel
when he files papers collaterally attacking a federal conviction,3 '
or even when he prepares a petition for certiorari on direct reviewY5 Indeed, only a short time ago, a careful student of the
problem found "no instance . . . where the Supreme Court appointed counsel before the grant or denial of certiorari, so as to
afford the unrepresented indigent effective assistance of counsel
in the preparation of either the petition for certiorari itself or a
memorandum to support it."3 6 Yet, the Douglas Court laid the
foundation for bestowing these rights,3 7 and more, on state indigents. The unqualified right to counsel at the trial level was a long
time in coming, but when that day finally arrived it may have
found the Court in a most expansive - explosive, if you will mood.
Nor - reading the case for all it may be worth - does Douglas
stop at discretionary review and post-conviction proceedings. Indigent persons may find that they also have been awarded absolute
32. Of. LLEwmL n, TnM CowmON LAW TAxrrIoN: DEcmDG APPEAs 303

(1960).
33. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
34. See Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appdlate Proceedings, 45 Mmx.
L. REv. 783, 799-801 (1961); Comment, 30 U. Cm. L. Rav. 583 (1963).
35. See Boskey, supra note 34, at 796-97.
36. Id. at 797. "[T]his is exactly the stage in the direct appellate review of
a federal criminal proceeding where the largest counsel gap now exists." Ibid.
37. The thrust of Chief Justice Knutson's reflections, in a bar association
address the head of the Minnesota Supreme Court delivered a few days after
the Douglas case was handed down, appears to be that fourteenth amendment
equal protection now requires the appointment of counsel in post-conviction
applications. Knutson, supra note 2, at 14-15:
We come then to the question that all this leads to. What are the requirements with respect to furnishing counsel for indigent defendants
...to assist in presenting applications for post-conviction remedies,
such as habeas corpus and coram nobis? Here the [Supreme Court of
the United States] has not specifically said that appointment of counsel is necessary, but from the discussion of the Indiana case [Lane v.
Brown, 372 US. 477 (1963), where the Court struck down a provision
permitting the public defender to determine whether the transcript of
a post-conviction proceeding should be ordered] it would seem to follow
that Griffinv. I/inois [351 U.S. 12 (1950)] applies, and if Griffin...
applies so, too, does Douglas ....
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rights to assigned counsel in justice courts, juvenile proceedings,
probation revocation hearings - everywhere a rich man may appear with counsel!
To say the "equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment" requires a state to provide counsel before it may revoke
what, a generation ago, the Supreme Court called "an act of grace
to one convicted of a crime,"3 "a matter of favor,"8 is to come
a long way. But even at this distant point, the force of Douglas
may not be spent. The case may signify that an indigent defendant is entitled to be furnished various forms of aid other than
counsel.
Twelve years ago, a federal appellate court all but guffawed at
the suggestion that "one accused of crime is entitled to receive at
public expense all the collateral assistance needed to make his
defense." 40 Few judges would find anything amusing about such
a contention today:
Although the Constitution does not guarantee the right to appeal and
although the defendant was not precluded, by lack of counsel, from
prosecuting his appeal, the Court argued [in Douglas] that counsel on
appeal is necessary to achieve some degree of equality. The same reafor a constitutional right to aid
soning is equally persuasive as support
41
other than counsel at the trial level.

Indeed, on reflection, the need for an investigator or psychiatrist or handwriting expert is likely to be more compelling than
the need for counsel on a second appeal, let alone on collateral
attack. Conceptually, such trial assistance may be viewed as a
distant consequence of Douglas, but practically it almost seems
to follow from Douglas a fortiori.42 Moreover, by thus removing
any obstacle to a fair trial before the trial, not afterwards, in the
38. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (Cardozo, J.).
39. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (referring to the
Federal Probation Act of 1925, ch. 24, 43 Stat. 1259).
40. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 547 (3d Cir. 1951),
aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953). The court manifested "great difficulty" in accepting
a line of reasoning which "would entitle [the accused] to consultation with
ballistic experts, chemists, engineers, biologists, or any type of expert whose
help in a particular case might be relevant." Ibid.
41. Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Mrnx. L. Rav. 1054, 1058 (1963).
42.
Such assistance might include, for example, payment of fees to secure
the assistance of expert witnesses in preparing the defense or payment
of investigatory costs to locate important missing witnesses. Frequently,
such assistance may be more important than counsel. An accountant
may be more helpful than an attorney to a person accused of tax
fraud, while a handwriting expert could be more essential than a crim-
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long run the state may be spared
much expense and the judicial
43
system much inconvenience.
2.

Possible Limitations

Have we been conjuring up 'ypothetical situations . . . by
gradations producing practical differences despite seemingly logical extensions"?" Is it not plain that the Douglas principle cannot
be "authoritatively enforced without adjustment or concession
and without let-up"? 45 that radiations from the case "must be
modulated by pragmatic compromises"?"0 To approach the problem by a somewhat different route, does not the principle on which
Douglas rests "carry within itself its own flexibility . . . flexibil47
ity on its own terms"?
Perhaps not -if this principle represents "a new concept of
equal protection which will require a state to alleviate inequities
even when they are not the product of discriminatory policies"48s
or if the relevant inquiry is "whether defendant is getting the
same brand of justice as the man with means to employ scillful
counsel." 49 But even those who foresaw the application of Grifin
v. Illinois to counsel on appeal pointed out:
Discrimination is a -partof denial of due process, just as it is a part of
denial of equal protection. Denial to all equally of a privilege which
due process does not in absolute terms exact, may come to violate due
process if the denial is arbitrarily applied to some persons but not to
inal lawyer to a person charged with forgery.
Id. at 1055.
Only last Term the Supreme Court of the United States heard argument
that an indigent state defendant has a constitutional right to be furnished the
services of an independent psychiatrist. Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
Since the state agreed to a retrial when a post-conviction psychiatric examination indicated that petitioner might have been "only partly or not at all responsible for his acts, for very many years," id. at 589, the Court postponed
evaluation of the constitutional argument.
43. Cf. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment:
A Dialogue on "The Most PervasiveRight of an Accused," 30 U. Cai. L. 11Ev.
1, 36 n-184 (1962).
44. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.)
45. Of. Bicx ,, Tm LFs DANGEROUS Bawca 59 (1962).
46. Id. at 58. Consider Qua, Grifn v. Illinois, 25 U. Car. L. REv. 143, 147
(1957): 'Tractical considerations may impinge heavily and divert the development of theory from its straight logical course. We all lmow that this occurs
from time to time in our own courts and sometimes to the great advantage of
the law and the community. Similar forces operate in Washington."
47. Cf. BicKxr, op. cit. supra note 45, at 58.
48. The Supreme Court,1955 Term, 70 HAnv. L. R.Ev. 83,127 (1956).
49. Allen, Griffin v. Iinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Car. L.
11Ev. 151, 157 (1957).
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others. And yet arbitrary discrimination is the traditional way of
violating the equal protection clause. Thus, the two concepts overlap.50

The root idea of the Griffin and Douglas cases may not be that
every inequality of any consequence in the criminal process is taboo, but only that due process incorporates a basic notion of
equality. It may be that the Griffin-Douglas principle does not
come into play unless and until "discriminations" based on wealth
work an inequality so significant in the criminal process as to
amount to "fundamental unfairness."'" The Grffin line of cases reveals that completely shutting off the means of appellate review or
collateral attack to indigent defendants produces the requisite
great disparity, as does the failure to provide counsel on the first
appeal,under the Douglas holding. Yet the absence of legal representation in other circumstances - for example, in post-conviction proceedings when petitioner had been represented by counsel
50. Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 29, at 22, referring inter alia, to Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
See also Note, 1959 DUKE LJ. 484, 489-90, pointing out that even taking the
"due process" approach, the Griffin result might well be extended to counsel
on appeal in order to eliminate "basic unfairness."
51. Note, 47 Mnqx. L. Rzv. 1054, 1072 (1963).
I submit that the basis for that holding is simply an unarticulated conclusion that it violates "fundamental fairness" for a State which provides for appellate review . . . not to see to it that such appeals are
in fact available to those it would imprison for serious crimes.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 36 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The real question in this case, I submit, and the only one that permits
of satisfactory analysis, is whether or not the state rule . . .is consistent with the requirements of fair procedure guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause .... Refusal to furnish criminal indigents with some
things that others can afford may fall short of constitutional standards
of fairness.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963) (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart,
J., dissenting).
In "equating the test for allowing a pauper's appeal [from a federal conviction] to the test for dismissing paid cases," Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 447 (1962), the Court felt "impelled by considerations beyond the
corners [of the statute] . . . to assure . . .equal treatment for every litigant
before the bar." Id. at 446-47, citing the Griffin case. As has been pointed out,
this suggests that if the statute were read so as to impose a greater burden
of proof on the pauper seeking appeal, the distinction might give rise to a discrimination of constitutional proportions. For although the fifth amendment
contains no equal protection clause, discriminatory federal legislation can
amount to a denial of due process. See the discussion in Hyser v. Reed, 318
F.2d 225, 255 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, C. J., joined by Edgerton, J..
concurring in part and dissenting in part); The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 70
HARv. L. REv. 54, 172 (1962). Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
Under this analysis, Coppedge, as much as Griffin, may have presaged Douglas.
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11

at every preceding stage52 -

may not. Analyzing the "equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment" in these terms, those traditionally relevant to problems of due process, Douglas rests on
"principle with flexibility built in."' 3
The Douglas Court took pains to point out what it "need not
now decide": 4
We are not here concerned with problems that might arise from the
denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or
mandatory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which
the claims have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by
an appellate court. We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted
as a matter of right to rich and poor alike . .

.

.But it is appropriate

to observe that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to
a denial of due process or an "invidious discrimination" Williamson -v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 [(1955)] .. .. But where the merits
of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided
without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been
drawn between rich and poor.

The Williamson passage alluded to by the Court recognizes
that "evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies" - that "reform may
take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute." The first appeal, the only appeal of
52. As the Supreme Court noted in the Douglas case, 372 US. at 355, some
years earlier, Judge Traynor had maintained that denial of counsel on appeal
to an indigent "would seem to be a discrimination at least as invidious as
that condemned in Grifn:'People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64, 71, 357 P.2d 1072,
1076 (1960) (concurring opinion). However, on the same occasion, Judge Traynor ventured to say that "the reasons for appointment of counsel on appeal
... do not extend to habeas corpus or other collateral attacks ... unless the
defendant presents a prima facie case for relief," in part because a collateral
proceeding imposes no "burden of complying with technicalities; it simply demands of [the indigent] a measure of frankness in disclosing his factual situation." Id. at 74, 357 P2d at 1078. Nor, Judge Traynor indicated, does it necessarily follow that misdemeanor defendants are entitled to counsel even on the
first appeal. He noted that "the misdemeanant suffers no loss of civil rights,"
and pointed, inter alia, to "the substantially less serious nature of misdemeanors
and their corresponding lighter penalties," frequently only punishment by fine.
Id. at 74-75, 357 P.d at 1078-79.
See also United States ex rel. Coleman v. Denno, 313 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.)
(decided two months before Douglas), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 919 (1903) (two
months after Douglas).The Second Circuit ruled that the furnishing of counsel at all stages of the state appellate system-but not in the preparation of
an application for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court -satisfied the Griffin principle.
53. Cf. Bicxn,, op. cit.supra note 45, at 59.
54. 372 U.S. at 356-57. (Emphasis added in first instance.)

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

right, appears sufficiently more important than any subsequent
phase of review -the need for counsel at this step of the appellate process seems sufficiently more "acute" than at other stages
-that the line may rationally be drawn here.
This proposition draws support from several notions: "[J]ustice
demands an independent and objective assessment of a district
judge's appraisal of his own conduct of a criminal trial" 5 - but
only one such assessment; when a state deems it so "wise and just
that convictions be susceptible to review by an appellate court" as
to grant such review as a matter of right "it cannot by force of its
exactions draw a line which precludes convicted indigent persons,
forsooth erroneously convicted, from securing such a review"; 0
"beyond the first appeal, counsel would appear less vital both because the incidence of reversal is presumably less and because the
courts to which such later appeals are addressed are probably already aware of the broad policy questions that the cases usually
pose.

57

Douglas could be more confidently limited to the first appeal
if Griffin had been similarly contained. Griffin itself held only that
"destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate [direct] appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts." ' But as Lane v. Brown50 illustrates, the principle is no
less applicable when the state has effectively foreclosed appellate
review of a coram nobis hearing:
To be sure, this case does not involve, as did Griffin, a direct appeal
from a criminal conviction, but [Smith v. Bennett, 865 U.S. 708 (1001)]
makes clear that the Griffin principle also applies to state collateral
proceedings, and [Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 25.2 (1959)] leaves no doubt
that the principle applies0° even though the State has already provided
one review on the merits.

But for the Douglas case, Griffin and all its progeny could be
55. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 488, 455-56 (1962) (Stewart, J.,
joined by Brennan, J., concurring). See also the discussion in note 51 supra.
56. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 28 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57. Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Dofendants, 47 Mi-N. L. REv. 1054, 1074-75 (1963).
One measure of [the criminal appeal's] importance is the frequency of
reversals in criminal cases. Thus between 1949 and 1954 nearly thirty
percent of Illinois criminal appeals resulted in reversals of convictions.
Similarly high percentages of reversals have occurred in some of the
other states.
Allen, supra note 49, at 155.
58. 351 U.S. at 19.
59. 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (decided the same day as Douglas).
60. Id. at 484-85.
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and has been - narrowly viewed as not affecting the "right
to counsel." The argument runs along these lines: The GriWn
principle is not concerned with the quality of appellate review,
merely the availability of such review. So long as a defendant is
allowed access to the courts (whether or not he has a lawyer),
"fourteenth amendment equality" does not require that he be
furnished counsel as well, simply because such assistance would
be "helpful."' 61 He is entitled to such aid only if without it the
criminal proceedings are "so apt to result in injustice as to be
fundamentally unfair" 62- the old Betts rule. "[Tjhe presence of
counsel is not a sine qua non to access to the courts, as was the
availability of the transcript in the Grifin case,"" or, one might
add, in Lane - or the payment of a filing fee in Burns v. Ohio"
and Smith v. Bennett. 5
Under this analysis, Betts and Grifn are easily reconcilable:
"[T]he state, having provided a road, need not guarantee that
every man have equally as good a car to drive down it.?""
After Douglas, however, the "access" interpretation of Griffin
must be substantially revised, if not abandoned. 'In either case"
- denial of a free transcript on appeal or denial of free counsel
on appeal - "the evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent." 67 Douglas may mean, then, that wherever an indigent person is permitted access to the courts, he is entitled to counsel in
order to make that access meaningful. Douglas, coupled with Griffin, may well demand at every post-trial stage "more than that
the state simply place the defendant upon the 'road'; it must see
that he has some vehicle - counsel - to use in traveling the
'road.'" "s
-

3.

Future Considerations

Or must it? Are all "roads" the same? Once the indigent has
come to the end of the "highway" and is proceeding on "side
roads," is the need for a vehicle of the same magnitude?
The Douglas and Griffin opinions are hardly the last word;
61. See, e.g., Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to
Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Mci. L. REv. 219, 247-S4 (1962); Qua,
supra note 46, at 146; Comment, 55 McH. L. REv. 413, 420 (1957).
62. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948).
63. Comment, 55 M.ic. L. R~v. 413, 420 (1957).
64. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
65. 365 US. 708 (1961).

66. Note, Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Criminal
Appeals, 1959 Dumn L. 484, 486.
67. Douglas v. California, 372 U.. 353, 355 (1963).
68. Note, 47 Mim. L.P~v. 1054, 1068 (1963).
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more likely they are merely the first and second. Thus, whether
it is profitable to dwell on their meaning at greater length is
doubtful. If nothing else is clear, this much seems to be: The
breadth and vagueness of the "equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment" terminology is such that the principles lurking in this area will be brought into sharp focus only by "new
prodding of the new facts""0 and- for many Griffin-Douglas
cases to come - by "never failing, each time, to take at least one
fresh look" 70 at the overall problem.
In the "full cry" over "today's sensations" 71- Gideon and
Douglas-other problems may be overlooked. But as has been
pointed out, "if the federal courts ever overrule Betts v. Brady,"
the inquiry as to "the times during the chain of criminal proceedings at which the right to counsel accrues . . .may become
the most significant in the area." 72 Although the issue of "when
the right to counsel begins" was not specifically considered in
either Gideon or Douglas, these cases do not leave the matter
unaffected. In disposing of the problem of the right to counsel
at trial, did the Court's reiteration of the necessity of "the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings,"Ta signal the
new battleground? Does the Douglas principle require the state
to provide counsel for indigents at as early a point in the case as
retained counsel makes his appearance?
C.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE FIELD STUDY

The need to gather information about the practices and attitudes bearing on all of these problems led the American Bar
Association to launch a nationwide state by state audit of the
representation of indigent accused persons. The project was
supervised by the American Bar Foundation and ABA associate
state subcommittees. The authors were designated Reporters for
Minnesota and this Article is an outgrowth of that effort.
The survey in Minnesota was conducted in June, July, and
August of 1963. Seven counties of various sizes were selected by
69. Cf. LLEwFLLYN, op.cit. supra note 32.
70. Ibid.
71. Cf. Packer, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1141 (1958).
72. Winters, Preliminary Report on Counsel for the Indigent Accused in
Wisconsin 41 (1963) (unpublished preliminary report in Minnesota Law School
Library).
73. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). See text accompany-

ing notes 234-49 infra.
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random sample 74 In each of these counties, the authors personally
interviewed at least one of the presiding district judgese 5 and the
county attorney, 8 sometimes accompanied by one or more assistants. Although not originally contemplated, personal interviews
were also held with four municipal judges78 because of their expertise with misdemeanors and the early stages of felony and gross
misdemeanor proceedings. In addition, the public defenders 79 in
74.

2
ieo

o

W

Chisago

13,419

Rush City 1,108

4

Dakota

78,803

So. St. Paul 22,0832

4

Freeborn

37,891

Albert Lea 17,108

5

Hennepin

842,854

Minneapolis 482,872

Ramsey
St. Louis

422,525
231,588

St. Paul 313,411
Duluth 106,884

9
6

80,345

St. Cloud 33,815

4

Stearns

16

Reformatory and
prison in the district
Relatively
wealthy county
Some Indian
population
Almost 50 different political
subdivisions
State capital
Declining
economy
St. Cloud is a

small college town
The population of these counties constitutes over half of the population of
the entire state.
75. The judges, 'by county, were: Rollin Johnson (Chisago); Roy Nelson
(Dakota); Warren F. Plunkett, 0. Russell Olson (Freeborn); John A. Weeks,
Irving R. Brand, Dana Nicholson (Hennepin); Clayton Parks, John W. Graff,
Leonard J. Keyes (Ramsey); Mark Nolan, Sidney E. Kaner, Donald Odden
(St. Louis); E. J. Ruegemer (Stearns).
76. The county attorneys, by county, in the above order, were: Howard
Johnson, J. Jerome Kluck, Robert C. Tuveson, George Scott, 'WilliamB. Randall, John C. Arko, Roger J. Nierengarten.
77. The assistant prosecutors, by county, were: Harlan Goulett (Hennepin);
Peter J. Maloney, Stephen L. Maxwell (Ramsey); William C. Johnson (St.

Louis).
78. They were, by city: John R. Peterson (Albert Lea), Donald Anderson
(Duluth), Bruce Stone (Minneapolis), Thomas Henning (St. Cloud).
79. Kermit A. Gill of Hennepin County and Thomas E. Moore of Ramsey

County.
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those two counties which utilize such a system were personally
interviewed. Finally, the authors spoke with Chief Justice Oscar
R. Knutson and Associate Justice Robert J. Sheran of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 0
The authors' original plan was to conduct the first few interviews jointly and then to split the remainder of the task. However,
after several interviews were completed in which both of the authors were present, it seemed that the sessions would be more
productive if two interviewers took part. As a result, both authors
participated in most of the interviews. This enabled us to maintain a greater continuity of discussion, to assure ourselves as to
the accuracy of much of what was reported, and to probe the
thinking of our subjects more thoroughly, thereby avoiding recording first impressions only.
Because of this interviewing technique, the source of most of
the information relied upon in this Article is the personal interviews. This has been supplemented by replies to mail questionnaires received from the prosecutors of 55 additional counties,
from 15 other district judges, and from 24 lawyers who acted as
assigned counsel in the sample counties. In most instances, the
mail replies follow the pattern of the personal interviews; in those
in which they do not, the authors prefer to rely upon the interviews themselves as reflecting the consensus of opinion in the
state."'
Included also in the Article, mainly by footnote, are the results
of a docket study made, in five of the counties, of a total of 212
criminal defendants in 1962. These too were selected by random
sample 2 and were recorded by several student assistants.8 8 The
80. The authors wish to express their deep gratitude to all of those named
above, many of them personal friends, for their enthusiastic cooperation. The
forthrightness of their comments and the generosity of their grant of time was
more than could reasonably be expected.
81. For example, a much smaller percentage of those judges who replied
by mail believed that counsel should be provided for indigent misdemeanor
defendants, see data in note 289 infra, than did those judges who were personally interviewed. However, many in the latter group who initially responded
"no" when asked if counsel should be provided in misdemeanor cases, modified
their views when questioned further by the authors or when it was suggested to
them that coverage might not be an "all-or-nothing" proposition.
Number Included in
82.
Number of Persons
Docket Study
County
Charged with Felonies
1

45

20

2
3
4
5

256
111
581
56

46
46
80
20
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findings of the docket study, in large measure, are consistent with
opinions expressed in the interviews. Variations are noted where
they exist. Unless otherwise designated, different identification
numbers were assigned to the counties in each of the tables showing the results of the docket study.
D.

Tem ScoPE OF

TH

ARTicLE

Since Minnesota has long provided indigents prosecuted for
felonies and gross- misdemeanors with counsel at trial and sentencing, as might be expected, this Article focuses on those matters remaining unsettled and raising controversy: (1) the standards and administration of "indigency," the point at which counsel (2) "begins" and (3) "ends," (4) the right to assigned counsel
in misdemeanor cases, and (5) an evaluation of the "public defender" and "appointed counsel" systems. Pursuit of these inquiries necessarily led to many problems transcending, yet significantly affecting, the right to counsel issue. For example, the
question of indigency could not be disentangled from bail and
probation practices; nor could the matter of when the right to
counsel begins be torn from police interrogation and all it entails
-powers of arrest, self incrimination, prompt commitment, coerced confessions; nor could the misdemeanor problem be considered without regard to the brand of justice dispensed by the
inferior courts.

I.

'TNDIGENCY": STANDARDS AND
ADMINISTRATION

In a recent study of the representation afforded indigents in
the federal courts, it was reported that "the most widely felt abuse
of the assignment system is the false claim of indigency to obtain
free counsel."' 4 Although several of those interviewed in Minnesota shared this view, the general reaction was not nearly that
strong. This was not because few Minnesota criminal defendants
claim to be indigent, for in no county was the estimate of indigent
felony defendants put at less than 50 percent, and the more com83. The authors wish to thank Mfichael S. Berman and James J. O'Connor
of the third-year class and William H. Bast of the second-year class for their
conscientious aid in this connection.
84. Note, The Representation of Indigent CritlnalDefendants in the Federal DistrictCourts, 76 H.&Rv. L. REv. 579, 585 (1963).
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mon approximations were between 70 and 90 percentf 5
Since "cost" probably presents the most formidable obstacle
to a full realization of equality of treatment for the impoverished
in criminal cases, much turns on (a) the basic standard of indigency, and (b) the manner in which it is administered. The survey
disclosed that in some respects the counties' approach to these
problems was quite similar, notably in the procedures used to
determine indigency. On the other hand, sharp differences were
uncovered in regard to (a) whether the indigent should later be
required to reimburse the county for its expenditure and (b) what
factors ought to be considered - and how much significance they
should be given - in establishing who is an indigent. For example,
the reaction to the defendant's ability to raise bail varied from
those who dismissed it as irrelevant to those who viewed it as
decisive.
A.

DETERMNATION OF INDIGENCY

Despite the prevalence of claims of indigency, only three of the
85. The replies of those interviewed estimating this percentage ran as follows:
County
District Judges
County Attorney
Public Defender
1
2
3
4
5

70
50*
75
67; 85
60; 90

70
60-75
70
90
50-75

6
75; 80; 90
50
70-75
7
70; 70-80; 90
70
70
*This judge pointed out that the percentage of indigent defendants is highest in the 18 to 21 year old age group.
In the docket study, 62% of all defendants selected were found to be
indigent, the range in the five counties being from 60 to 65%. The results of
the mail questionnaires on this point were as follows:
Estimated Percentage
No. of
No. of
of Indigents
District Judges
County Attorneys
5
2
10
1
20
2
25
1
35
1
50

1

60

11

8

70
75
80

2
7
2

5
14
4

85
90
95

1

1
5
6
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seven county attorneys interviewed felt that the system for determining indigency was too lenient. 8 But these three felt quite
strongly about the matter,87 one going so far as to claim that "half
of the 'so-called indigents' could afford a lawyer because that
many are working." Another prosecutor, from a small county,
complained that since the accused knew that appointed counsel
would probably be from the same law firm as retained counsel, the
attitude was, "might as well let the county pay for it." All three
prosecutors protested that "a claim of indigency is accepted at
face value."
The remaining four county attorneys, as well as the two public
defenders, considered the system for determining indigency to be
"about right." 'ost
of these people just have no money," was a
typical reaction from this group. Several recognized that their

judges were quite lenient 88 but felt that "all doubts should be

resolved in the defendant's favor."89 Two found comfort in the
thought that a defendant facing a felony charge would, as a matter
of self-interest, retain his own lawyer if he could afford it. A third
felt that the system might be "tightened up" by advising the
defendant that he would be better off with retained counsel - a
questionable approach 0
The method of ascertaining indigency does not differ significantly in the seven counties surveyed. The determination is made
either by a magistrate at the first appearance before him or by the
district judge at the arraignment stage, the only difference of any
86. Less than one-third of the prosecutors replying to the mail questionnaire complained that the system for determining indigency was too lenient.
Thirty-six out of 52 felt that it was "about right."
87. One complained that he was very unhappy about what he called the
"promiscuous appointment of counsel."
88. But one prosecutor, with over ten years experience in a rural county,
was confident that he had never seen a case in which counsel was appointed
where the defendant could have paid for counsel himself.
89. Here, as elsewhere, the matter of avoiding a defendant's subsequent
attack on his conviction, on the ground that counsel was denied, played a
significant role in the thinking of those interviewed. See text accompanying note
153 infra.
90. If this advice acted only to prevent false claims of indigency, it would
not seem to be legally objectionable. However, it may well operate to impose
an undue hardship on certain defendants; that is, it may cause some accused
persons, or their relatives or friends, to go into debt, or extend themselves in some
other way, beyond the point at which they would have been legitimately considered as indigents. And this result is even more unfortunate in light of the
fact that, in a number of counties surveyed, the advice would simply not be
true. See text accompanying notes 435-42 infra. Furthermore, such advice
would tend to undermine the confidence of the "true" indigents in their appointed counsel.
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note being that some magistrates do not put the accused under
oath.
All judges question the accused in open court- and that is
about all." In one county, law enforcement authorities and defense
counsel, who may have already consulted with the defendant
without formal appointment, also disclose any 2information they
may have about the accused's financial status
The inquiry in open court concerns the defendant's assets salary, real or personal property, wages due from last employer.
Most judges inquire into the financial resources of parents and
relatives," but two judges made the point that if these persons
were to refuse to retain a lawyer for the defendant, counsel would
be appointed 4 If the accused had sufficient equity in an automobile to cover an attorney's fee for this particular kind of case, he
would probably be forced to sell it- but this is a rare casel
B.

"BoRDERLiNE" INDIGEcY: Tim PRAcTicE AND
SOUM PROPOSALS

What about the person who has some money or property but
not enough to pay the entire fee for retained counsel? All persons
91. One judge, in a rural county, pointed out that since most of the criminal defendants were not residents of the county, no one had very much information about them.
92. One county attorney asserted that he would oppose a claim of indigency if he were convinced the defendant were guilty and had been uncoopera-

tive.
93. Contrast the procedure reported from the District of Columbia. There,
if the defendant requests assigned counsel and swears to an affidavit of poverty,
the court makes no further inquiry into his ability to retain counsel,
The denor is his family or employment situation investigated ....
fendant's ability to retain counsel is not investigated or measured by
any meaningful standard, and there are indications that counsel are
sometimes assigned to represent defendants who could, in fact, afford to
retain and pay counsel.
BAR Ass'N OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON LEGAL Am 109, 110 (1958).
94. It would seem that here, too, there is a certain unfairness in placing
pressures on parents or relatives to retain counsel. The result might well be
that the defendant whose relatives were "callous" would be represented by a
better lawyer than the defendant whose relatives were sympathetic and conscientious. And the better lawyer will be provided at state expense.
95. One judge reported that if it appears that the accused might be able
to raise $300-500, and if it seems that the case might be handled by retained
counsel for this amount, he continues the case for three or four days- "let's
give the private attorneys a crack at it." This judge estimates that in about
half of such cases the defendant retains a lawyer.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
interviewed were asked to comment on this problem. For various
reasons, about two-thirds maintained that the defendant should
not have to pay at all. The comment, "If all he has in the world
is a couple hundred dollars, he should not be stripped of it," was
the sentiment expressed by many. Others felt that the defendant
should be allowed to use this money for investigation-" that obtaining partial reimbursement was just "too cumbersome"; that
the question should turn on whether the defendant's family needed
the money.
Although several people said that for most offenses, if the
defendant had some money, he could obtain representation,OT one
judge stated flatly that no lawyer in his county would take a
felony case without a 500 dollar retainer in hand. A public defender from another county pointed out that the issue is complicated by the fact that many lawyers "deliberately price themselves out of criminal cases."
The remaining one-third was of the view that the defendant
should be required to contribute whatever he could to the county.
One prosecutor, describing most of those persons found indigent
as "not indigent, just insolvent," suggested that they should repay
the county on the installment plan s
The problem of defining indigency is a serious one, not only as
it affects the public treasury but also as it bears on the equal administration of justice. To say that "any extensive investigation
of indigency would cost more than it would be worth"0 9 might well
96. One county attorney, however, was of the opinion that if the defendant
had cash, it should be paid to the county, but that he should not have to liquidate everything else he had.
The matter of funds for investigation raises some nice questions. If the defendant has admitted his guilt and is ready to so plead or if preparation of
the defense requires no special investigation, the argument that the defendant
needs the money for investigation fails. On the other hand, if the defendant
has inadequate funds for necessary investigation or has no funds at all, the
argument that he is entitled, perhaps constitutionally, to financial help is reasonably persuasive. See generally Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Coaunsd
for Indigent CriinalDefendants, 47 Mum. L. Rav. 1054 (1903).
As to whether the defendant should be permitted to use this money for
bail, see text following note 124 infra.
97. One district judge commented that the defendant would be assured
of keeping a retained lawyer once he appeared at arraignment because this
judge would not permit the lawyer to withdraw after that stage. Of course, if
this practice were well known, it would seem unlikely that a fee-conscious attorney would ever accept an arraignment retainer without the assurance that
the defendant could pay for any additional proceedings required.
98. COf.
text following note 105 infra.
99. Note, The Representationof Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HAav. L. Rnv. 579, 586 (1963).
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be accurate and undoubtedly accounts for the willingness to accept the defendant's word at face value. Although this may well
dictate the ultimate resolution of the issue, as it apparently has
done in the counties surveyed, it only addresses itself to the "public treasury" aspect of the problem.
Cost, however, must always be measured by the benefits purchased. Not only would the possible additional public expense of
ferreting out false claims of indigency avoid discrimination in
favor of liars, it might also cause those who oppose affording free
services to indigent criminal defendants to be more receptive to
both the present system and forthcoming proposals for extending
further aid. Moreover, the "public treasury" argument overlooks
the possibility of the significant deterrent force of selective investigation. Here, as elsewhere, a small sampling with adequate publicity might well cause a would-be violator to regard detection as
a substantial risk. 0 0
To reach the broader question: what ought to constitute indigency? "Or, to avoid the deep sands of semantics," as Judge
Prettyman has put it:
under what financial circumstances is a person accused of crime entitled
to legal service at no cost to himself? . .. [S]uppose that, although lie
has no ready cash, he has a good job. Or suppose he has assets such as
a car, a television set or a refrigerator. Suppose he has a good job and

some cash but has a wife and children. Suppose he has no readily convertible asset but has an equity in a home. Suppose he has in his pocket
a hundred dollars but owns not another sou. Suppose he earns plenty
but spends more and so is always in debt ....

Suppose he can make

no present payment but could make a satisfactory installment arrangement ....

Suppose his wife works and really supports the family and

is willing, if need be, to shoulder the burden of his defense ....

101

Should the defendant who owns an automobile worth 500 dollars be forced to render himself penniless if a lawyer might be retained in his case for exactly that amount, while a similarly situated defendant who owns a 400 dollar car obtains perhaps even
better counsel at state expense? It seems evident that such arbitrary results should be avoided.
If workable, a much more desirable technique than the "all or
nothing" approach, would seem to be a case-by-case judgment as
to how much each defendant can reasonably afford for counsel, 10 2
100. Cf. Schwartz, On Current Proposals To Legalize Wire Tapping, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 157, 158 (1954).
LfE

101. Prettyman, Three Modern Problems in Criminal Law, 18 WASl1. &
L. REv. 187, 212 (1961).

102. ".Medical indigency" exists
when a patient is without sufficient funds to pay the expenses incident
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considering such matters as his family obligations and need for
investigation funds.103 "lP]overty must be viewed as a relative
concept."'"° If the defendant is unable to retain counsel of his
choice for this amount, state appointed counsel should be provided and the defendant should be required to reimburse the
county in the amount it is determined he can afford. Such a plan
would appear to substantially reduce the possibility that the borderline indigent, who is forced to retain counsel, receives less adequate representation than the total pauper, who has counsel appointed for him 0 5

C.

RUMBUR5sM

NT TO CouNTY As CONDITION OF

PROBATION

As was noted above, one prosecutor proposed that those persons who are employed pay for counsel "on the installment plan."
This suggestion is carried out, to a limited extent, in four of the
counties studied. The practice of certain judges in some of these
counties and of all judges in others is to require, as a condition of
to his particular illness. By analogy, indigency for legal purposes should
not depend on a fixed standard, such as whether the defendant has been
able to provide bail, but should be determined on the basis of the adequacy of the defendant's resources when measured against the complexity of the issues and the necessity for investigation and expert assistance.
Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants,
47 Mrmx. L. Rzv. 1054,1074 (1963).
103. Legislatively established guides would be extremely valuable here in
attaining the ends of uniformity and equality.
104. ATommy GnEuAzi's Commn=, REPORT ON Povsuvr AND mm AD!fiNmSn
IOw OF FEDERAT CmINAL JusTIcm 7 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
COmmn= ON PoVERiT]. Of.id. at 40-41:
Legislation should define persons eligible for appointment of counsel
and other defense services at government expense as persons 'financially
unable to obtain adequate representation.' The terms 'indigent' or 'indigency'should be avoided.... [Tlhey suggest, not financial inability to
obtain some essential defense service, but a total absence of financial
resources.

105. Professor Trebach has suggested as a test of indigency whether the
accused has "funds sufficient to interest a competent attorney in the community to handle his case." Trebach, A Modern Defender System for New
Jersey, 12 RuTGERs L. IRnv. 289, 325 (1957). Use of this test might result in
either (1) the defendant having a lawyer whom he really does not want, or
(2) the defendant having assigned counsel without charge despite the fact
that he has some money which could be used for this purpose.
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probation, °6 that the convicted indigent repay the county's expenditure for his lawyer. 10 7 The probation officer usually informs
the judge of the amount the defendant should be expected to repay each week. 08 The survey indicates that this condition of probation is rarely, if ever, violated.
Although one judge challenged the statutory authority to place
106. Statistics gathered from the seven counties revealed that a high percentage of all defendants found guilty of felonies and gross misdemeanors
are placed on probation. They are as follows:
County

Percentage

1
2
8*

47
39
66
55
59
42
40
83
38
31

4
5*
6*
7*

1962
1961
1962
1961
1962
1961

*Counties which follow the practice.
A judge in one of these counties stated that he usually follows the probation department reports that, except in the cases of crimes endangering human
life, recommend probation.
The docket study revealed the following:

Sentence

2
1
I**N*** I N

COUNTIES*
Ta
5
4
3
I N I N I N I N

Imprisonment

12

4

84

483 28

Probation

14

4

94

4 4

3

3

14

Combination

Tb

%c
I N

%d

T

6

4 256 19

75

43 23

35

13 18

5 2 45 32

77

3440

36

13

410

6

11

58

Not sentenced
or unknown

1 5 10 6 4 1 6
4 3 25 22 47 19 27 22
*The number of the county conforms to the number in the table immediately
above.
**Indigent
***Nonindigent
' Total number of indigents and nonindigents in each category.
b Combined total of indigents and nonindigents in each category.
c Percent of indigents and nonindigents in each category.
d Combined percentage of indigents and nonindigents in each category.
107. In two of these counties, collection is made in the probation office;
in the other two, in the clerk of court's office. See also text accompanying note
131 infra.
108. The defendant's potential income and family obligations are among
the factors which bear on this determination.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
such a condition on probation,10 9 this system is defensible, if properly administered." 0 In practice, it does not apply to those defendants who are acquitted; this certainly seems to be a rational distinction, especially if the defendant has already been taxed
for the amount that he can reasonably afford. In fact, it seems
anomalous to compel an indigent person to contribute his future
earnings to the county as reimbursement for a defense that has
been sustained.m Furthermore, it does not seem unduly harsh to
require a person found guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment, to repay the county for expenditures in his behalf. For if
the convicted person had been sent to prison, his earning capacity
would have been cut off completely.
This system would be most undesirable if probation were to
depend on whether a person makes reimbursement, irrespective of
109. The provision of MfNu. STAT. § 610.88 (1961) that "the court shall in
each case set forth the reason for the order of probation and may make such
terms and conditions of probation as are deemed suitable ...." seems to vest
the district judges with a rather broad discretion. But cf. State v. McCarthy,
259 T'inn. 24, 104 N.W.2d 673 (1960). See generally Rink, The Application of
Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation,29 U. Cm.L. ]lv. 483,
486-91 (1962); Note, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responibility in AdministeringProbation,71 YA.L.J. 551 (1962).
A bill recently introduced in the California legislature would have specfically granted trial judges this power. 22 CAL. AssEmLy ITERiM Comm.
REr'. 96 (1961). The Public Defender of Los Angeles County stated that the
courts already had such power. Id. at 102. The Assembly Interim Committee
on Criminal Procedure felt "that the adoption of this procedure would be unwise." Id. at 103.
110. Requiring an indigent to pay the cost of his defense after being found
guilty of a crime may be considered as part of the "penalty" for committing
the crime, particularly if such a provision is publicized. If reimbursement is
to be encouraged, perhaps the more desirable approach would be to grant the
county a civil action for its recovery. Of. NATIONAL PnoBA.ioN AND PAnoL
Ass'N, GumEs FOR JuvENE COURT JuDGEs 81 (1957).
111. Compare the system in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark where counsel is provided to all accused persons, irrespective of financial means, in the
first instance; if there is an acquittal, no effort to obtain reimbursement is
made. In Norway, even if the defendant is convicted, no inquiry is made as
to his ability to pay. Commna ON PovnrT 32. Professor Caln has stated
that a
fair-minded society will not only provide and pay independent counsel
to defend all indigent persons who are arrested on serious charges; it will
also pay the necessary and reasonable defense costs of all accused persons, whatever their economic condition, who are eventually found to be
not guilty. As matters now stand in the United States and most other
democratic countries, the state, by recognizing no duty of reimbursement after an acquittal, can compel an innocent man to choose between
unjust conviction and personal bankruptcy.
CAn, Tim PiumicAm=r oF Dmaoci ATIc MA 51-52 (1961).
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his ability to pay. The hardship it would work against those unfortunate, typically unemployable persons seems so unjust as to
arguably raise constitutional objections." 2 There is no reason to
believe that this was the case in the counties surveyed." 8
Apart from the public compensation factor, a deep-seated question bearing on the desirability of this practice is its effect on the
rehabilitation of the probationer. Although the stringent requirements of compulsive repayment might constantly remind him of
his past mistake and thus "make a better man of him," it might
well be that the financial hardship imposed would adversely affect
rehabilitation by, for example, embittering the probationer who
views this use of probation as extortion or threatened imprisonment for debt." 4 Further exploration of this matter, of course, lies
beyond the scope of this Article. Perhaps the ultimate legislative
answer can be formulated most effectively by those who are students of probation.
A final point merits consideration. Several judges who employ
this system disclosed that defendants first learn of it after sentence has been imposed. If only because "failure to give notice"
runs contrary to our general legal principles, this practice should
be abandoned, particularly when the defect may be so easily cured
by simply giving notice before counsel is appointed."n Moreover,
if such notice were given at the outset, it might significantly deter
112. But compare the frequently offered alternative of "$100 or 30 days":
In Illinois, for example, fines must be discharged by imprisonment for
a period of one day for each one dollar and fifty cents of fine and costs.
ILL. R V. STAT. ch. 88 § 391 (1953). A fine of ten thousand dollars requires from a penniless defendant over seventeen years of imprisonment
in a county jail. Petitioners [in Griffin v. Illinois] do not suggest that
this differentiation between solvent and insolvent convicted persons is
invidious within the constitutional concepts of 'equal protection' or 'due
process of law.'
Brief for Respondent, p. 7, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
113. One district judge stated that probation has never been revoked for
the sole reason of failure to meet the periodic payments.
Cf. United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1963), indicating that it
may be an abuse of discretion to revoke probation for failure to satisfy the condition that substantial fines be paid within a specified period, if the probationer
made a bona fide effort to do so, but failed simply because he was too poor.
114. It has been reported that, in Michigan, the use of this system in all
cases has produced the result "that the rehabilitative aspects of their probation
program have badly deteriorated, with the probation officers becoming mere
collection agents." 22 CAL. ASSEMBLY INrmuI CoVnm. REP. 103 (1961).
115. The explanation of one judge for lack of advance notice was that the
relevant financial information is not known until the presentence report is
compiled. This fact would not seem to preclude a judge from giving general
advance notice before appointment of counsel.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
those who might otherwise falsely claim indigency. A substantial
number of them might retain counsel, reasoning that if installment payments might have to be made, they might as well be
made to counsel of their own choice.
What of those defendants, if any, who would rather waive
counsel than be forced to pay for it later? To permit an "intelligent" waiver by those who are equipped to make one might be
theoretically justifiable. As a practical matter, however, most indigent defendants may not be in a position to assess adequately
the consequences of waiver." 6 For these, counsel should be provided. Although there is, of course, an element of unfairness in forcing
a man to pay for something he does not want, compelled financial
support of one's legal defense is surely no more objectionable than
"compelled financial support of group activities""17 to which the
member is indifferent or even opposed.

D.

FmNDiNG Op NOnINDiGENCY

As indicated above, rejected claims of indigency and discoveries of defendants' ineligibility after counsel was appointed were
extremely rare events everywhere." s When either of these incidents does occur, the defendant is usually advised or, more accurately, "told" by the judge" 9 to retain his own lawyer. In one
county, evidently, counsel is appointed anyway and if the defendant is found guilty and placed on probation, collection is made
in the manner described above 0 - an illustration of how the
116. "[T]he ordinary indigent defendant is incompetent intelligently to
waive the assistance of counsel. He needs the assistance of counsel to enable

him to know how great is his need of counsel." Potts, Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases: Legal Aid or Public Defender, 28 TEXAs L. lRv. 491, 500
(1950).

117. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 828 (1961) (integrated bar case
referring to Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson, 851 U.S. 225 (1956)
(union shop case)).
118. Two counties reported that there was no experience at all with such
situations.
119. In those counties in which the county attorney or clerk of court
may informally appoint counsel prior to arraignment, see text accompanying
notes 159-60 infra, these officials may advise a nonindigent person that he

must retain his own lawyer. Although this "nonjudicial determination of indigency" is subject to review by the district judge if the defendant refuses to
comply (and thus appears without counsel), this practice should be discouraged
if it causes some "obedient" defendants to retain their own lawyers when they

in fact qualify as indigents.
120. This appears to be an inequitable program since it quite clearly dis-

criminates against the "honest" defendant who provides his own counsel and
is then acquitted.
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"payment as a condition of probation" system breeds laxity in
the determination of indigency.
In the two counties utilizing the public defender system, it is
understood that if the defender discovers that his client is financially able to retain counsel, he is to so advise the client and then
have his appointment revoked.12 ' The defendant then obtains a
lawyer for himself.2 2 There is no reason to believe that this "nonjudicial determination of indigency" is abused. It should be discouraged, however, because the salaried defender's self-interest in
fewer clients clashes, in theory, with the public's interest in effective representation for the indigent accused. 28
28

E.

RELATIONSHIP OF RAISING BAIL TO INDIGENCY

An easily administered device for deterring false claims of indigency is to withhold the assignment of counsel to all persons
who raise bail.2 4 Three of the counties surveyed adhere to this
121. One public defender commented that this happens about 10 times a
year. The other reported that in one such case the "indigent" defendant retained private counsel for $5000.
122. In one of the counties, there is in the jail a list of private lawyers
whom the defendant may call and retain.
123. See also note 119 supra.
124. In all counties surveyed, bail is set by the magistrate at the first appearance. District judges have authority to alter the amount of bail. In six of
the counties, the recommendation of the county attorney carries great weight,
particularly when the defendant is unrepresented, although in one of the larger
counties some magistrates set it independently. In the seventh, the prosecutor
conceded that the municipal judge, a man of 28 years experience, ignorcs his
recommendation.
Only one county attorney has a prepared bail schedule for all offenses. The
minimum recommendation for felonies of other prosecutors varied from $1000
to $2500. One stated that bail of less than $500 is rarely set (in low bail cases,
the defendant ordinarily is unable to meet it anyway, ef. Foote, Foreword:
Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. Rnv. 685, 690 (1958)) and
that $5000 bail is usually asked in felony cases involving physical violence. Another reported that a minimum $5000 is asked if the defendant has prior convictions. One prosecutor remarked that he usually recommends an amount
just above what he feels the defendant is able to pay -except when he knows
that the district judge will not be in the county for some time and that inability to meet bail will therefore result in the defendant's staying in jail for
a prolonged period of time.
Among the additional factors reported as being important in determining
the amount of bail were whether the accused was a resident of the county and
what the likelihood was of repetition of the offense.
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rule quite rigidly. 2 5 Since few defendants who claim indigency are
able to meet the bail set, however, the issue does not arise often.ro
Both the judge and prosecutor in one of these counties stated
unequivocally that irrespective of how the bond is raised, no defendant who is out on bail is provided counsel at state expense.'- T
125. The docket study produced the following statistics:
Number of
Indigents
TotalNumber
Released
TotalNumber
County
of Indigents
Pre-Trial
of Nonindigents
1*
48
5
82
2*
80
3
16
8
28
10
18
4
13
3
7
8
2
5
12
*Counties which adhere to the rule.

Number of
Nonindigents
Released
Pre-Trial
18
8
11
5
a

CouWins
Amount of Bail on Which
Indigent Was Released
Personal recognizance or
less than $250
$250-1000
81000-2000
$2000 -3000
$5000-10,000
Unknown

1

2

3

2

2

2
1

1

5
1
1
1
1
1

4

5
1

1
2

1

It is interesting to note that of all those indigents released, only about
10% were released prior to arraignment in district court. (About half of the
nonindigents bailed were released prior to arraignment.) One public defender
truthfully tells his clients that they will not be released on bail if they avail
themselves of his services and that retained lawyers can probably get the
original bail reduced. He reported that this provides an incentive to a number of defendants to retain their own lawyers.
In some of the remaining four counties, the rule might be employed with
greater frequency were it not for its administrative inconvenience. Here,
counsel is often -appointed prior to the time defendant is released on bail.
Several judges commented that it was then "too late" to do anything about
the problem.
126. Both public defenders estimated the percentage of all felony defendants unable to make bail to be the same as the percentage of all felony defendants who are indigent.
127. This, of course, does not apply to persons released on their own recognizance. In this county, in 1962, 28% of those persons arrested on a felony
charge were released on bail. Half of these were on personal recognizancea seemingly high percentage. One-third of those released deposited cash bond,
while the remainder were released on a surety bond signed by a professional
bondsman.
In one of the other three counties in which this data was available, less
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In the other two counties, an estimated three percent of those defendants out on bail are furnished counsel. There are at least two
reasons for this: (1) In one county, some judges do not enforce
the rule strictly. This lack of uniformity, particularly within the
same county, seems eminently unfair. It is accentuated by the fact
that some magistrates in this county enforce the rule so rigidly
that if it appears that the defendant will request the appointment
of counsel, the matter of bail is not mentioned; others deliberately
set it beyond his reach to avoid the problem. 8 (2) Defendants
who have been out on bail appear at the arraignment and, for the
first time, state that they are unable to afford counsel. In most
cases, the judge feels compelled to appoint counsel and protect
the record. Thus, the "cunning" defendant enjoys liberty as well
as free counsel while the "unknowing" defendant remains in jail.12
The practice in the other counties regarding the relationship
between bail and the appointment of counsel is varied. In two, the
fact that the defendant is out on bail is a minor factor - "since
bail is usually provided by personal surety of friends and neighbors,
the defendant is still indigent."'8 0 One judge insisted, however,
that if relatives were willing to post bail, they should also retain
counsel and that if they can do only one or the other, they should
do the latter.
In another county, the fact that the defendant is out on bail is
of considerable importance in determining whether he is indigent.
If an "indigent" has posted cash bail and is later convicted and
than 25% of those released were on personal recognizance; about 40% were
released by the surety of a professional bondsman, about 20% on cash deposit,
and about 10% on a surety bond signed by a relative or friend. In the remaining two counties, all persons except one were released on sureties by professional bondsmen.
128. In the other county, it was reported that the bondsmen would not
post bail for any person who is represented by appointed counsel because such
persons are considered poor risks. Thus, the bondsmen provides as effective a
check on false claims of indigency here as do the judges.
A similar situation prompted the following recommendation in the CoMIEimE oN Povimer 67:
Given the crucial role of the bail bondsman . . .it is clear that he is
engaged in a business "affected by a public interest." . . . [T]he government is under clear obligation to insure that his practices are consistent with the important objectives of public policy in the area of pretrial release.
129. In a few cases, the amount of cash required to be posted for bail is
considerably less than the amount of money that would be required to obtain
representation. In these cases, counsel is provided at state expense.
130. If defendant himself provides cash bail in these counties, he will probably be ineligible for appointed counsel, unless the bail premium is much less
than the amount necessary to retain counsel.
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placed on probation, some of the bail money is remitted to the
county regardless of its source.' 3 ' In the final county surveyed, because the judges fear reversal if counsel is not appointed, counsel
is always furnished to those who claim indigency, regardless of
the bail factor and the source of the premium. This county also
of conditioning probation on reimbursement
follows the practice
32
of counsel fees.
Obviously, a person who has raised bail is less likely to be indigent than one who has not. It hardly follows, however, that all
persons out on bail are nonindigent. Friends or relatives or employers who may have furnished the bail premium may be unwilling or unable to pay for a lawyer. Or the defendant's own funds
for a low bail premium may be inadequate to retain counsel. In
such cases, an inflexible rule seems most inequitable.i
This injustice emerges more graphically when one considers the
long period of time - as long as seven or eight months in some
counties -that may and does pass between arrest and plea or
trial' 3 More than one person interviewed acknowledged the
strong incentive this provides for "jail case" defendants to plead
guilty. 35 The fairer solution would seem to be to enlarge the scope
of the indigency inquiry to include these factors.
The defendant who can either raise bail or retain counsel but
131. Compare this practice with that discussed in text accompanying notes
106-17 supra.
132. This is the same county discussed at note 120 supra.
133. See Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment:
A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cr. L. Rhv.
1, 64 n.353 (1962) and authorities cited therein.
134. This would be true if the court is not in session or the criminal term
of the particular session is over. In only one county surveyed was there a continuous criminal term. While we were told, in one county, that many defendants in this situation are released on bail or personal recognizance, some are
not. See also note 180 infra.
The time that elapses between arraignment and trial varies considerably
from county to county. When the court is sitting, delays may be occasioned
by the defendant's requests and by the number of preliminary motions iled.
One prosecutor pointed out that a defendant who has decided to plead guilty
will stand in much better stead if he makes restitution before he pleads.
One county reported that the trial is usually held less than a week after
arraignment; another, 8-14 days; another, 7-60 days; another, 2-3 weeks; another, 2 weeks to 4 months (but sometimes as quickly as 2 days if the session
is about to end); another, 2-4 weeks (for "jail cases," which are given priority). In only one county is there a greater delay for a jury trial than for a
nonjury trial. There, the court will hear nonjury cases all summer.
135. This incentive is especially acute when the defendant knows that he
is likely to be placed on probation or that his sentence will be less than the
time he will have to spend in jail awaiting arraignment or trial.
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not both arguably "should not be made to choose between freedom
pending trial and representation by counsel during the trial."1 10 In
several of the Minnesota counties surveyed, however, the latter
choice is made for him, a practice that "seems clearly unwise.' ' 7
Existing bail practice assumes the fourteenth amendment does
not require that one unable to raise bail be freed pending trial. 88
Otherwise, the rationale is, there would be little "to insure the defendant's appearance and submission to the judgment of the
court."'8 9 But this interest of the state is satisfied if the defendant
posts bond. To release the defendant and then provide counsel for
those few who have exhausted their funds for bail would not appear to involve much cost to the state. 140
Even if it did, the wrong done by denying release to a presumptively innocent defendant is of such magnitude that, on balance, pre-trial release would seem to be warranted. The effects of
detention are not limited to the denial of freedom alone. If a not
guilty verdict is returned, the defendant will have been incarcerated unjustly.' 4 ' In addition,
pre-trial detention almost invariably results in termination of income,
and often in loss of employment, at a time when unusual and urgent
demands on the resources of the accused are being made. The consequences are that the defendant is deprived of funds that might contribute to the costs of defense and is rendered incapable of providing
support for his family.... Pre-trial detention ... often impedes the
lawyer's contacts with his client. Detention facilities are frequently
located at places remote from the attorney's office .... Moreover, the
facilities available for interviewing in many jails are not conducive to
42
effective consultation'

136. Note, 107 U.

PA. L. REV. 812, 833 (1959).
137. Note, 76 HAnv. L. REV. 579, 587 (1963).
138. Cf. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1960) (memorandum decision).
139. Reynolds v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 30, 32 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1959).
140. It would seem to be a fairly uncommon situation where the accused
has just enough money to raise bail and no more. Moreover, it has been
pointed out that the denial of bail to an accused who is employed may result
in a greater expense for the county-for example, relief payments for the
accused's family- than the cost of assigning counsel. 22 CAL. Assumniy I,TEREM Comvr. REP. 101 (1961).
141. Of. McKay, Poverty and the Administration of Justice, 35 U. CoLO.
L. REV. 323, 327 (1963): "[I]n the first group of 111 [most of whom would have
remained in jail under ordinary procedures prior to a resolution of their cases]
disposed of by the courts after recommendation for bail by the Vera study
group, 66 were either acquitted or dismissed; 33 received suspended sentences;
7 received fines; and only 5 went to jail."
142. Coa nn=
ON POVERTY 70-71.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Furthermore, "the defendant enters court in the company of a
guard, a fact not lost on jurors. If convicted, he is unable to point
to employment and good conduct while on bail as grounds for
probation.'

1 43

Indeed, since pre-trial detention works an even greater hardship on the completely indigent defendant, 44 one who can neither
make bail nor retain a lawyer - and there appears to be "no evidence of any consistent correlation between financial incapacity
and the risk of nonappearance"' 4 5 -the recommendation that a
46
more liberal use be made of releases on personal recognizance1
merits serious consideration by both the state legislature and judiciary.

H.

WHEN DOES THE RIGHT TO ASSIGNED

COUNSEL "BEGIN"?
One of the major constitutional issues in the right to counsel
area, if not the most important one, remaining as unilluminated
after the Supreme Court's recent decisions as before, is the question of "when the right to counsel begins." That is, at what stage
in the proceedings between arrest 47 and trial must the state provide an indigent person with a lawyer. Here, the great controversy -how soon after a man is taken into custody must he be
advised of his right to counsel or, put another way, how much
"leeway" police interrogators should be allowed - far transcends
the right to counsel problem. It may well be the most pervasive
question in the field of constitutional-criminal procedure today,
both at the constitutional and normative levels. Heated resistance

1143. "Ares &Sturz, Bail and the IndigentAccused, 8 Camm &DLwQumncr
12, 15 (1962).
144. The defendant who has a small amount of money, and who chooses
to forego bail in order to have counsel appointed for him, may use that money
to finance a pre-trial investigation of his case. But, if the accused has no funds

whatever, he must conduct the full investigation himself- an impossible task
if he is incarcerated. See Comfrndm oN PovERT 71.
145. Commmrrrr ON PoVERTY 77-78. One prosecutor reported that the bail
schedule in his county had been recently cut in half and that there were no
adverse effects. See generally Ares, Ranldn & Sturz, The Manhaten Bail
Project:An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-TrialParole, 38 N.Y.U. L. RIv.
67 (1963).

146. See Commm= oi PoVERT 74-76. For a general discussion of the
amount of hail that should be required, see Sullivan, Proposed Rule 46 and the
Right to Bail, 31 Guo. WAsn. L. REy. 919 (1963).
147. Although it has been suggested to us that perhaps counsel ought to
be-provided even before an arrest has been made, this possibility appears too
far removed from current practices and present judicial and legislative thinking to merit serious consideration.
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rule"'148 and widespread persistence in
to the "McNabb-Mallory149
"arrests for investigation"' both subsume this matter. It also has
played an inextricable role in the coerced confession field ° and
suggests an independent solution to many of the problems in that
area.

1 51

The seven-county survey disclosed wholehearted approval of
the availability of counsel at the stage of arraignment in district
court. Significant differences in practice and attitude appeared
with increasing frequency, however, as the inquiry was directed
back in time toward the point of arrest.
Before proceeding to the center of the dispute - whether counsel should be provided immediately or soon after arrest - it is
appropriate to examine the current practice at those pre-trial
stages where the availability of counsel generates little or no controversy.
A.

ARRAIGNMENT IN DISTRICT COURT

In every county studied, the district judges were painstakingly
careful in providing counsel before accepting a plea,"8 2 although
fear of reversal on appeal or of later collateral attack, rather than
148. This rule, fashioned by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its general supervisory power over the administration of justice in the federal courts,
derives its name from the cases of McNabb v. United States, 818 U.S. 832
(1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). It provides that,
in federal prosecutions, all confessions or admissions are inadmissible if elicited
during a period of time when a suspect is being unreasonably detained, instead
of being brought before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay," FED. R.
CaRM. P. 5(a), so that he may be advised of his right to counsel and his right
to remain silent.
For sharp criticism of the rule, see, e.g., Inbau, More About Public Safety
v. Individual Liberties, 53 J. CnIn. L., C. & P.S. 329 (1962).
149. See note 203 infra and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 US. 568, 630-33 (1901) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (opinion of
Jackson, J.).
151. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324, 826 (1959) (concurring
opinions); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427
(1962); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70
(1961); People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21
(1960). See also Fortas, The Consequences of Gideon, 22 LEGAL Am BInEF CASE
7, 8-9 (1963) (Mr. Fortas was counsel for petitioner in Gideon).
152. In Minnesota, only district judges may take pleas in felony and gross
misdemeanor cases. In all seven counties surveyed, the procedure at arraignment is essentially the same. The defendant appears and is informed of the
charge against him. Unless waived, the indictment or information is read. All
counties use informations almost exclusively. Grand jury indictments are
mandatory for offenses which carry a sentence of life imprisonment, the most
severe penalty under state law. Occasionally, indictments are employed when
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concern for the rights of the accused, as such, not infrequently
seemed to be the dominant motivation 5 3 This scrupulousness is
sometimes carried to the point of simply not permitting a defendant to waive the assistance of counsel at arraignment. 5 4 One district judge acknowledged that some defendants appearing before
him admit their guilt and implore: "I don't want any lawyer or
any delays. I want the clock to start running right now." This
judge "talks the defendant into availing himself" of counsel. On
the other hand, another judge in the same county reported that in
his five years on the bench he had never witnessed an attempted
waiver; but if the situation were to arise, he would permit it if "inthe county attorney wishes to shift responsibility for the decision of bringing
an accused to trial; for example, in sex offenses when the county attorney has
some doubt about the complainant's credibility, in criminal negligence cases,
and, because of political implications, in cases involving the embezzlement of
funds by a public official. The reports from several rural counties indicated
that the convening of a grand jury is an extremely unusual event.
If the defendant pleads not guilty, it is assumed that he wishes a jury trial
unless he requests otherwise. He is not even asked if he wants to waive, although this matter is often settled informally between defendant's counsel and
the county attorney prior to the plea. In one county, if the defendant wishes
to waive, he is required to do so in writing.
153. The comment of one judge was rather colorful, but representative of
the prevailing attitude: "Generally, we appoint a lawyer to protect the record.
We are simply furnishing the defendant a pallbearer." Several persons interviewed expressed the view that most of the defendants who attempt to waive
do so to lay a foundation for a later attack on the conviction. For the expression of a similar feeling in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, see Kamisar, The Right
to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment. A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Bight" of an Accused, 80 U. C . L. R v. 1, 72 (1962) (App. 1).
An empirical basis for this attitude exists in some counties. In one, a
recent guilty plea was vacated on state habeas corpus on the ground that the
trial judge's explanation to the defendant of the need for counsel was inadequate. A new arraignment was held, counsel was appointed, and defendant
again pleaded guilty. In another, the judge explained that he had received
many habeas corpus petitions from the prison in his district which revealed
an incomplete trial record "as to whether the defendant's rights were observed." Thus, in order not "to leave any doors open," when a defendant has
sought to waive counsel before this judge, he asks, "If the court appoints
counsel, will you confer with him?" No one has ever refused.
One judge, however, felt that counsel was essential when a plea is made
because unrepresented defendants sometimes believe that they are guilty of
an offense when they are really not.
154. One prosecutor made the point that the judges in his county "bend
over backwards" so far for indigent defendants as to "almost urge them to
plead not guilty." It should be noted that the degree to which waivers are
permitted sometimes varies among judges in a single county, as well as from
county to county.
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telligently" made - "you can't force a lawyer on him. '
A tactic employed by some courts to cope with the waiver
problem is simply to appoint a lawyer who sits at counsel's table
and is available for consultation with the defendant. Most defendants placed in this position have conferred with counsel; some
have not. Those judges who will permit a defendant to waive assure themselves that the "waiver is intelligent" and take arduous
steps to insure that "a good record is made."
In all seven counties, the attempted waiver is the exceptional
case. Although one prosecutor estimated that almost 10 percent
of the accused attempted to decline counsel - especially if they
expected to be granted probation - this figure was atypical. Most
estimates ran under three percent," 6 and even this minute figure
155. Some other typical comments: "We don't let an indigent waive. He
has nothing to say about it." "I tell the defendant that he must have a lawyer." "I would insist on the appointment of counsel."
Although the Supreme Court has suggested that a trial court may not
force counsel upon a criminal defendant who wants to represent himself, see,
e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 855 U.S. 155, 161 (1957); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S.
173, 174-75 (1946); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 272
(1942), the Court has never held that due process would be violated by appointing counsel contrary to the wishes of the defendant. See also Anderson
v. Kentucky, 288 F.2d 383, 335 (6th Cir. 1961). Compare United States v.
Private Brands, Inc., 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
957 (1958). And, although a number of states have constitutional or statutory
provisions stipulating that an accused who is sui juris and mentally competent
has a right to conduct his own defense, see Annot., 77 AL.R.2d 1233 (1901),
there appears to be no case in which a conviction has been reversed for this
reason alone. Cf. State v. Thomlinson, 100 N.W.2d 121 (S.D. 1960) (alternative holding).
The argument that a criminal defendant may, in certain circumstances,
be so prejudiced by being barred from conducting his own trial that due
process has been violated is not wholly unpersuasive. See United States v.
SMitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1012 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J., dissenting) (the right
of an accused not to be represented by a lawyer he does not want approaches
an "absolute"). Perhaps only the accused fully understands the factual complexities of the issues; perhaps only the self-representing accused may best
invoke jury sympathy. See Brief for Alabama as Amicus Curiae, pp. 9-10,
L. REV. 579, 585
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Note, 76 HIvA.
(1968). The argument is probably strongest when the lawyer sought to be
appointed is "inexperienced and incompetent." See Macfenna v. Ellis, 263
F.2d 35, 41 (5th Cir. 1959). Yet it is difficult to see how an accused who
wishes to plead guilty and does so is in any way prejudiced by the court's
insistence that the accused first confer with appointed counsel.
156. No indigent defendant included in the docket study went unrepresented. The results of the mail questionnaire on this point were as follows:
Estimated Percentage of
Indigents Waiving

No. of
District Judges

No. of
County Attorneys

0
5
10
20

11
2

47
4
3

2
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is greatly fractionalized when the judge fully explains the impor5 7 On the basis of
tant role a defense lawyer may play.Y
these findings, any appellate court would seem justified in begrudgingly
treating a state's claim that counsel has been intelligently
waived. 5 s
Uniformity was also manifested in affording appointed counsel
ample time to confer with their clients prior to a plea. In one county where counsel is not generally provided until after the indigent
is brought into district court for arraignment, most judges immediately appoint counsel at this point and then grant a one-week
continuance of the arraignment. The other judges automatically
enter a not guilty plea for the defendant, then appoint counsel and
continue the case. In several of the other counties, the practice is
to furnish counsel at some pre-arraignment stage. In the exceptional case when this is not done, the arraignment is continued for
several days.
The extraordinary judicial caution exercised in this matter is
carried to an extreme by the practice in one of the remaining counties. Under state law,'5 9 only district judges may formally appoint
counsel. A problem arises when - as is often the case in the geographically large but sparsely populated judicial districts - the
judge is not sitting in the county. In this county, as in two other
rural counties studied, the meeting of attorney and client is expedited by an "informal" appointment of counsel, either by the
county attorney or clerk of court one or more days before arraignmentV
' 60 Nevertheless, when the already represented defendant
157. Compare the much -higher percentage of waivers reported from some
federal district courts. Comm n oN PovERTY 16; Note, 76 HAnv. L. REv.
579, 584 (1963).

A recent Wisconsin survey revealed that "the judges' estimates on the
percentage of eligible, indigent defendants who waived their right to have
counsel appointed varied from five percent up to one hundred percent, with
the bulk of the estimates spread rather evenly upward from fifty to ninety
or ninety-five percent." Wmters, Preliminary Report on Counsel for the Indigent Accused in Wisconsin 38 (1963) (unpublished preliminary report in Minnesota Law School Library).
158. See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, S55 U.S. 155, 161 (1957): "Where the
right to counsel is-of such critical importance as to be an element of Due
Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, a finding .of waiver is not lightly
to be made." Cf. Judd v. United States, 190 F-2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(discussion of "waiver" or "consent" in search and seizure cases).
159. M m. STAT. § 611.07 (1961).
160. This might be done either before or after the county attorney has
filed the information. In one of these counties, the infomnation is first filed at
the arraignment; in another, .less than three days before arraignment; in the
last, from four to seven days before arraignment. In the remaining four coun-
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appears at arraignment, the district judge, after "formally" appointing counsel, grants a recess and, before accepting a plea, insists that the defendant consult further with his lawyer. 1' 1
B.

FIRST APPEARANCE BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE

Moving back a step in time, the pre-arraignment stage at which
counsel is provided varies substantially among counties. Although
it was reported that at the first appearance before them, municipal
judges and justices of the peace'0 2 always advise felony defendants
of their right to free counsel, the symmetry ends there. Counsel
is regularly appointed at the first appearance stage in only two of
the counties, 163 and in a third, he often is. In the remaining four,
ties, the information is either filed at the arraignment or within three days
before it.
161. This practice caused one county attorney to say that "the courts are
absolutely frightened on this counsel matter. If a man is accused of chicken
theft and comes into court with the sack of chickens on his back, the judge
will not accept a guilty plea without appointing counsel and ordering a recess,
even though counsel has consulted with the defendant earlier."
162. All proceedings prior to arraignment are conducted before either
municipal judges, who preside in urban centers, or justices of the peace, who
are situated in the rural sectors of the counties. All municipal judges in the
counties surveyed were attorneys while most of the justices of the peace were
laymen. With the exception of one county, almost all first appearances in
felony and gross misdemeanor cases were held before the municipal judges. In
the excepted county, the justice courts handle most of this work because the
municipal judge prefers not to. Several county attorneys reported that, as a
practical matter, they conduct the proceedings held before justices of the
peace.

163. This is usually done pursuant to Mn.
provides that

STAT. § 611.07 (1961), which

when a defendant . . . shall request the magistrate to have counsel
appointed to assist in his defense . . . the county attorney shall im-

mediately certify to the judge of the district court of the county
wherein the preliminary examination is had that the defendant is
without counsel and that he has sworn, under oath, that he is financially unable to procure counsel. The district court shall then appoint
counsel ....

In at least one county, the district court has signed a blanket order permitting the municipal court to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This
county has a public defender system and a public defender is present in court
when first appearances are conducted.
In the two counties which regularly appoint counsel at the first appearance stage, counsel does not appear for the defendant until the "second appearance" before the magistrate, there having been a postponement of all
proceedings until counsel has conferred with his client.
Compare the situation existing in the federal courts where indigent defendants rarely have counsel provided prior to the arraignment in district
court. Note, 76 HAlv. L. Rav. 579, 591 (1963). For persuasive criticism of
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appointed counsel rarely appears until after the indigent has been
bound over to district court.0 4
Evidently, the basis for the diversity stems from the different
attitudes and emphases of the judicial officers conducting first appearances. 65 This buttresses the theory 60 that indigent defendants are unlikely to waive appointment of counsel if all the facts
are squarely presented to them. The important inquiry is whether
this dissimilarity in practice significantly affects the indigent defendants' rights.
When a preliminary hearing'T-the major pre-arraignment
proceeding -is held for an indigent defendant, counsel is almost
always appointed in every county.0 18 With the exception of one
county, however, they are held only infrequently 0 9 The fact that
this practice, see BAR Ass'N or = DmiucT OF COLUarIA, REPORT OF TIM
Ai 90-93 (1958); Cozn=nF. ON PovERTr 24-25.
164. Three of these follow the "informal" appointment of counsel praetice. See text accompanying note 160 supra. In the fourth county, counsel is
almost always first appointed at the arraignment in district court.
165. In one of the two counties where counsel is regularly appointed by
the municipal court, the county attorney remarked that the magistrate urges
the defendant to accept counsel and, if the defendant persists in declining,
"he is given a few days to think it over."
166. See text accompanying notes 157-58 supra.
167. The proceedings at preliminary hearings are basically the same in
all seven counties. The magistrate effectively conducts a full-fledged trial, a
practice that drew sharp criticism from one county attorney. Witnesses for
both sides testify and are cross-examined. A court reporter usually makes a
record of the proceedings, although in four of the counties this must be requested. The record is provided to indigent persons without cost.
The county attorney may reduce the charge to a lesser offense, but one
county attorney stated that he never did this because he "never charges too
high." The magistrate may alter the amount of ball but may not accept a plea
unless the charge is reduced to a misdemeanor. See note 152 supra.
168. Appointed counsel is always given adequate time to prepare for the
CoaMmIssIoN ON LrEAI

prelminary hearing.

169. The docket study showed the following:
:a
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most prosecutors employ an "open-file policy" -negativing defense counsel's need to use a preliminary hearing as a discovery
device - may account for this.17 0 But the "open-fie policy" does
not explain why indigent defendants are granted preliminary hearings more often in those counties where counsel is most frequently
appointed in the municipal court.
The inference seems fair that if counsel is provided prior to the
preliminary hearing, more will be held. This observation is supported by the fact that in the five counties that hold preliminary
hearings least regularly, indigent defendants are usually permitted
to waive them before counsel is appointed. In fact, one municipal
judge does not even offer the preliminary hearing to indigent defendants.171 Furthermore, those interviewed in these five counties
One smaller county reported 26 felony arrests in 1961-62 and no preliminary hearings. Another reported 55 felony arrests in 19062 and one preliminary
hearing. Other estimates ranged from "rarely held," to "ten percent of the
time," to "about thirty percent of all cases."
The excepted county reported 60 felony arrests in 1962 and 34 preliminary
hearings. (This is county number 1 in the above table which shows a much
smaller percentage -20%.) This was one of the two counties in which counsel
was regularly appointed in the municipal court. The other county with this
practice reported the next highest frequency - "about thirty percent." (This
is county number 4 in the above table which shows a much smaller percentage- 9%.)
Preliminary hearings are never held for crimes punishable by life imprisonment because these require grand jury indictment. One county attorney
reported that preliminary hearings are held with particular frequency for sex
offenses because counsel wish to pre-test the demeanor of witnesses.
170. Three of the prosecutors interviewed stated categorically that they
revealed their entire files, including the weak points, to counsel of unquestioned integrity and that this included most defense lawyers. A representative comment was, "We're not playing any games here. This is all going to
come out in open court." An attempt was made to confirm this with defense
counsel in two of the counties. One agreed generally with the county attorney's description, but stated that the county attorney holds back some in
cases that are going to trial; the other said that the county attorney "objected
to any use of the material in his files."
One county attorney conceded that, on occasion, he will withhold a "surprise" if he feels the case demands it. The other three stated that, generally,
they disclose no more than they have to -they might withhold an unfavorable autopsy or psychiatric report- but would reveal their strength to a
reputable lawyer if they believed it might induce a plea of guilty. Of.Louisell,
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CMIF. L. Ruv. 6, 5 &
n.6 (1961). One said that he has carried this so far as to almost lose a case on
preliminary hearing because he "held back." All of these agreed that they
would make no disclosures to "untrustworthy lawyers."
171. This judge only grants a preliminary hearing if the defendant "is
really screaming about a case of mistaken identity." Yet this county, number
3 in the table in note 169 supra, shows that a much greater proportion of indigents receive preliminary hearings than do nonindigents.
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all recognized that, although persons with retained counsel do not
often request preliminary hearings, they do so more frequently
than do paupers. 72 This is less true 1in3 one of the other two counties and not true at all in the second. 7
The fact that a waiver of preliminary hearing is not irrevocable
several judges remarked that they have remanded cases to
the municipal court prior to accepting a plea - does not seem to
have affected this finding. Apparently, appointed defense counsel
are less inclined to hold preliminary hearings after the accused has
left municipal court than when they are appointed before the
magistrate. Moreover, even in those few cases remanded for preliminary hearing, it cannot be said that the defendant has "been
made whole." Not only may the passage of time have hampered
his factual investigation but if the defendant is released after the
preliminary hearing, 74 he will have been incarcerated for some
time, unless he was out on bail -an uncommon status for indigent persons 75

C.

E

Y oR SooN ATm ARREST

The P'actice
In no county surveyed is counsel provided for the indigent
prior to the 'first appearance." Yet it has been urged that "the
time a defendant needs counsel most is immediately after his arrest," and that "representation must be provided early if it is to
be effective." 76 In theory, the Minnesota practice should accord
1.

172. Three of these five counties were included in the docket study (numbers,2, 3, and 5 in the table in note-169 supra). Only in number 2, is the above
statement dearly borne out by the sampling.
173. Again, the docket study in these counties (numbers 1 and 4 in the
table in note 169 supra) does not fully confirn this statement.
174. "Of 246 preliminary hearings assigned to [District of Columbia Legal
Aid Agency] staff attorneys in 1961-62, thirty were discharged by the commissioner." Murray, Defender System in the District of Columbia, 21 Trm LEGAL AD BIEF CA-s, 64 (1962).
175. See text accompanying notes 124-32 supra. Furthermore, the "pres-

ence of counsel [early in the proceedings] may importantly affect the levels at
which bail is set." Co
rrr ON PovERTy 24.
176. Ass'N or THE BAi& or THE Cry OF NEw Yor, EQuAL Jusrica Yon
TE AccusED 60 (1959). See also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448

(1958) (Douglas, J, dissenting); MODEL Dr'imER AcT § 2(b) (1959); Weisberg,
Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in PoLICE POWER
I rmD.nuAL Fnsunom 177 (Sowle ed. 1962); Allison, He Needs a Lawyer
Now, 42 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 113 (1958); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Inter-

rogation:The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BnooKLI-K L.
REv. 24, 60 (1960). Of. Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the FederalDistrict Courts, 76 HARv. L. Ruv. 579, 592 (1963): "About
half [of the United States District Judges and United States Attorneys]
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with these exhortations since, by statute, arresting officers are required to bring the accused before a magistrate "forthwith." '
If this provision were complied with, the indigent defendant
would at least be informed of his right to counsel shortly after being taken formally into custody. And, depending on the interpretation of "forthwith,""' compliance might require informing the
defendant of this right almost immediately after arrest.
The practice does not conform to the theory. 179 The amount
of time that elapses between the formal charge and booking of a
person by the arresting authorities and the accused's first appearance before a magistrate varies, in the counties surveyed, from
less than 12 hours to over three days.'8 0° Moreover, there is an even
wider gap between theory and practice than the data appearing
in the records indicates; in nearly every county, the individuals
surveyed generally admitted that a person taken into custody is
not "officially" arrested "until the authorities have enough on
responding [to a questionnaire on the representation of indigent criminal
defendants in federal district courts] indicated merely that representation
should be afforded as soon as possible."
177. MIN. STAT. § 629.42 (1961).
178. Because Minnesota has no rule similar to the "McNabb-Mallory rule,"
see note 185 infra, there has been little opportunity for an authoritative judicial definition.
179. Cf. Note, 107 U. PA.L. REv. 812, 821 (1959), which makes the same

observation about the system in New Jersey.
180. Two of the counties reported "12 hours or less and, in any event, not
later than the next day"; two more, "within 24 hours or over the weekend";
two, "25 to 48 hours"; one, "49 to 72 hours."
Nor, as has been indicated, does the defendant's first appearance before a
magistrate insure that he will in fact have counsel appointed then. See text
at notes 163-64 supra. In the county (number 8 on the table below) in which
counsel is rarely appointed before the arraignment in district court, as many
as seven days may elapse between "formal arrest" (booking) and arraignment,
although it was reported that it is usually three days or less. In the three
counties that have counsel appointed informally shortly before the arraignment, the time elapsing between booking and arraignment varies considerably.
One reported 8 to 14 days; another, 4 to 7 days (number 2 on the table below),
except when the district judge is not sitting in the county the delay may be
much longer unless the accused requests to be taken to another county for
arraignment; the third, three days or less when the judge is sitting in the
county. If he is not, it might be as long as six months, when a new criminal
term begins, unless the defendant wishes to plead guilty, in which case lie is
taken to a county in which a judge is sitting.
In the county (number 4 on the table below) in which counsel is often appointed at the first appearance stage, it was reported that the arraignment
in district court usually takes place about three days after booking - unless a
preliminary hearing is held, in which case as many as eight days might elapse.
In the two remaining counties, those in which counsel is regularly appointed
at the first appearance stage, the times that elapse between booking and ar-
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him," or "for a half day or so," or "for up to forty-eight hours,"
or "for from two to six days.' 8' This practice continues despite
the admonishments of several municipal judges. Furthermore, it
appears that many of those persons brought before a magistrate
with relative dispatch, are very often so treated because they

have "talked" with relative dispatch.
Although arresting officers who "willfully and wrongfully delay" taking an arrested person before a magistrate are guilty of a
gross misdemeanor, 18 2 this remedy seems to have had little or no
impact on police practiceas3 This suggests that the most effective
deterrent to these delays would be judicial or legislative exclusion
of all statements made by the defendant during this period"8 4 the federal "McNabb-Mallory rule." Yet neither the courts nor
raignment were reported to be about four to seven days in one and eight tot
fourteen days in the other (number 1 in the table below).
The docket study showed the following:
MAximum Number of
Days Between Arrest and
Median Number of Days Between
Arraignment in

Arrest and Arraignment

Non-Bail Cases

Non-Bail

Next

County

Overall

BaU.Cases

Cases

Longest

Longest

1

23

23-28

21

84

37

2

16

38

9-16

65

53

3

6

6

6

95

80*

4

5

7

6

40

39

Total

7

9-10

11

*This indigent defendant was found not guilty of a bad check charge.
Compare the not dissimilar statistics from New Jersey and New York in
Beaney, Rig t to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MNx. L. Rxv. 771, 780
(1961).
181. Compare the much shorter periods reported in a California study in
Barrett, Police Practicesand the Law -From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50
CAn.,.

L. Rv. 11, 41 (1962).

Mzmn. STAT. § 613.52 (1961). See also Mnz. STAT. § 481.10 (1961),
discussed at note 253 infra.
183. There appear to be no recent reported criminal prosecutions under
M
. STAT. § 613.52 (1961).
184. At a recent panel discussion dealing with the impact of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) on Minnesota police procedures, the point was made
that arrests and searches made without "probable cause" had always been in
violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Nonetheless, the fact that
182.

the Minnesota,courtsadmitted the fruits of illegal searches into evidence caused

one city attorney to conclude that it was not "really proper" to say that the
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legislature of Minnesota, 8 5 nor, for that matter, of any other
state, 88 have adopted such a rule. Moreover, even under the "MoNabb-Mallory rule" the lower federal courts, in determining what
constitutes an "unnecessary delay," have permitted the police considerable "leeway.' ' 7
2. Attitudes of Those Interviewed
This need to afford "some time"'5 8 for police interrogation before the accused is provided with counsel, the feeling that "questioning is an indispensable instrumentality of justice, 8 9 was recognized by a majority of those interviewed. As a group, the prosecutors were probably the most restrictive. Two of them felt that
indigent persons should not be provided with counsel until arpolice had been violating the law. It caused a detective to remark that "the
mores of society dictated" such police conduct; "that this is okay, it's been
going on in Minnesota since it became a state .... The Supreme Court of
Minnesota sustained this time after time .... Now, your judiciary okayed it;
they knew what the facts were." Minnesota ACLU Panel on "Police Searches
and Arrests in Relation to Civil Liberties," May 18, 1963 (emphasis added),
rebroadcast on KUOM, July 25, 1963, recording on file in audio-visual extension
service, University of Minnesota.
185. See Bench and Bar of Minn., Nov. 1962, p. 30, 43-44.
186. As asserted recently by the Supreme Court of Oregon:
This court has declined to adopt the McNabb-Mallory rule. [citing
cases.] The McNabb-Mallory rule apparently has not been adopted in
any state. Michigan seemed to adopt the rule in People v. Hamilton,
859 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960), but that holding has been severely limited by subsequent cases. People v. Harper, 365 Mich. 494,
118 N.W.2d 808 (1962); People v. Hannum, 862 Mich. 660, 107 N.W.2d
894 (1961).
State v. Shipley, 375 P.2d 237, 240 (Ore. 1962). See also Dawson v. State,
139 So. 2d 408, 417 (Fla. 1962).
187. Detention for the purpose of eliciting statements has been held to
constitute an "unnecessary delay." Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1957). But see Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(defendant questioned for 30 minutes); United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1961) (defendant questioned for nine hours by FBI); United States v.
Ladson, 294 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1961) (defendant questioned for one hour); Holt
v. United States, 280 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1960) (defendant held 21/2-3 hours);
Metoyer v. United States, 250 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (defendant held two
hours to write his confession); United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23
(D.D.C. 1961) (defendant held to re-enact the crime); Larkin v. United States,
144 A.2d 100 (D.C. Mun. App. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 72
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (defendant held about 2'2 hours). In all of these eases, the damaging statement was held admissible as not having been obtained during an "unreasonable delay." See generally Note, 68 YAm. L.J. 1003, 1013-20 (1959).
188. For some generalization as to what constitutes "some time," see text
accompanying note 224 infra.
189. Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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raignment in district court.190 "To do it any earlier would seriously
impair law enforcement .... We are only solving 20 to 25 percent
of major felonies now' 9 ' and 90 percent of these turn on getting a
statement from the defendant. We wouldn't get these if lawyers
were provided right after arrest."'19 2 Three others stated that the
defendant should not be advised of his right to counsel until the
"'first appearance" although one felt that the police should advise
the defendant of his right to remain silent. 13
In addition to underscoring the need for interrogation time,
one prosecutor pointed out that the rule against admitting coerced
190. One felt that counsel should not even be provided then "if guilt is
patent." One of the judges interviewed was also concerned about the appointment of counsel in this situation. The other prosecutor stated that his "open-file
policy" made counsel at the preliminary hearing stage superfluous.
191. Statistics in Minnesota for 1962 support this assertion. Only onefourth of all major offenses (murder, negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) were reported to be
"cleared." The percentages within this group, however, were highest for the
more serious crimes, e.g., murder-78%, negligent manslaughter-91%, rape-

55%.
192. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring):
To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime, because under our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty is to
protect his client- guilty or innocent-and that in such a capacity he
owes no duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem. Under
this 4onception of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell
the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under
any circumstances.
But,see Coiun= oN PovnRTY 38 (1963): "We are informed that [the California] public defender often enters a case while the accused is in police custody and before preliminary hearing and that these practices have in no way
disrupted or adversely affected the orderly prosecution of criminal cases in
that state." Interestingly, the Committee "concluded not to recommend a
similar provision for the federal law at this time [because] such a proposal
would be vigorously opposed by those who fear its consequences on law enforcement." Ibid.

193. For a discussion and collection of authorities on the matter of police in-

terrogation and the privilege against self-incrimination, see Locnmurm, IK~zsAn
& CHOPER, SUPPLEMENT TO DODD'S CASES Ox CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 607-08
(1963): "The police are not constitutionally obliged to warn a suspect either
that he need not make any statement or, if he does so, that it may be used
against him.'
Compare the statement of former United States Attorney Gasch to District
of Columbia police:
It would be my advice to [warn before questioning] ....

Let's look at

the military service- that is standard operating procedure .... The
FBI follows this practice. Congressman Dowdy, who was a prosecuting

attorney in Texas for 8 years... found that it was no impediment to
effective and intelligent law enforcement ....

It would be in the inter-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

confessions afforded the accused adequate protection."0 4 The impetus for the "McNabb-Mallory rule," however, was the Supreme
Court's concern that "unwarranted detention led to tempting
utilization of intensive interrogation, easily gliding into the evils
of 'the third degree,' "15 and its recognition of "the tremendous
problems of proof raised by the 'coerced confession' issue.' ' 0
Since "the prestige of police testimony usually carries the day,' ' 7
the safeguards upon which the traditional confessions rule rest
have been branded "illusory."' 8
Two county attorneys felt that fairness to the defendant demands that counsel be provided immediately after arrest. While
conceding that such a rule would cause law enforcement officials
to "become a little more disheartened," one maintained that a
great many confessions would still be obtained.' 0
est of justice and fairness and I think it will help us ultimately in our

cases in court.
Hearings on H.R. 11477, S. 2970, S.3825, S.3355 (Admission of Evidence Mallory Rule) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 897-98 (1958). See also id. at 415.

194. This point was also made by a district judge. He said that, although
he had never known of a coerced confession in his county, counsel subsequent-

ly appointed could redress this violation of the defendant's rights. See also
People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 185, 166, 867 P.2d 680, 699, 18 Cal. Rep. 40, 59

(1961) (Traynor, J., concurring). On the matter of police intimidation to obtain a confession, compare Willcox & Bloustein, Account of a Field Study in a

Rural Area of the Representation of Indigents Accused of Crime, 59 CoLum.
L. REV.551, 558-59 (1959).
195. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).

196. Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incrininating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure,
1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78, 141.
197. Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959 WAsa. U.L.Q. 103, 114. Cf.
McCoRMIcK, EVIDENcE 233 (1954): "lAin officer who is willing to use methods which he knows are unlawful is frequently (by no means always) willing
to deny the wrong under oath"; NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OnSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 189 (1931)
(Wickersham Report): "Officers who have obtained a confession by force and
who offer the confession in evidence are virtually bound to deny that force
was used."
198. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,55 YALE LJ.
694, 708 (1946).
199. This was also the opinion of one of the district judges in the group
discussed immediately below. He believed that the police could obtain many
statements without having to take people into custody. He recalled his experience as a personal injury lawyer in which he found that "hostile" persons
would often talk freely to him and did not even object to having their statements taped.
This is a technique widely used by the FBI. See Hearings on H.R. 11477,
supra note 193, at 409:

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This view as to when the right to counsel should begin was
shared by six of the 14 district judges interviewed 00 and by one
of the two public defenders. This group agreed that counsel should
be provided "as soon as humanly possible after arrest" and "before the interrogation begins. '201 Although they recognized that
implementation of their views might cause increased difficulties
for law enforcement, those who took this view generally believed
that the desirability of effectuating individual rights was an overriding consideration.
One of them, a judge, suggested that the problem could be solved
if the police would expand their pre-arrest investigation and amass
greater evidence of guilt at that early stage.20- 2 Not only would
this reduce the need for post-arrest interrogation, but confront[An instructor at the FBI school] told me that ... they go into a
man's home and say to him, "I just want to talk to you about this situation. You're not under arrest, you are free to go, but I have talked
to a few people and maybe you can help me solve this crime." Now the
instructor... a man of about 15 years' experience told me that that
technique has been found quite productive by their men in many different types of cases.
Mr. Gasch further stressed the necessity for a "voluntary" interview:
However, it is possible that a man might be under arrest even though
the magic words, "you are under arrest" are not used. Suppose, for example, the police officer takes a man by the arm and escorts him up
the street and says, 'Iwould like to invite you up to police headquarters for a little questioning." That would be an arrest ....
Id. at 413.
See also Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and
Limitations, 52 J. CRam. L., C. &P.S. 2, 12 (1961), for the position that "the
police ought to work more with [pre-arrest] interviews."
200. One of these six had previously been on the prosecution side for over
10 years. Although about 70% of those appointed lawyers who responded to the
mail questionnaire felt that they had been appointed in time to represent the accused adequately, 14 out of 24 recommended that counsel be appointed at an
earlier stage of the case.
201. See also Allison, supra note 176.
202. This has, in fact, occurred in the District of Columbia which has the
"McNabb-Mallory rule." See the statement of former United States Attorney
Oliver Gasch:
tDJue largely to the conscientious cooperation of our Chief of Police and
in accordance with the teaching of the decisions and our lectures on it,
the police are making better cases from the evidentiary standpoint. Extensive investigation prior to arrest of suspects has resulted. The accumulation of other evidentiary material has become standard operating procedure .... Reliance upon confessions generally has been minimized. It must be mentioned, however, that in some instances we have
been unable to go forward with cases wherein we felt that we were
largely dependent upon a confession ....

Address by Oliver Gasch, Twelfth Annual Conference, National Civil Liberties
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ing the accused with weighty evidence of guilt would have a strong
tendency to induce confessions.
The survey disclosed that many arrests are made "for investigation" or "on suspicion, ' '2°a i.e. where the police have acted on
less than probable cause.2 °4 In such cases, the need for interrogation time is at its greatest, but the justification for the arrest is
at its weakest. 20 5 To allow the police more interrogation time later because they made an illegal arrest earlier is strange logic indeed. °0 Moreover, under the recent decision of Wong Sun v.
Union Clearing House, March 25, 1960, in Washington Post, March 26, 1960,
p. Di.
One former prosecutor interviewed was of the opinion that "the weakest
part of police work is their insufficient use of surveillance and interviewing before they 'pop the arrest.' "
203. That this has also been the case in other jurisdictions, see COtMISSIONERS' COXLMvn.ON PoLIcE ARRESTS FOR INVESTIGATION, REPORT AND REC-

OMM%,ENDATIONs (1962) (Horsky Report); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 16 (1957); LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the
Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WAsH. U.LQ. 331, 356; Note,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1205-06 (1952).
204. This discussion assumes that an arrest is not lawful unless there is
sufficient evidence to charge the suspect, a premise that underlies the Mallory
case. 354 U.S. at 454, 456. However, it has been forcefully argued that the arrest norms allow, or at least ought to allow, a taking into custody on evidence
insufficient for charging. See Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street"
Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest
FnnnDom 11 (Sowle
Privileges in General, in PoLIcE PovER AND INTDivmuu
ed. 1962); LaFave, supra note 203, at 344-53.
205. Where sufficient grounds for making an arrest do not exist, the practice of briefly "detaining" a person at precinct headquarters, but not recording the detention as an arrest, seems much less justifiable than the practice of
stopping a suspect on the street and making inquiries then and there, usually
denominated "field interrogation" by the police. As Professor Foote has suggested, in many respects compulsory detention at a police station carries a
stigma equivalent to that of an actual arrest. Foote, supra note 203, at 37.
Moreover, as a commentator, not unsympathetic to the problems confronting
police interrogators, has recognized
a convincing argument can be made that even brief detention at the
station, unlike on-the-street questioning, is substantially like custody
after actual arrest, as it makes possible similar investigative methods detailed search, questioning of unreasonable intensity, and interrogation
behind closed doors.
LaFave, supra note 203, at 362. Professor LaFave notes, too, that "it is far
from clear" that even the Uniform Arrest Act contemplates police station detention on grounds insufficient for arrest. Id. at 361.
206. The contrary argument was made by Judge Prettyman in Mallory v.
United States, 236 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1956). This evoked a strong dissent by Judge Bazelon, id. at 706-07, who was vindicated by the Supreme
Court on review.
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United States,2 7 the statements obtained from defendants in these
cases may well be inadmissible regardless of the failure to provide counsel. °8
This still leaves a substantial number of cases in which the police have lawful cause to arrest but in which there is insufficient
evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2°0 Under such
circumstances several questions remain unanswered. Should law
enforcement officers be permitted some short period of time for
noncoercive interrogation2 10 without the inhibiting -if not paralyzing - influence of defense counsel?211 Here, too, a confession
by the accused may be of extreme importance. -'
207. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
208. This case holds that at least in a federal prosecution, and at least
under certain circumstances, verbal evidence following an unlawful arrest or
search must be excluded as the "fruit" of police illegality. For the conclusion,
after an exhaustive analysis of the case, that it applies to state as well as federal officers and is neither limited to incriminating statements obtained im=nediately after an illegal arrest nor to those obtained under "oppressive circumstaices," see Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and
Hope, 42 NEB. L. :REv. 483, 519-32 (1963).
209. Even where law enforcement officers possess sufficient information to
arrest-and charge-a suspect, as a matter of practice a charge will usually
not be forthcoming absent "admissible evidence showing a high probability of

guilt." Barrett, supra note 181, at 30. Recent statistics from the District of
Columbia indicate that probable cause to arrest for a specific offense actually
existed in something over 50% of all "arrests for investigation," yet only five
per cent of those arrested were ultimately charged. Co.asisxouns' CoamM.
ON Pou cE AuxEsTs FoR IvESTIGATION, srupra note 203, at 58, 69.
210. One might object to the stipulation that general police interrogation
may be characterized as noncoercive. See text accompanying notes 19-1-98
supra. But many reasonable suggestions have been offered to cure the objection. See Note, 107 U. PA. L. Rv. 286, 288 (1958); Note, 72 YALE L. J. 1434,
1454-58 (1963).
- 211. Perhaps one of the judges who urged the immediate appearance of
counsel would answer "yes" here. He was troubled because "the great percentage of those arrested are guilty. If only you could separate the clearly
guilty ones."
212. One experienced prosecuting attorney stated that, in many cases, irrespective of the extrinsic evidence, "juries want to know what the defendant
said." A possible reason for this was offered by Weisberg, supra note 176, at
169: "When the search for confessions becomes a principal tactic in police
work and a large percentage of prosecutions depend on confessions, juries may
come to feel that a charge unsupported by a confession is weaker than it
really is."
For a related problem, see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 508, 571
(1961) (Frankfurter, J.):
Despite modem advances in the technology of crime detection, offenses
frequently occur about which things cannot be made to speak. And
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If the accused's liberty and privacy are not being curtailed
without due cause and if the interrogation techniques utilized are
neither offensive nor likely to cause an innocent man to confess,
what is the objection? 213 Why is not lawful cause to incarcerate a
sufficient basis for interrogation as well? Is it that once the authorities possess sufficient information to charge a person, he "has
become an accused, rather than a suspect" and this "requires
214
cloaking him with added protections from official inquiry"?
Does this advance the analysis?
Is it that at this point there is a "declaration of war . . .
the police ... are no longer .. the neutral inquirer whom the
good citizen ought to assist" but now "the prosecution . . . without right . . . to further help from the accused"? 1 0 Does this approach liken law enforcement to little more than a sporting contest?
Is it the possibility - or the likelihood - that an innocent
man will make an "incriminating" statement or resort to damaging tactics that will supply a crucial link in the chain of evidence
against him? Is it not likely that an innocent man, alarmed because he has been arrested, may give a false alibi?2 .
Or is it the entire philosophy that underlies the privilege
where there cannot be found innocent human witnesses to such offenses
nothing remains- if police investigation is not to be balked before it
has fairly begun- but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask
them questions ....
See also Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogationand Confessions, 52
Nw. U.L. Rav. 77, 80 (1957). However, does the fact that some crimes may
go unsolved without interrogation automatically establish its validity? See
Weisberg, supra note 176, at 171-72; cf. Schwartz, On Current Proposals To
Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 157 (1954).
213. "Unless it can be said that the police procedures for preliminary questioning are so outrageous that the police cannot be trusted, there must be
some middle ground that will give reasonable protection against improper procedures and still permit fruitful police inquiry." Lumbard, The Administration of Criminal Justice: Some Problems and Their Resolution, 49 A.B.A.J.
840, 843 (1963).
214. LaFave, supra note 203, at 374.
215.

D

vwIN, THE CREWINA

PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND

37 (1958). See gen-

erally LaFave, supra note 203, at 373-79.
216. "An innocent man, when placed by circumstances in a condition of
suspicion and danger, may resort to deception in the hope of avoiding the force
of such proofs." Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 205, $17
(1810) (Shaw, CJ.). "Proof that an alibi . . . was false, though in fact the accused had nothing to do with the crime, was extremely prejudicial, if not fatal,
in several cases." BORCHARD, CoNVIcTNG THE INNOCENT 373-74 (1932).
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against self-incrimination?2 17 Is it simply that because "of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man," "we do not
make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull the lever which springs the trap
2 18
on which he stands"?
In addition to the aforementioned five county attorneys, a majority of the district judges interviewed believed that interrogation time should be permitted. The initial reaction of two of these,
both from rural areas, was to provide counsel immediately after
arrest. Yet on considering the effect this would have on the administration of criminal justice, -19 one decided that the preliminary hearing stage was soon enough, although conceding that this
was probably unfair to the defendant;2 0 the other considered the
arraignment stage appropriate. A third judge, a former prosecutor,
pointed out that between 70 and 80 percent of all convictions are
based on incriminating statements;-' that, in rural areas, at least,
217. Professor McNaughton, after an exhaustive analysis of the dozen pol-

icies advanced as the justification for the privilege, 8 WiGmonE, EviDnrcE
295-318 (MeNaughton rev. 1961), has concluded that its two significant purposes are (1) "to remove . .. abusive tactics by a zealous questioner" and
(2) "that the individual not be bothered for less than good reason and not be
conscripted by his opponent to defeat himself." Id. at 318. In the situation at
hand, "abusive tactics" and "less than good reason" have been removed by
hypothesis.
218. GaRswoLD, Tam F=rm Aannm"r TODAY 7 (1955).
219. "Over 90 percent of those picked up and charged are guilty - at least
that many plead guilty. Those arrested usually cough up their guts and do so
voluntarily. I can't believe the system would work if, as soon as arrested, the
suspect was told of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent."
The notion that many arrested persons, particularly the "amateur criminals," are "contrite" and "talk freely" was expressed by a number of persons.
But see the statement of former District of Columbia United States Attorney
Gasch that confessions or admissions are of controlling importance in probably less than 5% of our criminal prosecutions. Gasch, supra note 202, at 3.
220. "By the time counsel is appointed, it is too late to do the defendant
any good. The 'late' appearance of counsel is decisive in many cases."
221. Another dimension to this point has been suggested by Barrett, supra
note 181, at 45:
Our system for the trial of criminal cases would be burdened to the
verge of collapse if the percentage of guilty pleas were substantially reduced. This survey suggests that a substantial percentage of these pleas
results from confessions or admissions given as a result of minimal police interrogation.
Of. text following note 233 infra. But the compelling need for confessions has
been questioned by Weisberg, supra note 176, at 166:
The police official characteristically reasons from individual cases, frequently those in which questioning produced a confession and which, in
retrospect, he does not believe could have been solved in any other way.
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these are crucial because most officers "really know very little
about scientific criminal investigation- I doubt that some can
even take fingerprints properly' '222- but they often become tremendously effective interrogators.

The remaining six district judges and one public defender all
believed that counsel should initially be provided for indigent persons at the first appearance before the magistrate. 2 3 Although
they recognized the need for interrogation time, their general feeling was that "a half day or so" was adequate 224 because of the tendIt is not, of course, possible to determine what might happen if the police were effectively denied the power to engage in secret questioning
and thus compelled to stress or develop other methods of investigation.
There is some empirical evidence that a confession is not as crucial an ingredient for a conviction as would be supposed. Of the 22 state convictions overturned by the Supreme Court on coerced confession grounds, the state
successfully retried half of the defendants. See Ritz, State Criminal Confession
Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases Reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court and Some Current Problems, 19 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 202, 208-09
(1962). See also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963). But sea 01
CoLum. L. REV. 744, 748 n.32 (1962).
222. Is this not "treating the sore by encouraging the infection"? Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt
Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24, 68 (1960). A large part of the solution
would seem to be the improvement of the quality, training and facilities of
law enforcement officers.
223. All but one of these agreed that it would be unfair to the indigent
defendant not to furnish counsel at state expense at this stage. "Some very
substantial rights come into play here." The dissenter on this point stated
that, due to the county attorney's "open-file policy," the preliminary hearing
was unimportant, but that "it provides a convenient time to appoint counsel."
The responses on the mail questionnaire to the query as to when in the
proceedings a lawyer should first be made available to an indigent person were
as follows:.
Stage

District Judges

County Attorneys

Between arrest and first appear19
5
ance before a magistrate
8
4
At first appearance before a magistrate
Between first appearance and
13
3
preliminary hearing
3
1
At preliminary hearing
After preliminary hearing but before the
6
filing of an indictment or information
After the filing of indictment or informa4
1
tion but before arraignment thereon
2
At arraignment on indictment or information
224. The public defender stressed the need of the defendant for prompt
arraignment before the magistrate if counsel were to be first provided there.
He felt, however, that the defendant's rights might be compromised to satisfy
the need for law enforcement.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
ency of many suspects to "talk freely." This reaction is confirmed by the impressive statistics gathered by Professor Edward
L. Barrett, Jr. His study of two California cities showed that 50
percent of all confessions and admissions came within eight hours
or less after the suspect was arrested and 81 percent in 24 hours
or less.mo Whatever the ultimate answer to the question of when
the right to counsel begins, the argnument that successful prosecution necessitates long detention is not very compelling.
Many of those interviewed found a mechanical difficulty in
providing indigent persons with counsel immediately after arrest.
Some typical remarks were: 'Do you want the police to determine
indigency?" "The sheriff can't determine indigency because an
oath is required." A solution suggested by one public defender
was simply to exclude all statements made by the defendant prior
to the time he is brought before a magistrate to determine indigency. This would encourage prompt first appearances to be sure,
but it would be even more restrictive than the "McNabb-Mallory

rule."
A viable approach to this problem was offered by one of the
district judges whose county has a public-defender system. After
first recalling that judicial determination of indigency is a rather
perfunctory procedure, he suggested that any person who claims
to be indigent at the time of arrest should be assigned counsel
from a list of younger lawyers. 7 The designated lawyer will insure protection of the accused's rights and secure a prompt arraignment before the magistrate. If the lawyer or judge discovers
that the defendant is not indigent, the lawyer should be reimbursed
for his time and may have a client. If the magistrate finds that
225. Of. 3 WriroR, EvmrcE § 851, at 319 (Sd ed. 1940):
Every guilty person is almost always ready and desirous to confess, as
soon as he is detected and arrested .... The nervous pressure of guilt
is enormous . .. and -when detection comes, the pressure is relieved;
and the deep sense of relief makes confession a satisfaction .... To
forbid soliciting him, to seek to prevent this relief, is to fly in the face
of human nature.
See generally Rum, Tum CoxpulsioN To CoNFEss (1959); lOGGa, Wn" lbw
CoNFEss (1959).

226. Barrett, supra note 181, at 41-44. Also interesting is the fact that almost 90% of all suspects arrested were interrogated for no more than two
hours.
227. This plan would be similar to the system, formerly used in Hennepin
County, of having the junior bar section of the bar association represent indigent defendants at those stages in felony proceedings held in municipal
court. See JoNEs, MhX .SOTA CRMnUNA PaocErmU § 15, at 29 n.131 (1955).
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the defendant is indigent, the public defender will take over. The
burden imposed on the bar seems slight and the protection accorded the accused seems substantial. And there appears to be no reason why a similar system could not operate in those counties that
have an appointed counsel system rather than the public defender. 228 Conversely, a member of the public defender's staff could be
similarly utilized, if not more efficiently,2 29 with reimbursement
for his services being made to the county if it is subsequently discovered that the accused was not indigent.2 80 If mechanics were
the only objection to appointing counsel immediately after arrest,
the problem would not seem to be a very vexing one.
Cost was another obstacle raised. Some of those questioned
felt that many more publicly financed attorneys would be required
if counsel were appointed immediately or soon after arrest.28l The
reply of some was this: Indigent defendants are offered counsel as
soon as they are brought before the magistrate; if counsel were
provided soon after arrest, the first appearance would follow
"forthwith" and the time and effort spent by appointed counsel
would be essentially the same.
This explanation is not really responsive to the point, raised by
several, that since the early provision of counsel would curtail the
"opportunity" of many defendants to confess, many more trials
would be held and much greater public expense would be incurred 2 32 Two judges met this argument by challenging the prem-

ise. They believed that many of those arrested, particularly persons with prior offenses, would not ask for counsel even if informed of their rights and that most defendants would continue
228. The proposal of a district judge in a rural county was somewhat
similar: As soon as a person is arrested, have the clerk of court appoint the
next lawyer on the list to represent the defendant until a change of counsel,
for one reason or another, may be made.
229. The "advantage of a public defender office is that a staff member will
be readily available, thus ensuring early representation for the indigent."
Note, 76 HARv. L. Rnv. 579, 608 (1963). See also Murray, 8upra note 174, at
68.
230. For a similar suggestion, see STAFF OF HousE Comm. or TnE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPRESENTATION FOR INDIG NT DEFENDANTS IN

FEDEaAL CRmiNAL CASES 39 (Comm. Print 1960).
231. A district judge, whose county has a public defender system, speculated that the size of the defender's staff would have to be doubled. Another
judge in this same county said that, whatever the increased cost, it would be
more economical if done through the public defender's office. A judge in a
nonpublic defender county agreed.
282. See quote from Barrett note 221 supra.
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to plead guiltyum Two others conceded an increased cost but con-

tended that this would not be serious. "Until the county spends
as much for indigents as it does for the county attorney, cost
should not be considered a problem."
3.

Constitutional Dimensions

As mentioned above, whether fourteenth amendment due process requires the appointment of counsel immediately or soon after
an indigent person is taken into custody is not at all clear. Over
30 years ago, in Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court stated, in
dictum, that in capital cases the accused "requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."
Yet, in a 1958 decision, Crooker -v. California,"' the Court, by

a five-four decision, upheld a death sentence despite the fact that
Crooker's confession, secured by the police after Crooker's re233. The docket study revealed a very high number of guilty pleas:

COUNTIES

WC
Tb
Ta
5
4
3
2
I*-N** I N I NI N I N I N
I N
Pleaded guilty 11 8 9 3 18 1028 12 09 27 105 60 165 80 74

1

Found guilty
byjury

1

2 1

Found guilty
bycourt
Acquitted by
jury
Noleprosequi

1

43

%d

T
78

4

5 3

8 44

4

1 1

1 1

2

1 1

1

6

1 6

12

1

9 1

2 2

2

15
16 6

22 12 7

3
10

Directed

verdict of
acquittal
Dismissed

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2 1

3

2 1

1

3
2
5
5
6 2
*Indigent
**Nonindigent
aTotal number of indigents and nonindigents in each category.
'Combined total of indigents and nonindigents in each category.
.Per cent of indigents and nonindigents in each category.
dPer cent of all defendants in each category.
If it is assumed that nonindigents often get a lawyer immediately or soon
after arrest, the fact that almost as many nonindigents plead guilty as do indigents (in fact, the percentage is the same if the "unknowns" are excluded)
supports -the contention that the early provision of counsel will not significantly affect guilty pleas.
234. 287 U.S.45, 69 (1932).
235. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
Unknown
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quests for counsel were repeatedly denied, was admitted into
evidence.
In light of the opinions of almost every person interviewed and
the estimates of convictions based on confessions, it seems difficult
to deny the Crooker dissenters' claim that the accused's interrogation period is "the most critical period of his ordeal."23 8 In finding no "fundamental unfairness" to Crooker resulting from the
denial of counsel the Court observed that he was "a college-educated man with law school training who knew of his right to keep
silent. 23 7 Even if Crooker were not "prejudiced" by the failure
of the police to provide him with counsel because he knew of his
right to remain silent, this cannot be said of the less sophisticated
defendant 2 8 Yet evidently the Court would have found no "fundamental unfairness" if the accused, not unlike most persons arrested, had received little more than a grade school education.""
For, on the very day that Crooker was decided, the same five
man majority, in Cicenia v. Lagay,240 upheld a plea of non vult
based on a confession made after the police refused Cicenia's request to see his lawyer and the lawyer's request to see Cicenia.
Although Cicenia was a noncapital case, the Court's approach
to the problem was no different than it was in Crooker. In both
cases, the Court stressed both the need for and constitutionality
of noncoercive police interrogation.2 41 Although the Court could
have likened Cicenia to Crooker by pointing out that Cicenia had
consulted counsel before the interrogation began and thus, presumably knew of his right to remain silent, 24 2 it failed to do so.
Rather it chose to proceed on the broader ground. Thus, there
236. 357 U.S. at 444. The dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice
Douglas, with whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice
Brennan concurred.
237. 357 U.S. at 440.
38. It has been pointed out that "prejudice" may perhaps most easily be
established by proving that the accused failed to request counsel, thus buttressing his argument that he was ignorant of his rights. Weisberg, supra note
176, at 43.
239. This was the fact in Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). Brief for
Petitioner, p. 3.

240. 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
241. 357 U.S. at 441; 357 U.S. at 509. See also Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, particularly at 588-92 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.). Mr. Justice
Stewart joined the C!lombe opinion and Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Clark,
and Mr. Justice Whittaker agreed with its "general principles governing police
interrogation of those suspected of, or under investigation in connection with,
the commission of a crime." 367 U.S. at 642.
2,42. Cicenia was so distinguished in Griffith v. Rhay, 282 F.2d 711, 717

(9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 941 (1961).
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seems to be a fairly clear constitutional answer to the question of
whether the right to counsel begins soon after arrest.
Yet there have been some new developments since 1958. In two
recent capital cases involving pleas without the assistance of coun43 and White v. Maryland,"4 the Court
sel, Hamilton v. Alabama0
has unanimously held that the right to counsel in such cases extends
to any "critical stage in a criminal proceeding,12 4 whether it be
arraignment or preliminary hearing, irrespective of "whether
prejudice resulted." 246 And in Gideon v. Wainwright 47 the Court
unanimously obliterated the distinction between the right to counsel in capital and noncapital cases, at least as far as the trial is
concerned.
Does Crooker remain unshaken after Hamilton and White?
Does the fact that Hamilton and White involved the stage at
which defendant pleaded, a stage at which defendant is already
in court and seemingly more akin to trial, render the language
"critical stage in a criminal proceeding" inapplicable to the nonjudicial stages -the period soon after a person is arrested?
Despite the fact that four Justices, still on the Court, described
this latter stage in Crooker as "the most critical period of [the arrested person's] ordeal"? How much constitutional importance
must be attributed to the fact that this is also "the most critical
period" for law enforcement officials? -48 How significant is it that
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote both of these phrases - dissenting in
Crooker, for the Court in Hamilton? Is this phrase to be given
greater weight than the language "every step in the proceedings"
in Powell?
If "fundamental unfairness" remains the test, even in capital
cases, for early stages of the proceedings, and if this requires greater prejudice than was established in Crooker, does the requisite
prejudice exist when a less sophisticated, uncounseled defendant
confesses? Even if Crooker stands, will the Court now find "fundamental unfairness" in a case like Cicenia? Or in a case in which
the confessor never consulted with counsel prior to making his
statement?
243. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
244. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).

245. 868 U.S. at 54; 373 U.S. at 60.
246. 368 U.S. at 55; 373 U.S. at 60.
247. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

248. Even AIr. Justice Douglas has observed that the "right of counsel at
the moment of arrest is a proposal that would be opposed by police every-

where. It takes an advantage from them ....

." Douglas,

Foreword to Right

to Counsel A Symposium, 45 MmN. L. Rnv. 693, 694 (1961). See also quote

from Co munTE ox POvERTY note 192 supra.
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If Croolcer has been debilitated, does Gideon erase the distinction between capital and noncapital cases at all pre-trial stagesy240
In short, has Cicenia also fallen? What is the significance of the
fact that the per curiam opinion in White, decided a full six weeks
after Gideon, specifically mentioned that White was a capital case
and specifically relied on Hamilton? Does it presage a revival of
the capital-noncapital dichotomy for pre-trial proceedings? Was
Or was it just the most perit to preserve a unanimous Court?
2 50
suasive way to write the opinion?
Only the Supreme Court has the authoritative answers to
these and, undoubtedly, many more important and perplexing related questions. But we venture to say that many of the considerations advanced by those interviewed in Minnesota will ultimately be among the determinative ones. This will be true not
only in the United States Supreme Court's constitutional decision; it will also operate in the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision whether to adopt a "McNabb-Mallory rule" or something
akin to it and in the Minnesota legislature's decision whether to
impose "a flat rule that a certain period of interrogation without
counsel is within police powers, but that [an appearance before a
magistrate] and a right to consultation must take place within a
twenty-four hours [or twelve hours? or four?
short time, perhaps
' '25 1
or two?] of arrest.

249. Significantly, perhaps, Mr. Justice Black ended the Court's Gideon
opinion by relying on Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and citing the
language from that case stated in text accompanying note 234 supra.
250. If failure to provide counsel soon after arrest is held to violate duo
process, will the Court go beyond the remedy of excluding confessions and
admissions? Might the Court someday hold that failure to provide counsel
shortly after arrest is an absolute bar to conviction? The majority in Crooker
found this possibility totally untenable. 357 U.S. at 441. However, the dissent
stated that the denial of counsel, rather than the introduction of the confession, was "a denial of that due process of law guaranteed the citizen by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 442. For analogous situations, illegal arrest,
unlawful search and seizure, violation of the "McNabb-Mallory rule," in which
the courts have declined to impose such a stringent remedy, see Kamisar,
What is an "Involuntary Confession"? A Commentary on Inbau and Reid's
"Criminal Interrogationand Confessions," 17 RUTGERs L. REv. 728, 749 n.148
(1963).

251. Beaney, The Effective Assistance of Counsel, in
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 52 (Harding ed. 1959).

Cf.

FUNDAMENTAL LAW
D.C. CODE ANN. §

2-2202 (1961), which charges courts to "make every reasonable effort to provide assignment of counsel as early in the proceeding as practicable." For a
collection of the various state provisions, see LalFave, supra note 203, at 33233. Section 43-3 of the Proposed Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure (Tent.
Final Draft 1963), patterned after UNIFovRM ARREST ACT § 2, empowers police
to "detain for investigation for a reasonable period of time . . . under reason-

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Another point concerning this general problem merits consideration. Several district judges interviewed firmly believed that if
counsel is requested by an indigent accused immediately or soon
after arrest, this request should be promptly honored.2 -52 Under
Minnesota law, any officer who denies an arrested person's request
to consult with counsel "as soon as practicable, and before other
proceedings shall be had" 253 is guilty of a misdemeanorcsI This
statute may well apply to retained counsel onlyms and the statute
pertaining to the provision of counsel for indigent defendants is
phrased in terms of a request being made to a magistrate who
2 0
determines indigency while the defendant is under oath. 5
As Grifin and Douglas amply demonstrate, if due process does
not require the prompt provision of counsel, this is not the end of
the matter. For it can be forcefully argued that if Minnesota law
permits a financially able person promptly to secure a lawyer, but
does not permit an indigent person to do so, "there is lacling that
equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment."2 57 On its
face, "the evil is . . . discrimination against the indigent,15sB
able circumstances"; deeming "a period of detention in excess of four hours
...
unreasonable." The "reasonable circumstances" basis for "detention" in
the Illinois proposal is intended to signify something less than "reasonable
grounds" or "probable cause" to arrest. The proposed code has been sharply
criticized in CIvm RiGHTs Co m. OF THE CmcAGo BAR Ass'x, REPORT ON CERTAflw

DETENTIOIN AND ARREST PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT

IIoisom

CODE OF

CaIIIXAL PROCEDURE (1963).

Consider the objection that "any fixed amount of time is likely to be inadequate for the police in the most difficult cases. Any requirement designed
for the most difficult cases lends to harden into a practice utilized in all cases,
petty and serious alike." Weisberg, supra note 176, at 172.
252. Here, too, the mechanics of doing so posed a problem to some of
these judges. See text accompanying notes 2-026-30 aupra.
253. MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1961). The phrase "other proceedings" has
been interpreted to include police interrogation. State v. Schabert, 1218 Mlinn.
1, 9, 15 N.W.2d 585, 589 (1944).
254. There appear to be no reported prosecutions despite the fact that one
county attorney admitted that, in practice, unless and until the sheriff is
"ready" to permit consultation with counsel, he "doesn't hear the request."
255. It demands that officers "admit any resident attorney retained by or
in behalf of the person restrained or whom he may desire to consult, to a private interview at the place of custody." MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1961).
256. Mr N. STAT. § 611.07 (1961). One district judge suggested that counsel could be provided by having the sheriff report the accused's request to the
county attorney who, in turn, would seek appointment, on the accused's behalf,
from the district judge. Even if within the legislative intendment (and this
seems doubtful) this appears to be a rather cumbersome and, more importantly, time-consuming procedure.
257. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
258. Id. at 355.
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and, although it is plain that the Supreme Court has not gone so
far as to read the fourteenth amendment to eliminate every social
and economic disadvantage suffered by the indigent criminal defendant," 9 as has been pointed out, the early appearance of counsel is a major, often decisive, protection.2 -0 It certainly seems to be
a more valuable safeguard than the right to a transcript or lawyer
on appeal. 261
Regardless of whether the federal constitution demands equality in this matter, the indigent's equal right to obtain counsel at
his request warrants serious consideration by court or legislature.
That closer examination is in order is evidenced by the recognition, as a fact, by several judges and prosecutors that the defendant who is able to retain a lawyer may secure one much earlier in the proceedings than may the indigent.02 2
Other questions naturally follow from what has just been discussed: (1) If due process does not require the appointment of
counsel immediately or soon after arrest in every case, does it
nevertheless require the appointment of counsel on request? (2)
Is it constitutionally permissible to provide counsel immediately
or soon after arrest only when requested?
The answer to the first question would seem to be "no." Although the Court considered a request for counsel to have special
significance when it stated that "to be sure, coercion seems more
likely to result from state denial of a specific request for opportunity to engage counsel than it does from state failure to appoint
counsel immediately upon arrest,"2 63 we are here concerned not
with the matter of coerced confessions but with the right to counsel. Just last year, the Supreme Court said of the right to counsel
at trial that "it is settled that where the assistance of counsel is
a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does
not depend on a request. 20 4 Irrespective of the additional law
enforcement problems created by providing counsel soon after arrest, it does not seem that any greater significance should be at259.
260.
ioned if
261.

See id. at 356-57.
An interesting question presented here is what remedy would be fashthis were held to be a constitutional violation. See note 250 supra.
Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372

U.S. 353 (1963).
262. A study made in New Jersey disclosed that defendants with retained
counsel were able to make contact with an attorney in less than one-fifth the
time required by indigents for the same purpose. Trebach, A Modern Defender
System for New Jersey, 12 RUTGERs L. Rnv. 289, 300 (1957).
263. Crooker v California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958).
264. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
tached to the request for counsel at that earlier stage. 6 5 If the
right is deemed sufficiently important to be a due process requirement, why is it not sufficiently important to be made available
to the unwary, ignorant and inexperienced as well as to the informed, sophisticated, and professional?2 60
If due process does not require the immediate provision of
counsel, may a state, consistently with the fourteenth amendment,
provide it only on request -to rich and poor alike? On its face,
this approach would appear to involve no violation of fourteenth
amendment equality. Seemingly, it would not be an "invidious
discrimination"2 67 for a state to offer something only to those who
ask for it, if that something is not so valuable as to be part of due
process. However, if it could be demonstrated that such a system
operates to provide only retained counsel - that most financially
able persons know of their right to a lawyer without being informed while most indigent persons do not -perhaps the answer
to the second question may not be an unequivocal "yes" - particularly on recalling that the availability of counsel immediately
or soon after arrest is regarded by those on both sides to be of
great consequence.26 8
265. But see Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the U.S. District
Courts (1962), which does not require that a defendant be informed of his
"right to request the assignment of counsel" until he appears before the commissioner [proposed Rule 5(b)] but provides that an indigent "shall be entitled,
if he so requests, to have counsel assigned to represent him within a reasonable
time after such request," [proposed Rule 44(a)]; State v. Bell, 24 Conn. Sup.
94, 186 A.2d 805, 807 (1962), which suggests a distinction between the necessity to request counsel in felony cases and misdemeanors. Cf. Douglas v. California, 872 U.S. 353, 354 (1963), in which the Court specifically mentioned
"that petitioners requested, and were denied, the assistance of counsel on appeal." See also BEsr y, THE RiGnT To CouxsEr w Am
aICA COURTS 104-0

(1955), and cases cited therein.
266. For the scrupulousness with which some state courts have interpreted
statutes requiring that defendants be informed of their right to counsel, see
e.g., State v. Moosbrugger, 263 Minn. 56, 116 N.W.2d 68 (1962), 47 i.m- L.
lrEv. 281; State v. Greco, 271 Wis. 54, 72 N.W.2d 661 (1955); In 7c Newbern,
168 Cal. App. 2d 472, 385 P.2d 948 (1959).
267. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 358, 856 (1963).
268. Compare the matter of appellate review of a criminal conviction. The
Supreme Court's decision in McKane v. Durston, 153 US. 684 (1894), that
due process does not require a state to provide an appeal at all, still stands. See
Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). Yet, the Court has held that, since
appellate review is of sufficient consequence, at least as to "the one and only
appeal an indigent has as of right," the state must provide counsel. Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). See the discussion at notes 48-8 supra.
Suppose that an indigent's appointed trial counsel terminated his relation-
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THE RIGHT TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL IN
"CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS":
WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE?

When petitioner Betts sought the absolute right to assigned
counsel for indigent noncapital state defendants, he furnished the
Supreme Court no stopping point and the Court saw none: 0
To deduce from the due process clause a rule binding upon the States
in this matter would be to impose upon them, as Judge Bond points
out, a requirement without distinction between criminal charges of different magnitude or in respect of courts of varying jurisdiction. As he
says: "Charges of small crimes tried before justices of the peace and
capital charges tried in the higher courts would equally require the appointment of counsel. Presumably it would be argued that trials in the
Traffic Court would require it." And, indeed, it was said by petitioner's counsel both below and in this court, that as the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the protection of due process to property as well
as to life and liberty, if we hold with the petitioner, logic would require
the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving property.

The demands of petitioner Gideon were more modest. Like
Betts, he urged the abandonment of the "special circumstances"
test in noncapital cases - but only in prosecutions for "a serious
criminal offense.

'270

Indeed, he reminded the Court of its own

holdings to the effect that the right to trial by jury "in all criminal prosecutions" - the opening phrase in the sixth amendment
which qualifies the right to the "assistance of counsel" and all
other rights enumerated in the amendment - "does not extend to
'petty' offenses." 2 7 '
ship with the defendant as soon as sentence was imposed, and, as a result, the
indigent failed to file notice of appeal within the prescribed time. Despite the
fact that no specific information as to appeal time is given to either rich or
poor defendants, a persuasive argument may be made that the indigent defendant's right to equal protection has been violated. Cf. Coffman v. Bomar,
220 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
Is this any different than allowing counsel after arrest only to those who
request it? Arguably, "yes," because in the "appeal hypothetical" the financially able defendant would know of his obligation to request an appeal because
he was already represented by counsel while the indigent would not know because he was not represented. But perhaps "no," because in the "counsel after
arrest hypothetical" the disparity in knowledge between the financially able
defendant and the indigent defendant may be just as great as in the "appeal
hypothetical" irrespective of the presence of counsel.
269. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
270. Brief for Petitioner, p. 6, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1903).
271. Id. at 44 n.43. See generally Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years
Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Mien. L. IEV. 219,
267-70 (1962).
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The 23 attorneys general who filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of272petitioner Gideon were more emphatic about a cut-off
point:
There will be some administrative burdens imposed upon the bench
and bar if Betts v. Brady is reconsidered. But these are not insuperable.
By such measures as limiting at this time the constitutional right to
counsel to felonies ... the problem in respect to the courts can be contained ....
We repeat that we are limiting our claim to the constitutional right
to representation for felonies. Gideon . . . is a felony case, and the
question of the right to obtain counsel in misdemeanors is not before
this Court.... As of this time, in any event, the experience of the
states justifies the restriction of the right to serious charges ....

Petitioner showed the Gideon Court a stopping point and an

amicus brief urged another one, but will the Court stop at either
place? Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, agreed that the "special
circumstances" rule should be
abandoned in noncapital cases, at least as to offenses which, as the one
involved here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence.
(Whether the rule should extend to all criminal cases need not now
273
be decided.)

However, Mr. Justice Black, in an opinion in which five other
'members of the Court joined, was somewhat less circumspect:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
...This noble ideal [equality before the law] cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer
to assist him.74

A.

DEFnIoNAL PRoBLEMs

"Crime" covers a multitude of sins. In Minnesota, it means
"conduct which is prohibited by statute and for which the actor
may be sentenced to imprisonment or fine."2 75 The Gideon majority opinion nowhere considers the "wedge" objection which so pervades the Betts case, but is Gideon nevertheless only the "opening wedge"? Does it signify the assignment of counsel for drunks,
speeding and parking violators?
272. Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae, pp. 3, 21.
273. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963).
274. Id. at 344. (Emphasis added.) See CouNcm OF STATE Govzm,'-ANSTs,
INCREAS

RIGHTS FOR DEEND-Ts n

STATE CRIUINAL PoSECUTIONs

30

(1963): "The language in the Gideon case is sufficiently broad and flexible so
as to easily permit the.. extension.., to all crimes, including misdemeanors."
275. Minn- Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.0°(1).
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If so, then in the opinion of all those interviewed, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders alike, the Supreme Court has indeed
unleashed a "parade of horrors." And none of those interviewed
seemed to recognize the possible application of Douglas v. California276 to appeals in misdemeanor cases. 7
Even those inclined to push ahead on other fronts - for example, assign counsel in habeas corpus proceedings and at probation
revocation hearings - balked at extending the Gideon principle
to all misdemeanor cases. Typical of the reception such a suggestion met were:
"What? All misdemeanor cases. Absolutely not! You can't expect society to go that far!"
"That's an intolerable burden on the bench, the bar and the
county treasury!"
"Ridiculous! And no one who has ever sat on a municipal bench
and stared down at fifty drunks on a Monday morning could feel
otherwise."
"It's just nonsensical to provide an attorney at state expense
when the man's defense would cost the government more than
the fine involved."
Should the line be drawn at felonies, (or, in Minnesota's case,
at gross misdemeanors), or should misdemeanors be covered as
well? The issue is often framed in such terms, since an obvious
place to draw the line is where much of the law already does at the felony-misdemeanor boundary. 78 This is, however, only a
shorthand, and somewhat oversimplified, statement of the issue.
Many state codes contain crimes of "felony" gravity, carrying
"felony" penalties, which are nevertheless labeled "misdemeanors." Conversely, relatively minor offenses, carrying light maximum sentences, are sometimes designated "felonies."
Thus, a generation ago, the State of Maryland suggested then quickly rejected - the possibility that the force of petitioner
Betts' reasoning could be limited to "capital cases and felonies":27
[Blut this line would not be practical in Maryland, and . . . in other
States ....
For instance, the larceny of dogs or cats in this State is
a felony yet a conviction for it is subject to confinement in jail for not

276. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
277. See generally text accompanying notes 37-38 & 52 supra.
278. See, e.g., Bennett, Right to Counsel- A Due Process Requirement,
23 LA. L. Rnv. 662, 668 (1963): "It is sincerely hoped that future . . . decisions will not extend the indigent defendants' 'due process' right to courtappointed counsel beyond the actual holding of Gideon v. Wainwright, i.e.,
where the defendant is charged with a felony."
279. Brief for Respondent, p. 22, Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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more than three months . .. while a violation of certain of the motor
vehicle laws of Maryland providing a fine of $5,000 and imprisonment
for five years is merely a misdemeanor .... These instances arc only
cited to show the anomalies that may result from an application of the
mechanical rule ....
The answer, of course, is that the rule need not be applied me-

chanically. Utilization of the basic felony-misdemeanor dichotomy
need not preclude a critical recognition of certain "misclassified"

offenses. -oreover,

it is most doubtful that the states would be

allowed to apply such a test mechanically. That is to say, even if
the Supreme Court were to draw a halt at the felony-misdemeanor
line, it would quite likely remind the states that their character-

ization of criminal offenses for varied, unrelated state purposes
does not bind the federal judiciary when the content of a federal
right is at stake.

0

Were it otherwise, an unrepresented indigent defendant could
be deprived of his liberty for as much as five or ten years, because

the serious crime for which he was found guilty happened to be
! 2- called a "misdemeanor."
' Were it otherwise - if the right to assigned counsel were limited to "felony" prosecutions and the con-

280. Cf. Gonzales v. Barber, 207 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347
U.S. 637 (1954):
[Petitioner] argues that the crime is not, per se, one which involves
moral turpitude. A California case is cited.... However, there the
California court was concerned with whether the crime involved such
moral turpitude as to reflect upon the attorney's moral fitness to practice law, a state question. Here we are faced with the federal question
of whether the crime involves such moral turpitude as to show that the
alien has a criminal heart and a criminal tendency.... In the federal
law, assault with a deadly weapon is such a crime.
Cf. Fulda & Hiemme, The Statute of Limitations in Antitrust Litigation,
16 OnIo ST. LT. 33, 241-44 (1955). See generally Mishkin, The Variouness
of 'Tedral Law":. Competence and Discretiol in the Choice of National and
State Rules for Decisim, 105 U. PA. L. Rsv. 797 (1957).
281. In June of 1962, Delaware Deputy Attorney General E. Norman
Veasey, a member of a recently appointed Committee of the Superior Court
of Delaware directed to study existing and proposed rules for appointment of
counsel, reported that his examination of the Delaware Code "indicates ...
in excess of thirty-five statutory misdemeanors" punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment, among them narcotic violations classified as "misdemeanors" but punishable by as much as ten years in prison. Veasey, Preliminary Report to the Committee of the Superior Court of Delaware (unpublished
report in University of Mimnesota Law Library).
The most atypical grading of offenses occurs in New Jersey, where, fortunately, N.J. RuLus 1:1,-9 provides counsel as of right to all indigents
"charged with a crime." Almost all crimes are designated "misdemeanors" or
"high misdemeanors" by New Jersey law. For example, kidnapping, punishable
by life imprisonment, N.J. hav. STAT. § 2:143-1 (1937), is classified a "high
misdemeanor."
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tent of such a right were not a "federal question" - then a state
legislature could largely frustrate the purpose of the Gideon case
simply by changing the classification of an offense from "felony"
to "misdemeanor," the substance and reality remaining the
282
same.
In short, where the question raised is whether or not the right
to assigned counsel should extend to "misdemeanor" cases, we
would hope and expect that even if it were answered in the negative, "federal characterization" of the "felony" category for purposes of the Gideon rule would prevent the anomalous results suggested by Maryland in its Betts brief. For these purposes, federal
law could achieve something along these lines: The "felony" characterization would (1) subsume at least those offenses - whether
designated "felonies" or "misdemeanors" by state law - punishable by a term exceeding one year (the definition of felony now
generally employed in most jurisdictions); 23 and perhaps also include (2) any offense designated a "felony" by a particular state,
4
2
regardless of the maximum penalty it carries.

1

Although the foregoing definitional problem is not present in
Minnesota where a "crime for which a sentence of imprisonment
for more than one year may be imposed" is designated a "felony,"'25 5 local law does depart from the typical grading of offenses
282. For example, because juries were reluctant to convict a person of
"negligent homicide," in 1947 Michigan designated the offense (until then a
felony) a "misdemeanor," and although the maximum penalty was lowered,
the "misdemeanor" is still punishable by two years imprisonment. Micn.
CoNvn. LAws § 750.324 (1948). Cf. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 179-80,
188 N.E. 853, 356 (1932) (Crane, J., dissenting) (protesting that an accused
may be deprived of procedural safeguards by changing the name of an offense
from "burglary" or "larceny" to "juvenile delinquency").
283. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05, comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
284. "[W]hen a sufficient amount is involved [in stealing, larceny, and its
variants] the infamy is that of a felony, which, says Maitland, is'. . . as bad
a word as you can give to man or thing."' Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (Jackson, J.). The "bitter incidentals" which flow from
this categorization "far exceeds" the prison sentence per se "as a measurement of society's determination to chastise and humiliate"; the "felon" or
"ex-felon" brand reduces a person to a "handicapped 'twilight' citizen." Teeters,
The Loss of Civil Rights of the Convicted Felon and Their Reinstatement, 52
PRisoN J. 77, 80, 86 (1945). See also BARNES & TETrERs, Nwv HoIzoNs IN
CRinmmOLOOY 544-46 (3d ed. 1959); Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners,Annals, May, 1954, pp. 101-02.
285. Mimi. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 758, § 609.02(2). The new Minnesota
Criminal Code, adopting § 17 of the California Penal Code, provides that
"notwithstanding a conviction is for a felony" the conviction is "deemed to
be for a misdemeanor .

.

. if the sentence imposed is within the limits pro-

vided by law for a misdemeanor" or, under certain circumstances, when the

1963]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

in another respect. Non-felonies are broken down into two categories: "misdemeanors" and "gross misdemeanors. '28- And present
law already entitles indigent defendants to assigned counsel in all
gross misdemeanor (any crime punishable by more than 90 days
but not more than one year of incarceration) as well as all felony
prosecutions.2 87 Thus, when the question of whether the Gideon
principle should extend to "misdemeanors" is raised in this State,
what is meant is whether it should govern those offenses "for
which a sentence of not more than 90 days or a fine of not more
than $100 may be imposed." 2a Here, the Gideon principle already
applies to a number of crimes generally designated "misdemeanors" elsewhere.
While there was unanimity in the Mnnesota counties surveyed
that not all misdemeanants should be furnished counsel at state
expense, there was much discord as to whether any misdemeanant
should be afforded such assistance. Six of the seven county attorneys interviewed thought no misdemeanant should be given such
aid (although one of the six added: "with the possible exception
of driving while intoxicated"), but only two of the 16 district
and municipal judges interviewed shared this view.2 8
imposition of sentence is stayed, Mimn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.13,
but it is fairly clear that the crime remains a felony until sentence is imposed.
Cf. People v. Weaver, 56 Cal. App. 2d 732, 737-38, 133 P.2d 818, 821 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1943).
286. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, §§ 609.00(3), (4).
287. Mnmn. STAT. § 611.07 (1961). The field study disclosed that in two
counties counsel is also appointed- on rare occasions- in misdemeanor cases.
At least one judge has been appointing lawyers in a few misdemeanor cases

"when a municipal judge or justice of the peace asks me to do so." And the
public defender in another county reported that infrequently he "represents
a misdemeanor defendant, chiefly those charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor [MwN. STAT. § 260.315 (1961)], at the request of the
presiding judge, who asks that it be done as a favor."
288. Ann. Sess. Laws 1968, ch. 753, § 609.02(3).
289. Although 17 judges were interviewed, since a meeting with one municipal judge was abbreviated he was not asked for his views on this matter.
A much greater resistance to furnishing counsel in any misdemeanor case
is reflected in the mail replies: 51 of 55 county attorneys and 12 of 15 district
judges took a flat "no" position. On the other hand, whereas no person inter.
viewed favored appointing counsel in every misdemeanor case, four persons
(a judge and three prosecutors) responding to the mail questionnaire did advocate such an absolute approach. We suspect that many, if not most, responding to the questionnaires assumed they had to take a flat "yes" or "no" position because of the way in which the question was asked. Interestingly, eight of
the 24 appointed counsel responding by mail volunteered the suggestion that
counsel should be provided in additional kinds of cases, such as "serious misdemeanors." For reasons previously noted, see note 81 upra and accompanying
text, where the mail replies and the personal interviews vary substantially, we
consider the interviews more reliable.
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CONCEPT

The crucial problem, as most judges viewed the matter, and as
one of them put it, is to "come up with some rule or principle - if
there is one - which covers the serious misdemeanors, but weeds
out the really petty stuff." If no such dividing line can be
drawn, 290 if the question of assigned counsel in misdemeanor cases
resolves itself into an "all or nothing" proposition, then, the thrust
of their views was that limited funds and lawyer-manpower and
the need for judicial economy dictate that it be "nothing."
There was a variety of theories as to where the line ought to
be drawn between felonies and gross misdemeanors on the one
hand, and simple traffic cases on the other, but a "core" idea ran
through the answers of 11 of the 14 judges (and the one prosecutor) who preferred to extend the right to counsel to some
misdemeanors. They thought that the test should turn in large
measure on the nature and consequences of the offense, on the way
in which friends, neighbors, employers and the general public
viewed the matter.
One of the 11 judges put it in these terms: "Is the misdemeanor akin to a felony, as is true of, say, simple assault or petty
larceny?" A good starting point for such an inquiry, he suggested,
would be whether mens rea was an element of the offense. 2 1 Two
290. Two district judges from different parts of the state were greatly
troubled by their failure to perceive any limiting principle to the Gideon case.
One of them commented:
If the basic theory of Gideon is sound - and of course we have to
assume it is-there is no logical distinction between a "felony" and
any other "crime." All I can say is that when you get down to some
offenses, say spitting on the sidewalk, you reach the point of reduotio
ad absurdum. You come to a point where no rational man-not even
the defendant himself - expects the county boards - pressed as they
are - to subsidize the defense.
Cf. BicxuL, TE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 59 (1962):
[T]he demand for neutral principles . . . is that the Court rest judgment only on principles that will be capable of application across the
board and without compromise, in all relevant cases in the foreseeable
future . . . . If it sometimes hurts, nothing is better proof of its validity. If it must sometimes fail of application, it won't do. Given the
nature of a free society and the ultimate consensual basis of all its
effective law, there can be but very few such principles.
291. This judge also advanced the requirement of "intent" as an alternative test and "any misdemeanor where a defendant is likely to be jailed" as
another alternative. As to this last approach, see text accompanying notes
309-15 infra.
In holding that omission of any mention of "intent" from 18 U.S.C. § 641
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others would focus on "whether the misdemeanor involved 'moral
turpitude.' 292 A fourth thought that the crucial feature was
whether a "public or social stigma attached." "There's no stigma
to speeding or going through a stop sign; everybody does that."
The remaining seven judges, and the lone prosecutor who favored
providing counsel in some misdemeanor cases, stressed the extralegal as well as the legal consequences. In proposing a "serious
misdemeanor"-"trivial misdemeanor" distinction, they felt that
such factors as loss of job and higher insurance premiums should
be considered.
Although all of these persons formulated their views in a
somewhat different fashion, they reached substantially similar results. Of the nine (including the prosecutor) who cited specific examples of misdemeanors covered by their proposed tests, all but
(1958) (making it a misdemeanor punishable by not more than one year in
prison to "embezzle, steal, purloin or kmowingly convert" government property) did not eliminate that element from the crimes denounced, the Court
pointed out in Morissette v. United States, 34- U.S. 246, 252, 260 (1952):
[C]ourts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the
instruction of juries around such terms as . . . "criminal intent"...
"fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "senter,"to denote guilty kmowledge,
or "mewns rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability. By use
or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect
those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous
common-law crimes. Stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents,
were among the earliest offenses kmown to the law that existed before
legislation; they . . . stir a sense of insecurity in the whole community
and arouse public demand for retribution, the penalty is high and, when
a sufficient amount is involved, the infamy is that of a felony ....
State courts of last resort ... have consistently retained the requirement of intent in larceny-type offenses.
For thoughtful discussion of the mens 7ea concept and the standard for
deciding when it ought to be read into criminal statutes, see HAm, Gum-nAL
immAL LAw 70-211, 351-59 (2d ed. 1960); Mueller, On
PRmCIPE OF Cvn
Common Law Mens Rea, 42 M]NN. L. llv. 1043 (1958); Packer, Mlcn Rea
and the Supreme Court,in 1962 THE Surmzm CoURT REviEw 107, especially
150-52 (Kurland ed.).
292. "The term 'moral turpitude' has deep roots in the law. The presence
of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations, including
legislation governing the disbarment of attorneys and the revocation of medical licenses [and] ... as a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching witnesses." Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951). "[i]t is not decisive
that the crime is described as a felony, since moral turpitude does not inhere
in all felonies. Conversely, some misdemeanors may be held to involve moral

turpitude."
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(1959). For a comprehensive classification of specific crimes, see id. at 472-81.
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20
two named petty larceny; five, "driving under the influence;
four, simple assault. The only other misdemeanors specifically
cited as falling within the coverage of their proposals were "bad

checks" (two)2 94 and "hit and run" (one).205
293. Four of the five cited "driving while under the influence" [DWUI]
without qualification; a fifth specifically limited the offense to "DWUI, if it
carries a mandatory jail sentence." (In the case of a second conviction for this
offense in a three-year span, the penalty is not less than 10 nor more than 90
days imprisonment, MINN. STAT. § 169.121 (1961).)
It is interesting to note that in each of the five instances DWUI (qualified
or not) was listed as a "serious" misdemeanor, it was the first misdemeanor so
named. One judge went so far as to say that he regarded DWUI (first offense)
the only misdemeanor "serious" enough to warrant the assignment of counsel
in indigent cases. A second judge went almost as far. He indicated a preference
for a "'fiat rule' that counsel be provided indigents accused of 'serious' misdemeanors and broad discretion to appoint counsel elsewhere." What misdemeanors fell in the "flat rule" category? DWUI (first offense) was the only
one he was "sure about," although a moment later he added, "maybe petty
larceny, too."
The two judges who singled out DWUI as perhaps the only misdemeanor
warranting the assignment of counsel placed great stress on the "public stigma"
which attaches to this offense, the mandatory revocation of a driver's license
for even a first offense (not less than 80 days), and the mandatory jail sentence for a second conviction within three years (not less than 10 days). A
third judge who listed DWUI and petty larceny, pointed out that the "stigma"
is likely to cut more deeply in these cases because "generally a better class of
person" commits these offenses. He had in mind not only the otherwise lawabiding drunken driver but the "kleptomaniac housewife or grandma who shoplifts during the Christmas season."
But doesn't this last point cut two ways? Are not those offenders who represent a "better class" more likely to be the beneficiaries of police-prosecution
discretion? less likely to have their procedural rights violated? less likely to be
given maximum sentences or jail sentences at all? Is not the need for legal
representation greatest for those misdemeanor defendants of "the worst type,"
those from a "lower class," and those with prior histories of minor offenses?
294. The issuance of a check with the intent, at the time of issuance that
it not be paid, is punishable by 90 days imprisonment or a fine of $100. Minn.
Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.535. Prior to the passage of the new code,
there were two statutes on the subject, Minn. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 243, § 1,
ch. 282, the first making the issuance of a "worthless check" a gross misdemeanor, the second making it a misdemeanor. See PRoPosED MINNESOTA
CRnvrNAL CODE § 609.535, comment (1962). However, except for "repeaters,"
"bad check" offenders were almost invariably charged under the misdemeanor
provision.
295. Although never once mentioned, probably because the new Minnesota
Criminal Code had not yet gone into effect at the time of the interviews, or,
in any event, because few persons could be expected to know or recall offhand that the new Code takes this offense out of the "felony" category,
"simple arson" is now a leading candidate for "serious misdemeanor" honors.
The intentional damaging or destruction of property of less than $100 value
"by means of fire or explosives," now only carries a maximum sentence of
90 days imprisonment or $100 fine. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.565.

1963]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

What these judges and prosecutors were groping for, although
none articulated it in these terms, is something approximating the
"serious misdemeanor"-"petty offense" distinction which now prevails in the sixth amendment trial by jury cases -the stopping
point, as already noted, suggested by petitioner in the Gideon
case.
Although Johnson v. Zerbst" has been on the books for a
quarter of a century, the Supreme Court has never passed on the
question of whether the sixth amendment right to assigned counsel
"in all criminal prosecutions" includes all - or any - "misdemeanors." However, the "criminal prosecutions" category qualifies not only the right to counsel but all the rights enumerated in
the sixth amendment, among them the right to trial by jury. And
the Court has illuminated the "criminal prosecution" term in trial

by jury cases.

There is no right to a jury for those charged with federal "petty
offenses" or "summary offenses" - for example, dealing in secondhand goods without a license, punishable by a maximum sentence
of 90 days or 300 dollar fine.F97 Although there may be a presumption that a maximum punishment of 90 days - the highest penalty for a "misdemeanor" in Minnesota - connotes a "petty" or
"summary" character, 298 this factor is hardly decisive. One must
296. 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (sixth amendment furnishes indigent right to
assigned counsel in all federal "criminal proceedings").
297. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
298. See id. at 627-29. An early draft of the MODEr PENr CODE § 1.05(4)
(Tent Draft No. 2, 1954), defined a "petty misdemeanor" as an offense not,
punishable by more than three months' imprisonment. The revised definition
designates an offense a "petty misdemeanor" if the maximum sentence does
not exceed thirty days. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(4) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962).
The Federal Criminal Code characterizes as "petty" those offenses punishable by no more than six months' imprisonment, $500, or both. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1958). That. the sole criterion is the severity of potential punishment is
conceptually unsound. The Clawans opinion first notes that "apart from the
prescribed -penalty, the offense of which petitioner was convicted is, by its
nature, of this ["petty ' ] class," 300 U.S. at 625, then considers the significance
of the maximum. penalty. Moreover, the Court has ruled that reckless driving
cannot be classified as a "petty offense," notwithstanding a maximum penalty
of 30 days or $100. See text accompanying note 300 infra.. However, two
commentators have concluded that factors other than the severity of potential
punishment "have only academic relevance here, for al offenses now in the
United States Code which fall within the petty offenses definition appear
dearly not to involve any 'obvious depravity' and hence may constitutionally
be classed as petty offenses." Doub & IKestenbaum, Federal Magistrates for
the Trial of Petty Offenses: Need and Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. Rltv.
443, 469. (1959).
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also reckon with the "gravity" of the offense. Thus, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the offense of "reckless driving," although
subject only to a maximum punishment of 30 days imprisonment
or 100 dollar fine (the Minnesota offenses of "reckless driving" and
"driving under the influence" are punishable by 90 days imprisonment and 100 dollar fine), 2 9 could not be categorized a "petty offense," in respect of which Congress may dispense with a trial: 0 0
The offense here charged is not merely malum prohibititum, but in its
very nature is malum in se.... [It] is an act of such obvious depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to shock the general moral sense. If the act . . .had culminated in the death of a human being, respondent would have been subject to indictment for
some degree of felonious homicide.

That the "petty offense" concept does not always produce tidy,
neat results may be its weakness, but it is also its strength. In
the last analysis, as two astute commentators observed many
years ago, this concept
invokes judgment and not mechanical tests in the use of common-law
history in the life of the law today. We cannot exclude recognition of
a scale of moral values according to which some offenses are heinous
and some are not .... The history of the common law does not solve
the problem of judgment which it raises in demonstrating that the guaranty . . . did not cover offenses which, because of their quality and
their consequences, had a relatively minor place in the register of misconduct.3 01

That the "petty offense" concept defies any closed definition,
that "commonly accepted views of the severity of punishment
. . . may become so modified that a penalty once thought to be
mild may come to be regarded as so harsh as to call for the jury
trial,

80

2

is nicely illustrated by Minnesota's experience with the

DWUI misdemeanor. In 1937 the Minnesota Supreme Court regarded it as an offense which "neither involves such moral turpitude as would remove it from that class of cases in which there is
no right to a jury trial, nor is it of such a serious nature that it
should be given the character of a common-law crime."'8 Two
decades later, however, the court re-examined- and rejected this point of view "in the light of present-day realities. 8 0 4 It no
longer saw anything "mild" about a maximum punishment of 90
299. MiNN.

STAT.

§§ 169.121, .13 (1961).

300. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930).
301. Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 H.Aav. L. R1v.917, 981 (1926).
302. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1937).
303. State ex rel. Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 625, 273 N.W. 233,
234 (1937).
304. State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 486, 441, 98 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1959).

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
days in prison and, "when the motor vehicle has clearly become a
necessity to many people," 30 5 a mandatory revocation of driver's
license for not less than S0 days.
"At any given time," it has been said, due process "includes
those procedures that are fair and feasible in the light of then existing values and capabilities.'3081In considering how far the right
to assigned counsel extends, perhaps we would do well to take
into account the "feeling for judicial economy and dignity, realization of the disproportionate burden upon courts, jurors and defendants of handling all crimes upon the same procedural basis,
and . . .moral judgment ' 3 0 7 reflected in the historic, yet dynamic, classification of "petty offenses" for trial by jury purposes.308

C.

TR.IOoD

OF JLM SENTENCE

The views of the one prosecutor and 11 of the 14 judges who
would apply the Gideon principle to some misdemeanor cases have
been considered. What was the thinking of the remaining five interviewed - three judges and two public defenders - who also
favored such a result?
Three - one judge and both public defenders - minimized the
305. Id. at 441-42; 98 N.W.2d at 817.
306. Schaefer, Federalsm and State Criminal Procedure,7o HAnv. L. REv.
1, 6 (1956). (Emphasis added.)

307. Doub &Kestenbaum, supra note 298, at 447.
308. Despite the view to the contrary in Note, 48 CAIw. L. Rv. 501, 506

(1960), we do not consider this approach inconsistent with Evans v. Rives,
126 Fad 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942), apparently the only lower federal court case
to consider the scope of the sixth amendment right to assigned counsel in
the felony-misdemeanor context.
Evans did hold that petitioner, charged with the misdemeanor of failing
to support a minor child, was entitled to appointed counsel if he could not
afford to retain his own. And it does contain language supporting the view
that an indigent charged with an offense punishable by as much as one day
in jail is entitled to counsel at state expense. It is fairly clear, however, that
the Evans court did not consider, nor did the District of Columbia call to
its attention, the trial by jury misdemeanor-petty offense distinction. Of course
there was no point in the District's doing so. The nonsupport charge, albeit
a misdemeanor, carried a maximum punishment of one year in the workhouse
- petitioner's actual sentence. Clearly, this made it more than a "petty offense"; indeed some years earlier the Supreme Court had classified this very
offense an "infamous crime." United States v. Moreland, 258 U.. 433 (1922).
Thus, all the District could do was contend that the sixth amendment right
to counsel did not apply to any misdemeanor prosecution. The court ruled
to the contrary, but it did not hold -since this was not a "petty offense"
case it could not hold-that the sixth amendment right to assigned counsel
extended to petty offenders as well.
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significance of the maximum punishment prescribed for an offense
"on paper," and focused instead on the likelihood, if a conviction
resulted in a particularcase, that the defendant would go to jail and on the probable length of the sentence.8 00
The judge who advocated this approach was the most articulate of the three:
I don't think it's very useful to label a certain misdemeanor -as
an
abstract matter -"serious"
or "not serious." Whether or not somebody
found guilty of a misdemeanor is going to be sentenced to jail turns to
a large extent on (1) the particular facts surrounding the individual
case- were there mitigating or aggravating elements? (2) the defendant's particular background-his prior offenses, if any.
Now, take "simple assault," for example. We've had cases where
somebody slashed or knifed a person, but was only prosecuted for
"simple assault." On the other hand, sometimes people are charged with
this same misdemeanor when they've done little more than push somebody in the elevator, or shove somebody around a little bit.
If found guilty, the "knifing" assaulter is probably going to be given
a maximum 90 day sentence. But it's not likely that the "pushing" assaulter will get a day in jail. Unless, that is, the record shows he's done
this sort of thing a number of times before. 10

Along these same lines, one public defender suggested that the
cut-off point for assigned counsel in misdemeanor cases might be
those prosecutions "involving a strong possibility of a sentence of
80 days or more." Although the other defender also laid stress on
what the "actual punishment" would likely be, he raised another,
albeit related, point. He thought that in addition to misdemeanor
prosecutions creating a substantial possibility of imprisonment,
coverage should be extended to those charged with "misdemeanors not necessarily 'serious' in themselves, but which, if committed
again, would carry relatively long jail sentences."
To illustrate his point, he cited the misdemeanor of "indecent
exposure." "[A]fter having once been convicted of such an offense
inthis state," a person committing the offense a second time is
guilty of a gross misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for
309. As pointed out earlier, note 291 supra, another judge advanced a
similar test as an alternative to a "serious" misdemeanor -"trivial"
offense
approach. Moreover, a third judge, who advocated a "flat rule" in serious
cases and wide discretion elsewhere, see note 293 supra, presumably would
assign great weight to the likelihood of an actual jail sentence in the exercise
of such discretion.
310. For a general discussion of the very substantial victim-police-prosecutor discretion not to invoke the felonious assault laws, see Goldstein, Police
DiscretionNot To Invoke the CriminalProcess:Low-Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 YALEL
I.J. 543, 573-80 (1960).
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one years' And if, within a five year period, he is convicted of the
offense a third time, pointed out the defender, he is "guilty of being an habitual offender" and subject to punishment "if a man
between the ages of 18 and 30 years, by imprisonment in the state
reformatory," and if older, "by imprisonment in the state prison
. . for a term . .. not exceeding three years.""
Those who attached great significance to the likelihood of actual incarceration in a particular misdemeanor case contributed a
valuable insight to the problem. It is interesting to note that the
same notion that the actual punishment imposed is the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense -but from another perspective - is reflected in the new Minnesota Criminal Code. It
provides that "notwithstanding a conviction is for a felony" it is
"deemed to be for a misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor if the
sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor. ...
However, this sensitive case-by-case approach to assigned
counsel in misdemeanor cases may well be too fine, too subtle, to
prove workable. There is much to be said for a broader, simpler
rule -a blunter rule, if you will. A rule which would "make it
hard for even the dull or duffer to go too far wrong"; 14 one
which (considering the litigation the suggested case-by-case approach could breed) might well prove less costly in the long run.
Moreover, and more fundamentally, an approach based exclusively on the likely or actual punishment overlooks that a stigma
attaches to - and serious extra-legal consequences may stem from
-such
misdemeanors as larceny, assault, and drunken driving,
even though a convicted defendant does not in fact see the inside
*

of a jail..
STAT. § 617.23 (1961). The Advisory Committee on Revision of
Criminal Law proposed that the increase in penalty for a second conviction of "indecent exposure" be deleted, see Proposed Nnumesota
Criminal Code § 609.695 (1962) and accompanying comment, but before final
passage of the new code, this recommended section, inter alia, was withdrawn
pending further study.
311.

the

MnM.

rinnesota

312. Mnn. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 251, § 1. These Minnesota provisions were
abolished by the new code, which went into effect subsequent to this interview.
Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 758, § 609.155. See generally Pirsig, Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47 Mum-. L. REv. 417, 461-63 (1903).
Nevertheless, the public defender's comments in this regard remain significant, for provisions similar to old § 617.75, Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 251, § 1,
are still prevalent throughout the country.
313. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.13. See PnoPosn Mm--TrA
CnnmwA
CoDE § 609.13, comment (1962). See also note 285 supra.
314. Cf. LLtwELLN, Tan CommaoN LAw TnAwrnom : Dncwnza APPEAs
Aimi.

291 (1960).
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If the right to assigned counsel is extended to "serious" misdemeanors categorically, and in addition a broad discretion to appoint counsel is permitted in all other misdemeanor cases, the likelihood of a jail sentence should certainly be a dominant consideration in the exercise of this discretion. 1" Indeed, there is something
to be said for going further - for requiring the assignment of
counsel whenever in fact a defendant is sentenced to jail in these
lesser misdemeanor cases. If this were the test, then when there
was a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be deprived of his liberty if convicted, assigned counsel would be
available at the outset. If the judge miscalculated and failed
to proffer assigned counsel, yet sentenced an indigent to jail and in the overwhelming majority of cases, of course, this would
be after a plea of guilty -then the defendant would have the
option of starting anew - with counsel.
D.

OTER SELECTIVE APPROAcHES

Two judges who favored furnishing counsel in some misdemeanor cases remain to be accounted for. One, a municipal judge,
felt counsel should be assigned whenever an indigent defendant
expressed a desire for one. Indeed, this judge indicated he was putting this policy into effect immediately: "I'm going to see to it
that every indigent misdemeanor defendant who asks for a lawyer
is going to get one - even if I have to call up the President of the
Bar Association and request that he represent him."
It is not surprising that a judge would feel especially uncomfortable about forcing an indigent to "go it alone" in the face of
his specific request for representation. Prior to the overruling of
Betts, the practice in a number of jurisdictions was to honor specific requests even though their laws did not require the appointment of counsel in all felony cases.81 Analytically, however, it is
difficult to see why the availability of counsel should turn on the
defendant's request for representation - unless all indigent defendants are made aware that they can request such aid.81 7 Of
course, once they are, the proposed "limitation" on the right to
assigned counsel in the misdemeanor area disappears - it comes
down to nothing more than the correlative right to waive counsel,
one which now exists in all felony cases.
315. See note 309 supra.
316. See the extracts from correspondence with prosecuting attorneys
and/or the attorney general's office in Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
FourteenthAmendment: A Dialogue on "The Most PervasiveRight" of an Accused, S0 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 67-74 (1962).
317. See text accompanying notes 263-68 supra.
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The last judge inclined to assign counsel in some misdemeanor
cases was of the view that legal representation should be provided
when - regardless of the gravity of the offense or the punishment
it carried - "the defense appears to be of real substance or the
facts of a particular case are sufficiently complex that a lawyer's
skills may aftect the outcome."
This approach smacks of the late and unlamented Betts v.
Brady test. And such a test seems too vulnerable whether applied
to misdemeanor or felony prosecutions. As 23 attorneys general
pointed out, urging the overruling of Betts, in their brief amicus
curiae,in the Gideon case:
coun[According to] Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633, 637 (1959) ...
sel is required if injustice is "apt to result." This means that the Betts
-v. Brady test must now be applied through the perspective of the trial
judge, not the reviewing appellate judge.
But it is difficult to comprehend how, as a practical matter, a trial
judge can do this with the degree of consistency presupposed by a judicial determination placing the onus of such decisions upon him ....
How can the judge ... anticipate what is to come up in trial? ... If
the proof of an alibi.., is extremely difficult to establish, or if the accused gets enmeshed in seeking to examine or cross-examine, is the judge
expected to stay proceedings in order to bring in defense counsel? Suppose the trial proceeds without incident until the sentencing stage, at
which point complicated problems of law arise: will counsel at that time
be ordered in? . .. [Tihe judges of the highest court in this land have
often divided 5 to 4 on whether an indigent accused's possible trial was
a "denial of fundamental fairness." It is now most unrealistic to expect
that the trial judges, looking ahead, can accomplish that which has obviously been so disturbing to this Court from the vantage point of looking back. 18

Moreover, and more fundamentally, it may be that only with
the assistance of counsel can a "defense of real substance" emerge;
that the complexity of the ease may only be perceived after a lawyer has marshalled the relevant facts, studied the law, and presented his case. The decision in Douglas v. Californias' 9 manifests
the Court's concern that without legal aid "any real chance" an
indigent defendant "may have had of showing that his appeal
has hidden merit is deprived him. ' 3- What then may be said of
an indigent defendant's chances when he has never had the assistance of counsel to uncover the "hidden merit" in his case?
How, consistently with the Douglas case, can an unchampioned
indigent defendant be "forced to run this gauntlet of a preliminary
showing of meri
318.
319.
320.
321.

'' 3 1

in the first instance?

Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae, pp. 17-18.
372 U.S. 358 (1963).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
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E.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST APPOINTING CouNsEL

What reasons were advanced by the two judges and six prosecutors who would not apply the Gideon principle to any misdemeanor case? At least three were given:
1.

Not "Serious" Enough

Misdemeanors "aren't that important" or "serious enough."
One prosecutor pre-emptorily dismissed them as "de minimis"; another regarded the assignment of counsel in these cases a "luxury":
"Society has no duty to go that far. A man may have a right to
dental care at state expense, but not to gold inlays."
Persuasive reasons were given by others against this line of
argument. One dwelt on the maximum punishment for many misdemeanors -

"90 days in the county jail is no joke" -

but most

of those who favored the assignment of counsel in some misdemeanor cases stressed the extralegal consequences which stem
from certain misdemeanor convictions. Thus, one municipal judge
observed: "A number of college kids have pled guilty to petty larceny without thinking too much about it. Too many of them don't
think it's a serious matter, either. But when a prospective employer checks up on them -

and I know they do -

and sees "petty

larceny" in a kid's file, he's through, everytime. ' 2 2
A prosecutor made a similar point: "When a person is accused
of shoplifting or passing a bad check, he's facing more than a
misdemeanor charge, his job may be in jeopardy." He also pointed
out that although "driving while intoxicated" is only a misdemeanor, a conviction for such an offense may not only lead to substantially higher insurance premiums, but suspension, severe restriction, or outright revocation of the person's driver's license. Although, he did not point to the language of the Minnesota Supreme Court in the recent case of State v. Moseng,828 he might
well have done so:
Much has been said as to whether a license to operate a motor vehicle
is a right or a privilege. It has been variously denominated as a privilege

322. Consider [1961-1962] SAN FRANcIsco CiT AND

COUNTY

PUDLIC Dr-

FENDER AN . REP. 5:

We are finding that an increasing number of so called minor offenses or
misdemeanors are continually presenting more complex issues and carrying more severe penalties; some penalties, in their practical implications, are considerably more severe than penalties in some felony cases.
Serious, surprising and unanticipated results often follow when an uninformed and inexperienced person pleads guilty to a minor offense either
in order to save time or to win an expected suspension of sentence.
323. 254 Minn. 263, 271, 95 N.W.2d 6, 12-13 (1959). See also State v.
Moosbrugger, 263 Minn. 56, 60, 116 N.W.2d 68, 71 (1962).
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in the nature of a right and as an important privilege or right under
our present mode of living. No one will deny that we have reached a.
time in our modem way of life when the motor vehicle has clearly become a necessity to many people. The very livelihood of many, such as
chauffeurs, truckers, traveling salesmen, men who work in skilled or unskilled labor, depends upon the operation of a motor vehicle. Their drivers' licenses are just as valuable as a license to engage in an occupation or profession ....
It is therefore clear that, whether a driver's license be termed a "privilege" or a "ight," such license, whether restricted or not, once granted, is of substantial value to the holder there-

of

....

One judge summed it up. this way: "Offenses such as drunken
driving or petty larceny carry a stigma. Are they misdemeanors or
felonies? The public just doesn't think that way. It just doesn't
draw that kind of line here."

2.

No, "Prejudice"

Uncounselled misdemeanor defendants are not "prejudiced"
in Minnesota. As one prosecutor put it, "This isn't Alabama, you
know. Our judges are very fair." And a municipal judge maintained: "These misdemeanor defendants are not getting 'hurt'
without counsel; I'm the-best defense counsel these guys have."
This type of reasoning seems to be little more than the Betts v.
Brady approach all over again. It was disposed of in Powel 'v.
Alabamc, 24 the "old precedent" to which the Court "returned" in
Gideon v. Wainwrgh. 25 As the Court pointed out in that very
first fourteenth amendment due process right to counsel case: 8
But how can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively
discharge the obligations of counsel for the accused? ... He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate in those
necessary conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes
partake of the inviolable character of the confessional.

Furthermore, although the municipal judges interviewed are all
reputed to be able lawyers, many, if not most, of those who
"judge" misdemeanor cases have no legal training whatsoever.
According to a 1958 report, of 123 municipal judges in the
state, -55 were nonlawyers.32 7 Undoubtedly, even a smaller percentage of the justices of the peace - how many there are no one
has been able to ascertain,32 s but a 1957 questionnaire to clerks of
324.- 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
325. 372 US. 33, 344 (1963).
326. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).
327. nr momT LowER Count STu
Comrassiox, REPORT 14 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as CoAmrrsoN REPonr].
328. Early this year, a citizens committee comprised largely of judges and
lawyers from Hennepin County (greater imneapolis) reported that "no one
seems certain how many j.p.'s there are in Minnesota" and "even more in-
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are members of the

bar. Although
dissatisfaction with the functioning of the justice of the peace court
system culminated in the overwhelming approval by the voters in 1956
of a state constitutional amendment which abolished the justice of
the peace as a constitutional office . . . those who thought . . . this
would be followed by the early end of the justice of the peace system
were to be disappointed. An Attorney General's opinion and a subsequent Supreme Court decision have held that justice of the peace courts
continue until abolished by law. Thus far, a relatively small proportion
of the justice of the peace courts have been abolished.880

It is difficult to exaggerate the inferiority of the brand of justice
dispensed by "justice courts." Too often, their attitude is that of
one in Minnesota who, when being briefed by a county attorney
on a pending matter, had just one question - "Do I have to listen
to the defendant's side of the case?" ' ' A similar attitude was expressed by another Minnesota justice whose response to a motorist's protestations of innocence was "What you say may be true,
but after all you did get a ticket. Guilty." 8 2
A 1958 Lower Court Study Commission Report condemned the
fee system for justices of the peace: "For all practical purposes defendants under the fee system are in reality deprived of due process of law. ' 85 The report noted that even though in theory the
justice of the peace may be paid if he acquits a defendant by applying to the proper governmental agency for his fee,
this is a cumbersome process. Apparently very few justices of the
peace ever use it, and many may not be aware of it. The Highway Patrol reported that very few of those authorized charges were billed by
the justices of the peace- probably not more than eight or ten per
8384
year.
credible, we have been unable to ascertain for certain how many j.p.'s there
are in Hennepin County." MuIrNcinPA
COURTS COMMITTEE OF CITIZENS
LEAGUE OF MnNEAPoLis AND HENNEPIN CouNTY, REOaRT 12 (1062) [hereinafter cited as CrrizENs LEAGUE REPORT].
This report led to the creation of a Municipal Court of Hennepin County,
to be manned by judges "learned in the law" and "admitted and qualified to
practice in the supreme court of this state"; with jurisdiction, inter alia to try
any charge of violation of "any ordinance, charter provision, rule or regulation
of any subdivision of government in the county"; the merger of the Municipal Court of Mlinneapolis into the Municipal Court of the County; and the
abolition in Hennepin County, as of January 1, 1965, of, inter alia, all "justice courts." Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 877, §§ 1, 2, 7(2), 45, 51.
329. COIMMISSION REPORT 15.

830. CITIZENS LEAGUE REPORT 8.
331. Reported in Note, 47 MINN. L. REv. 93 (1962).
332. Ibid.
333. Co-NmnssioN REPORT 17.
334. Id. at 16-17

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Consider the remarks of a much-experienced and much-respected
voluntary defender concerning lawyer-judges in felony cases:
Frequently in the trial of an uncounselled defendant, I have heard
the judge announce that he will protect the defendant's legal rights.
I have witnessed the agonizing scene in which an unrepresented defendant is asked by the court or the district attorney if he wishes to
cross-examine a witness for the prosecution. Instead of asking a question of the witness in the proper form, the accused, startled and confused, makes a statement contradicting the testimony of the prosecuting
witness. Not infrequently, this violation of the rules of trial procedure
brings forth sharp official rebuke which quickly ends the defendant's
abortive attempt at cross-examination.
I have heard a judge presiding over the trial of a criminal case
inadvertently misquote the governing law to the serious detriment of
the unrepresented defendant. And I have observed the district attorney, preoccupied with the next case, remain silent while an excessive
and illegal sentence was imposed on the uncounselled defendant whose
interest he had said earlier in the proceedings he would protect.
'
how should we deIf such a proceeding is often a "travesty, ' aao
scribe the plight of the uncounselled misdemeanor defendant who
appears before a layman, ignorant of the law,"s? whose office "has
become almost synonymous with miscarriages of justice and in too
many instances with outright corruption"? 33 or before a nonlawyer municipal
judge whose "judicial work is likely to be a side33 9
line activity"?
The need for legal representation in the "justice courts" may
be illuminated by returning to the offense of driving while under
the influence (DWUI). This crime is worth dwelling on, for, as previously noted, it was prominently suggested as a misdemeanor serious enough to be brought within the Gideon fold and it is un-

335. Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 MnsrN. L. Rnv. 737, 741-42
(1961) (Defender, Philadelphia Voluntary Defender Association).
336. Id. at 741.
337. When asked what he thought about trying a case against an unrepresented defendant, the one prosecutor who favored extending the Gideon principle to some misdemeanor cases responded, "I don't like it at all because I feel
I am taking advantage of the defendant. It is especially bad before a lay justice of the peace. Here, the trial loses all semblance of a legal proceeding." Although they balked at assigning counsel in misdemeanor cases, the other
prosecutors interviewed all voiced a considerable "uneasiness" about prosecuting an uncounseled defendant. "It's revolting," said one. Another said of his
experience in bastardy proceedings, where counsel is not assigned: "These
cases are fiascos."
338. Pirsig, The ProposedAmendment of he Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution,40 MEnN. L. REV. 815, 828 (1956).
339. Ibid.
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doubtedly the most prevalent of all the misdemeanors so mentioned. While many instances of DWUI are prosecuted as statutory violations, many more are treated as municipal ordinance
violations. Indeed the number of such municipal violations in
Minneapolis alone almost equals the number of such statutory
violations reported by all county attorneys.8 40
If the Gideon principle is extended to statutory DWUI, it
should surely embrace its municipal ordinance counterpart as
well. The stigma and consequences are the same;84 ' "the fact that
the municipality is given authority to adopt such an ordinance
does not change the nature and quality of the offense. 3 4 2 But until
quite recently fewer procedural safeguards were available to one
accused of an ordinance violation.
In the past few years, however, by virtue of court decision and
legislative mandate, important rights have been extended to the
accused ordinance violator. In 1959, the legislature provided that
such a defendant may demand in writing that his case be removed
from a justice court or a municipal court in which the judge is
paid upon a fee basis to another court presided over by a salaried
judge. 48 Furthermore, although prior to 1959 one charged with
violating an ordinance had no right to a jury trial at any level, as
a result of State v. Hoben3 " and new legislation, 40 most traffic offenders, notably, for our purposes, the alleged drunken driver, are
now afforded a choice between a jury trial at the municipal court
or justice of the peace level and, if a jury is waived at that stage,
a jury trial upon appeal to the district court. 40 These new developments "reflect respected opinion to the effect that the trial of
an action before a layman whose judicial work is a sideline activity is not consonant with the modern view of the sound adminis340. In 1959, 1696 statutory prosecutions were reported throughout the
state as against 1648 Minneapolis municipal prosecutions; in 1960 there were
1595 statutory cases as against 1293 Minneapolis municipal violation cases.
See [1959-60] MINN. ATT'Y GEN. BiENN AL REP. xxxi (Table No. 2); Note, 47
Mn-N. I,. REv. 93, 107 n.64 (1962).
341. mimu r. STAT. § 169.03 (1961) provides that "when any local ordinance
regulating traffic covers the same subject for which a penalty is provided in
this chapter [e.g., DWUI], then the penalty provided for violation of said local
ordinance shall be identical . .. ."
342. State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 443-44, 98 N.W.2d 818, 818 (1959).
But cf. State v. Moosbrugger, 263 Minn. 56, 116 N.W.2d 68 (1962).
343. Mun. STAT. § 531.115 (1961).
344. 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959), 44 MINN. L. Rzv. 755 (1960).
345. MIN. STAT. § 484.63 (1961).
346. See generally Note, 47 MINN. L. Rxv. 93, 99-105 (1962).
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tration of justice." 4 7 More particularly, and most significantly for
our purposes, they manifest the notion that "it should be accepted
without argument that under present-day conditions driving an
automobile while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor is an
3 48
offense of a serious nature"
Has the recent movement to protect the defendant from the arbitrary procedures, too often present in our justice and municipal
courts, munrnized the need for counsel in this area? On reflection,
ironically enough, these new procedural developments only seem
to have accentuated the need.
A person charged with an ordinance violation may have the
right to remove his case from a "judge" operating on a fee basis to
one paid by salary,8 9 but absent counsel, who informs him of this
right? Certainly not the "judge" the legislature was trying to protect him against! He wants the case - and the fee. Again, isn't
the right - on paper- of the unrepresented indigent defendant
to a trial by jury in the first instance and a trial by jury on appeal - or for that matter the right of appeal itself - likely to be
nullified by his ignorance?
The choice of forum for jury trial not available to many alleged
traffic ordinance violators gives rise to a number of interesting tactical possibilities. For example, after hearing the prosecution's
case in municipal or justice court, the defendant may rest, without
disclosing the nature of his defense, and demand a jury trial upon
appeal to the district coure 5 0 But how often is a lone lay defendant likely to use such a "discovery device"?
The new procedural developments in the municipal ordinance
field graphically demonstrate how the right to counsel is "by far
the most pervasive" of all the defendants rights, how "it affects
his ability to assert any other rights he may have.!""' These new
safeguards illustrate poignantly how the more "advances"
achieved in procedure, the more "rights" theoretically available,
the wider grows the gap between those who can afford a lawyer
and those who cannot.
347. Smith v. Tuman, 262 Mrinn. 149, 153, 114 N.W.2d 73, 76-77 (1902).
348. State v. Hoben, 256 Minn.436, 441, 98 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1959).
349. "No provision is made . . . for the payment of any fees or costs...
that have accrued in justice court prior to the time ... [a defendant] demands a change of venue. The only time a justice of the peace can enter costs
against a defendant, in a criminal case, is after his conviction... ." 1960 OP.
Mxmx. A7''y Gm-i. 266b-7. A defendant may demand removal of his case even
after arraignment and entry of plea of not guilty in justice court. Smith v.
Tuman, 262 Mnn. 149, 114 N.W2d. 73 (1962).
350. See generally Note, 47 Mmm. L. RPv.93, 102-05 (1902).
851. Schaefer, supranote 306, at 8.
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Financial Burden

Assignment of counsel in misdemeanor cases would prove an
"intolerable" financial burden on the state, or at least on many
counties.
Of course, the force of this objection varies inversely with the
modesty of the proposal to extend counsel to misdemeanor cases.
For example, minor traffic offenses (excluding those such as driving while intoxicated and driving while a license is suspended or
revoked) account for the great bulk of all "crimes" and, as we
have seen, none of those who favored carrying the Gideon princategory advocated
ciple beyond the felony-gross misdemeanor
52
extending it to this large group
True, a good number of those interviewed would apply Gideon
to DWUI and even excluding its municipal ordinance counterparts35 this is easily the most commonly committed offense cited
for coverage.3 54 But even if "indigency" should turn on a fixed
standard - and we think it should not - the incidence of indigency will undoubtedly be much lower here than for most criminal
defendants generally. Indeed, one judge thought "drunken driv352. Consider [1958-1959] SAN FRANcisco CIrY AND COUNTY PBLIC DEANN. REP. 4:
No one suggests that representation by attorneys is a prerequisite to
justice in such minor offenses as drunkenness or traffic violations. For
the most part, these cases are disposed of with relative informality within the simple framework of procedure by elected magistrates who are
chosen by the people . . . .We do not represent defendants in all misdemeanor cases, such as all vagrants and common drunks. We do, however, handle some of these cases when appointed by the Trial Judge

FENDER

For the fiscal year 1961-1962, however, the San Francisco Public Defender's
Office handled 1075 cases of "disorderly conduct" and 1054 cases of "drunkenness in public places." [1961-1962] SAN FRANcisco CITY AND COUNTY PUDLIC
DEFENDER ANN. REP. 7.
See also Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, in 1962 TuE Surtnnm
COURT Rnvmw 107, 150 (Kurland ed.):
The fact is that the processes of criminal justice are used, or misused,
for purposes that have no odor of criminality except that which resides
in the use of the word itself. Traffic offenses are perhaps the most extreme example. It makes trivial the concept of criminality to apply it
to such minor infractions of the laws.
But see text accompanying notes 360-61 infra.
853. We have already indicated that the mere fact that a person is alleged to have violated a municipal ordinance rather than a statutory provision should not be considered significant for "right to counsel" purposes. See
text accompanying notes 341-42 supra.
354. See, e.g., [1959-1960] Mm. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. XXX-XXXi (Table No. 2).

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
ing" should not be covered because "almost all motorists can afford a lawyer." But this, it seems, cuts in favor of extending it to
those few who cannot.
More fundamentally, however, the concept of "indigency"
should not reflect a stated amount of assets but should vary, depending, among other factors,sss on the expense incident to the defense of the particularoffense. As one municipal judge put it: '"Ve
can expect a much lower percentage of misdemeanor defendants to
be 'indigent' than felony defendants. For many lawyers will be
willing to defend a misdemeanor defendant for much less - many
times less - than their 'felony fee.'" On reflection then, cost may
not be an insuperable obstacle after all.
The "plain guilt" of virtually all misdemeanor defendants was
also advanced as a reason for not extending assigned counsel to
this group. This, more or less, is another way of stating the second
objection considered above - "misdemeanor defendants are not
getting 'hurt' without counsel." And the short answer is the same:
This is Betts v. Brady all over again. The failure of the unrepresented defendant to develop a satisfactory theory, or, if he does,
to support it with adequate evidence, may only be the not improbable consequences of being without the aid of counsel inside
and outside the courtroom 5 6
In all fairness, this much should be added. For certain offenses,
because of victim-police-prosecution discretion, it may be true
that virtually all those ultimately charged are "plainly guilty!."' T
But in a way, this operates in favor of extending the right to as355. See generally notes 101-05 supra and accompanying text.
356. This point is developed in Kamisar, The Right to Cousel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Persuasive Right" of an
Accused, 80 U. Cm'. L. ltnv. 1, 53-65 (1962).
Moreover, even though a misdemeanant's guilt may be "plain," he still may
have a great need for a lawyer at the sentencing stage. One of the Minnesota
judges who was favorably impressed with the operation of the public defender's office in his county cited as one of his reasons: "Even in the clearly guilty
cases, they make good recommendations as to sentencing." The Public Defender of the City and County of San Francisco, who has represented indigent
misdemeanor defendants since 1955, has warned: "Serious and unanticipated
consequences may follow when an uninformed and inexperienced person pleads
guilty to save time or trouble or to win an expected suspension of sentence."
STATE oF CALiFoRNu, [1960-1961] REPORT OF AssEmI3,y I.NEnmL Co3,zuTTr
oN CiuarNAL PnocEun

104 (1961).

357. For example, one of the authors, who has conducted field research in
some 50 Minnesota counties in connection with another project, one sponsored
by the Social Science Research Council, has been struck with the relatively
small "hard core" of bad checks ever brought to prosecution (almost invariably on a misdemeanor charge, see note 294 supra). This "screening out" proc-
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signed counsel. For one thing, it is fair to assume that the great

bulk of these defendants will continue to plead guilty."" In the
unlikely event that a defendant with a meritorious case has not

been "screened out," he has a legal representative - for which he
may have desperate need. Since the judges are well aware of the
"screening out" process, protests of innocence at this late stage
are not likely to command a receptive audience. Finally - surely
if this can be done at minimal expense and effort - "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice." 8 9
True, here as elsewhere, the establishment of public defenders
may well strengthen the case for counsel at state expense at the
misdemeanor level. A California judge has found "hurried representation" of indigent misdemeanor defendants in that state
"adequate":
ess appears to be the product of two factors: (1) the casual, patient manner
in which first the victims themselves, then law enforcement officials, allow
"bad check" offenders time to make amends; (2) the willingness -almost
eagerness- of the part-time prosecutor (and this is the status of the county
attorney in 82 of the 87 counties) to resolve legal and factual doubts in the
potential defendant's favor in order to get rid of this "nuisance" and devote
more time to relatively serious criminal matters- or private practice.
358. It is well to recall that there is a very high incidence of guilty pleas
among those indigent defendants entitled to assigned counsel under existing
Minnesota law. According to the docket study, of those felony prosecutions
against indigents actually decided (12% were nolle pressed and 2% dismissed),
92% were resolved by pleas of guilty. See note 233 supra. There is a like percentage of guilty pleas among those defendants with sufficient funds to retain
counsel, but this group suffers a slightly higher overall conviction rate. Ibid.
See also text accompanying note 360 infra.
The fear has been voiced that if indigent misdemeanor defendants were afforded the right to counsel, they "would be encouraged to plead not guilty and
consequently more time would be consumed in the trial of minor cases." CouNcIL OF STATE GOVENNIAENTS, INCREASED RIGHTS FOR DEFENDANTS
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

AND

IN STATE

30 (1963). But see [1958-1959] SAN FRANCISCO CITY

COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ANN. REP. 5:
When a jury trial is demanded, the case is referred to the jury calendar
for trial. After a thorough discussion of the case with the Deputy Public
Defender appointed to represent said client, there is almost always a request by the client who had previously demanded a jury trial that the
demand for the jury trial be waived, and the case referred back to the
original Judge for final disposition.
Over the period of the last three years, we have had only 8 actual
jury trials out of 178 demands. In other words, 170 waived their demand
for a jury trial because of the faith and confidence they had in our
Deputies' abilities to see that they were properly represented in a court
trial.
359. Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.).
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In the morning roundup, the defendants held in the Los Angeles
City jail are arraigned before two criminal court divisions of the Los
Angeles Municipal Court. In this police court procedure the misdemeanants pass in a steady stream. Sometimes 350 at a session are arraigned, advised of their constitutional rights, and plead. Those who
wish the assistance of counsel to plead are referred to the deputy city
public defender who is stationed in the courtroom.
While presiding for the first time in this court, doubts arose in my
mind whether such hurried representation could be adequate. But in
general it seems to be. Great numbers of those held for drunkenness,
gambling, and morals offenses waive counsel and plead guilty. Those
who do not are referred to the trial divisions in which they can secure
assistance from the trial deputies of the Los Angeles City Public Defender.860

Even absent a public defender arrangement, however, it may
be that misdemeanor cases can be defended fairly expeditiously
and economically on a "time," rather than a "case" basis. Consider
Judge Prettyman's observations: 88 '
The prosecutors come into these [lower] courts prepared to present
eight, ten or a dozen cases in quick succession. The defense of the indigents on such a docket could, I think, be organized upon a similar basis. Instead of agreeing to take a case, counsel might agree to serve a
day, or two days, or even three days. Advance preparation is easily possible with a bit of cooperation from the prosecutor ... Of course, it
is the method where public defenders operate.
F. PmwciPzx AN ExpmmN~cy

Should the right to assigned counsel be extended beyond felonies and gross misdemeanors? And if so, how far beyond? In
360. David, Institutionalor PrivateCounse" A Judge's View of the Public
Defender System, 45 MinN. L. IREv. 753, 767 (1961). As already pointed out,
none of those interviewed in Minnesota favored providing counsel in "drunkenness" cases.
"Although section 859 of the Penal Code would appear to limit the provision for court-appointed counsel for indigents to those cases triable in the superior courts," 36 Os. CAL. ATY' GEN. 87 (1960), as a result of various California court decisions, "the appointment of counsel is required in all misdemeanor cases where the defendant requires the aid of such counsel and is financially unable to employ one," id. at 86. Generally "the services of the county public defender in California are limited to offenses triable in superior court.
Thus far in only four areas of the state [City of Los Angeles, City of Long
Beach, and Alameda and San Francisco Counties] are public defender services
provided in misdemeanor cases." Cuff, Public Defender System- The Los Angeles Story, 45 Mmw. L. REv. 715, 734 (1961). But "Alameda and San Francisco counties appear to take the position that representation is not an absolute requisite in cases of petty offenses." Note, Representation of Indigents in
California-AField Study of the Public Defender and Assigned Counsel Sys.tems,13 STrA. L. REv. 522, 524 n.9 (1961).
361. Prettyman, Three Modem Problems in Criminal Law, 18 WAsir. &
Lun L. Ray. 187, 213-14 (1961).
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searching for the answers, one might recall that No good society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden. But it is not true in our society that we are generally governed wholly by principle in some matters and indulge a rule of expediency exclusively in others. There is no such neat dividing line ....
Most often . . . and as often as not in matters of the widest and deepest concern . . . both requirements exist most imperatively side by

side: guiding principle and expedient compromise. The role of principle,
when it cannot be the immutable governing rule, is30to2 affect the tendency of policies of expediency. And it is a potent role.

To what extent should the Gideon-Douglasprinciple affect the
"tendency of policies of expediency" in the misdemeanor area? To
what extent should it yield to compromise?"0 3 These are hard questions, but ones which the legislature or courts of this state should
consider in the very near future, whether or not the federal judiciary provides further illumination in the meantime. And when
the decision-makers do reach these questions they would do well
to draw upon the wealth of thoughtful suggestions supplied by
those interviewed in the seven counties surveyed.
IV. WHEN DOES THE RIGHT TO
ASSIGNED COUNSEL "END"?
If the point at which the right to assigned counsel "begins" is
the subject of much uncertainty and controversy, 0 4 the point at
which it "ends" presents problems no less vexing. How demanding
is fourteenth amendment equality? May Douglas v. California8""
be confined to first appeals, or does the principle extend much
further? These questions loom large when an inquiry is made into
the practices and attitudes concerning assigned counsel at the ap362.

BicaEI, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 64 (1962).
363. But consider [1961-1962] SAx FRa.Ncisco CITY AND COUNTY PUDLIC
DEFENDER ANN. REP. 4:

$148 represents one cent in the tax rate in San Francisco on the secured and unsecured assessment roll.
We handle over 70% of the felony cases in San Francisco and between
80% and 85% of the contested misdemeanor cases.
Our office is less than 14 the size of the District Attorney's office, plus
the fact that they have the whole Police Department for investigation
purposes. We are 1/3 the size of the Probation Department.
It costs only a little over one cent in the tax rate to support our office
and would cost only about 11/ cents in the tax rate to properly staff our
office.
864. See text accompanying notes 147-268 8upra.
365. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See generally text accompanying notes 27-69
supra.
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pellate and post-conviction stages and in probation and parole
revocation hearings.
A. APPFAis AND POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDNGS360
1.
Recent Local Developments
The Minnesota legislature moved swiftly to bring state law
into line with the Douglas case. In a bill approved May 23, 1963,
effective during the biennium beginning July 1, 1963, it appropriated 34,000 dollars for appointed counsel who represent indigent
felony defendants in appeals and post-conviction proceedingsGTthe first time the state has ever allocated funds for such purposes.3 68
Appointments both on appeals and in post-conviction proceedings are conditioned on a finding by the state supreme court that
review is "sought in good faith" and upon "reasonable grounds. '30
With respect to post-conviction proceedings, the legislature may
have gone further than Douglasrequires; 70 so far as appellate review is concerned, it plainly has not gone far enough.
366. To make this section of the Article as current as possible, an August
5,1963 interview with Chief Justice Oscar Knutson lasting several hours was
supplemented by two. lengthy telephone interviews with Associate Justice
:Robert Sheran on October 5 and October 15. Justice Sheran is processing most
of the applications for counsel.
367. Minm Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 838, § 2(1).
This modest- sum may go a long way because, as Chief Justice Oscar
Knutson expressed it recently, members of the state bar have responded "in
marvelous fashion" to his request that attorneys volunteer on a nonfee basis
to represent at least one indigent defendant a year on appeals or in postconviction proceedings. St. Paul Dispatch, Sept. 3, 1963, p. 4, col. 1. Philip
Neville, Esq., president of the State Bar Association, reinforced the Chief
Justice's request with a long memorandum to all attorneys in the state
marked "Urgent Appeal." Ibid. Irving Gotlieb, Esq., president of the R1amsey County Bar Association, and Charles Mumane, Esq., president-elect of
the state bar, secured the volunteer services of 125 lawyers in Ilamsey County
alone. Ibid. As of October 15, 1963, the volunteer attorneys outnumbered the
prisoners who had applied to the state supreme court for appointed counsel.
368.
While the courts may have inherent power to appoint counsel to
represent an indigent person on appeal, we have no power to appropriate money to compensate such counsel. Only the legislature can do
that. The only statutory provision for such compensation is that found
in § 611.07, Subd. 2.
This statutory provision contemplates payment of the expenses of
an attorney representing an indigent prisoner only in cases where the
attorney has been appointed to assist defendant in the trial court ....
State v. Dahlgren, 259 Mlnn. 307, 313, 318, 107 N.W.2d 299, 303, 306 (1901).
369. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 838, § 2(5).
370. See text accompanying notes 50-57 supra.
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The California procedure, whereby appellate courts were to
"deny the appointment of counsel only if in their judgment such
appointment would be of no value to either the defendant or the
court ' 71 did not pass muster in Douglasv. California.If anything,
the indigent California defendant had to satisfy a less stringent
preliminary showing of merit than that imposed by the new Minnesota law. Nevertheless, California procedure was held to violate
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment because:
[T]he type of an appeal a person is afforded . . .hinges upon whether or
not he can pay for the assistance of counsel. If he can the appellate court
passes on the merit of his case only after hearing the full benefit of written briefs and oral argument by counsel. If he cannot the appellate
court is forced to prejudge the merits before it can even determine
whether counsel should be provided . . . .Any real chance [the indigent] may have had of showing that his appeal has hidden merit is deprived him when the court decides on an ex parte examination of the
8 72
record that the assistance of counsel is not required.

If Minnesota has not complied with the Douglas mandate in
theory, however, there is every indication that it is doing so in
practice. As of October 15, 1963, every application for appointed
counsel on appeal, where the time for such direct review had not
expired -some 25 requests since the historic decisions of March
18 -had been granted automatically. Fortunately, the state's
highest court seems to have viewed the Douglas case more generously than the legislature. 73
The new Minnesota law permits a person convicted of a felony
371. People v. Hyde, 51 Cal. 2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958), quoted
in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
372. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963).
373. There is reason to think that the conditions imposed were simply
included for their in terrorem effect. Whether this accounts for the small number of requests for counsel on appeal to date, however, is most doubtful. A
more probable explanation is: (1) of those prosecutions against indigent felony
defendants which result in convictions, about 95% are obtained by pleas of
guilty, see note 233 supra; the district judges are (2) painstakingly careful in
providing counsel before accepting a plea, see text accompanying notes 152-57
upra, (3) scrupulously careful in establishing, for the record, that the pleas
were "voluntarily" and "understandably" made, ibid.
The new provision is generally regarded as a "stopgap" measure. As this
Article went to press, a special committee, directed to "make an exhaustive
study of the [right to counsel] situation so that the Bar Association might
be able to recommend legislation," letter from Philip Neville to Yale Kamisar,
Oct. 3, 1963, had already held its first meeting. The distinguished committee
includes state supreme court and district court judges, legislators, leaders of
the bar, county attorneys and defense attorneys, and is chaired by District
Judge Donald T. Barbeau.
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"who is unable, by reason of poverty, to pay counsel"3 74 to apply
to the supreme court for the appointment of counsel and other expenses. In appeals to date, the trial court has been making a finding of "poverty" and the supreme court has simply been accepting
that finding. Although no such case has yet arisen, Chief Justice
Knutson contemplates instances where the defendant had counsel
at the trial level but then exhausted his funds, or "his relatives
'quit' after he was convicted." If, as a result of these post-trial developments, the trial judge makes a finding of indigency, the supreme court will also appoint counsel on appeal.
Although the items of expense allowed are not spelled out in
the new law, according to the Chief Justice, travel expenses, funds
for the preparation of the trial transcript and "anything else needed" will be supplied. If the particular error assigned requires preparation of only a portion of the transcript, no more will be prepared. The Chief Justice's "guess," however, is that in most cases
the whole transcript will have to be furnished. On the basis of past
experience, he expects the most commonly assigned error to be
"inadequacy of counsel below," and generally this requires the
preparation of the entire transcript. To date no requests for transcripts have been made, perhaps because the fairly detailed summaries of the trial proceedings are sufficient3 75 or the appointed
attorneys are making their requests for transcripts in district
court, or, in some instances, simply because they have not progressed that far in their development of the case.
Under Minnesota law, the indigent gross misdemeanor defendant enjoys an absolute right to appointed counsel at the trial level 37 As previously noted, however, the new statutory right to
counsel on appeal and in post-conviction proceedings is confined to
felony cases. Whether the federal constitution demands more is
unclear. Indeed, it is not yet known whether the Gideon and Douglas cases require a state to furnish counsel for an indigent nonfelony defendant at any stage 7 7 Even if they do, it is conceivable
that the right might not extend beyond the trial level3 78
Initially the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the same approach with respect to applications for counsel on collateral attack
as it did for such requests on appeal. The practice, in effect, was to
grant an indigent who had not had the assistance of counsel on
374. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 838, § 2(3).

375. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
376. MN-. STAT.

§ 611.07

377. See § MT supra.

378. See note 52 supra.

(1961).
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appeal - and virtually none have3 79 - an absolute right to counsel in the first post-conviction proceeding. However, the steady
flow of applications for counsel on habeas corpus 810 coupled with
the realization that some were abusing this liberal practice 8 led
the court to modify its approach. Thus, in late September, it appointed an attorney to "sift" these applications for merit.
To date, about half of the estimated 125 applications for counsel in post-conviction proceedings have been granted and only
three have been denied; the rest are still pending. Two of the three
denials came about only after the attorney appointed to screen
out the applications had established, by personally interviewing
the prisoners, that an alleged defect in the informations filed
against them was the sole basis of their claims. The court studied
the relevant informations and found no fatal defect. The third denial came about only after an attorney appointed for the indigent
found no substance to his claim and requested that he be relieved,
accompanying his request with a statement by the prisoner that
he was now satisfied that no error had occurred at the trial.
2. Attitudes of Those Interviewed
The suddenness of the potentially far-reaching Douglas decision and the uncertainty it has generated are reflected in the fact
that seven of the 22 district judges, prosecutors, and public defenders queried about the desirability of appointing counsel in
post-conviction proceedings "hadn't thought it through yet" or
had "no comment."
Four, one judge and three county attorneys, favored appointment as of right, at least in the first post-conviction proceeding.
One of these county attorneys picked up a habeas corpus petition
on his desk and complained: "This petition is virtually unintelligible. It would be a good thing if lawyers were available to assist
in the drafting of such petitions. Then, they would at least be
readable."
Five others, four judges and a public defender, felt that counsel
should be appointed whenever there is "substance" or "merit" to
the claim, or as several expressed it, whenever a hearing is granted.
379. In the past, the public defender has taken an appeal on behalf of

his indigent client if and when he "felt duty bound to do so as the trial
attorney," but some public defenders and assistant public defenders have
never felt this need in all their years in office. See also note 868 supra.
380. The applications for appointed counsel on appeal and in post-conviction proceedings did not reach the state supreme court in volume until July
of 1963, and have been averaging about 30 to 40 a month ever since.
381. One prisoner requested an attorney to assist him in a post-conviction
proceeding although he already had his own lawyer. Two others, on being
interviewed, were unable to allege any specific error.
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Another judge suggested that before the decision is made to furnish
or withhold counsel "an independent panel ought to screen the
cases for merit." Still another judge would require, where counsel
had been provided on appeal, that the prisoner make a "special
showing" before being furnished counsel in a post-conviction
proceeding.
The remaining four, three judges and a prosecutor, were inclined to deny counsel in all post-conviction proceedings. As one
judge put it: "He's had his day in court. And post-conviction proceedings are just too tedious." Another judge made essentially the
same observation with one caveat: perhaps counsel ought to be
provided when the petition for habeas corpus raises a "coerced
confession" issue. s 2 The other two persons interviewed who were
opposed to the appointment of counsel on collateral attack admitted that they had no experience with post-conviction proceedings
whatever; "these proceedings are unknown in this county."
In short, the median view seems to be that counsel should be
appointed only when there is some merit to the prisoner's claim for
collateral relief.3ss Any prisoner brash enough, or lucky enough to
have the assistance of a "jailhouse lawyer," however, can make a
meritorious allegation" Anybody can point to a recent case and
maintain: "this is just' what happened to me!" Conversely, the
prisoner whose case does have real merit may38lose out because
"the record is unclear or the errors are hidden."
Although the state supreme court is currently utilizing a "merit" system of sorts in collateral proceedings, it seems to have gone
a step further - a long step further - than those interviewed who
382. The prisoner, however, may not even see the "coerced confession"
problem. For example, he may think the confession is unchallengeable because
he was not subjected to any physical violence. Or the first confession may
not have been introduced and the prisoner may not have the faintest notion
that even a second or third confession is inadmissible if tainted by the coer-

cive measures that evoked the first. Similarly, the prisoner may not have the
slightest suspicion that his case presents a substantial "search and seizure"
question. See generally Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue bn "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, So
UI. CHr. L. ] v.1, 21-37 (1962).

883. By contrast, 11 of 15 district judges and 28 of 55 prosecutors responding to the mail questionnaire favored providing counsel for the prisoner who
sought post-conviction relief. Three judges and five prosecutors were inclined
to furnish counsel in some cases, presumably when the allegations entitled
the prisoner to a hearing.
384. Appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings would undoubtedly operate to reduce, if not virtually eliminate, unscrupulous and
perjured allegations and to minimize the impact of the "jailhouse lawyer."
Cf. BowxmLm

, Lw.AL Am

iN Tm Umrmn STATEs 145 (1951).

385. Of. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1903).
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advocated such an approach were prepared to go. To date, the supreme court has not denied counsel in post-conviction proceedings
unless and until counsel has in fact consulted with the prisoner. In
a real sense, it has not "decided the merits . . .without benefit of
counsel."38 6 Even if the Griffin-Douglas principle were to extend
to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, it may be said that current Minnesota practice is in substantial compliance with this
principle.
B.

PROBATION REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS

88 7

Until September of this year, Minnesota, as is still true of most
386. Id. at 357. Indeed, two Supreme Court Justices, Harlan and Clark,
have taken the position -in a case where petitioner was sentenced to death
- that a public defender (or, presumably, a specially appointed attorney)
may completely foreclose an indigent's avenue of appeal, at least from a denial
of collateral relief, "were it clear that the decision of [counsel] not to appeal
had been subject to judicial review." Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 486 (1903)
(concurring opinion).
387. We were not directed to make any inquiries about parole revocation,
but, nonetheless, this matter was raised in the interviews. A proponent of assigned counsel in probation revocation hearings felt that the same need to
"check" the state warranted providing counsel in parole revocation proceedings as well. An opponent of assigned counsel in probation revocation hearings
saw "no difference" between probation and parole revocation either, but he
reasoned that since the indigent parolee is not furnished counsel, the indigent
probationer should not be either: "Why," he asked, "do we trust the corrections commission more than our district judges?"

So far as we have been able to ascertain (one of the authors was a member of the Advisory Committee on Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Law).
the new code deals with probation, but not parole, revocation simply because
only the former was deemed an integral part of sentencing procedure. Thus,
the new code leaves unchanged MINN. STAT. § 243.05 (1961), which permits
parole to be revoked without notice or hearing.
The observation that "in the parole area, the controversy [over the right
to counsel] centers around an issue largely a matter of history in most areasthe very privilege of being represented by one's own lawyer," Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert - Counsel in the Peno-CorrectionalProcess, 45 MINN.
L. REv. 803, 825 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kadish], is amply corroborated
by a recent account by the counsel for the National Council on Crime and Delinquency of a "workshop session" dealing with due process in parole revocation hearings: "Applause greeted the ridiculing of the right to counsel as a device to make business for lawyers . . . [Olne board member considered the

appearance of an attorney as an affront to the board, implying that the board
does not represent the parolee." Rubin, Due Process is Required in Parole
Revocation Proceedings,Fed. Prob., June, 1963, p. 45.
A number of theories have been advanced to rationalize the striking distinction between the procedural rights of a person accused of crime and those
of a convicted person granted parole. These same theories have also been utilized to defend the failure to afford probationers facing revocation trial-type
safeguards. The principle ones are (1) parole is a matter of "favor" or "grace"
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states, 3 5 did not view probation revocation proceedings as subject
to the procedural safeguards surrounding criminal prosecutions,
even as regards the right to a hearing and confrontation. Indeed,
Minnesota law expressly dispensed with notice and hearing. " The
new code, however, provides that a probationer facing revocation
0 The
"is entitled to be heard and to be represented by counsel."3 Q
judges in the state's two most populous counties, Hennepin and
Ramsey, have construed the statute - without regard to "due
process" and "equal protection" arguments - as requiring the assignment of counsel for indigent probationers in revocation proceedings 91 Indeed, to effectuate the "policy" reflected in the new
provision, several judges in the two counties had begun to routinely appoint the public defender in probation revocation proceedings
some months before September 1, 1963, the date the new code officially went into effect 3 92
and the state may attach such conditions to the favor as it pleases; (2) the
conditional liberty granted a parolee is the result of a "bargain" entered into
between state and prisoner and its violation is in the nature of a "breach of
contract"; (3) constructively, the parolee is still a "prisoner"; although the
"prison walls" have expanded, parole rules and regulations are nothing more
than prison rules and regulations. See, e.g., Urbaniak, Due Process Should Not
Be a Requirement at a Parole Revocation Hearing, Fed. Prob., June, 1963,
p. 50. These fictions are exposed in 1ink, The Application of Constitutional
Standards of Protection to Probation,29 U. Cnm. L. I~v. 483, 491-94 (1962);
Kadish 825-28; Rubin, supra at 44-45; Tappan, The Role of Counsel in Parole
Matters, 3 PR~c. Lw. 21 (Feb. 1957); Weihofen, Revoking Probation,Parole
or PardonWithout a Hearing, 32 J. Cmi. L., C. & P.S. 531 (1942); Note, 59
CoLm.L. R v. 311, 324-26 (1959); Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702, 70-1-200
(1963). See also text accompanying notes 403-05 infra.
Only this year, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia directly
addressed itself for the first time to the question of whether an indigent parolee is entitled to appointed counsel at a federal parole revocation hearing. A
majority ruled he was not, Bazelon, CJ., and Edgerton, J., dissenting. Hyser
v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (en banc).
388. See Kadish 815-17.
389. Minn. Laws 1909, ch. 391, § 3.
390. minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.14(2).
391. Even three of the interviewees opposed to the appointment of counsel
in such proceedings and a fourth who had "no comment" on the issue "recognized" that an indigent probationer is entitled to assigned counsel under the
new code. All four (two district judges, a county attorney and a public defender) were from Hennepin and Ramsey Counties. Somewhat surprisingly, no
person interviewed in the other five counties suggested that the new code had
any bearing on the issue.
392. Outside these two counties, several judges have been appointing counsel in some probation revocation hearings for years. One indicated he does so
"if there is any question about the facts." A second "assigns counsel" when
the attorney appointed at the original trial learns that the probationer is facing
revocation and asks permission of the judge to appear at the revocation hear-
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Constitutional Dimensions

The constitutional dimensions of the problem, however, cannot
be put aside. Indeed, probation revocation procedure dramatically
89 may
illustrates the tremendous impact Douglas v. California
have had on the entire criminal process.
Even if the new Minnesota provision is read only to permit the
man with sufficient funds to retain counsel in revocation proceedings, the formidable authority to the effect that due process requires neither notice nor hearing on revocation 894 may no longer
stymie the indigent probationer. It may be that he need only point
to the new Minnesota provision, and then paraphrase the Douglas
95

case:8

There can be no equal justice where the kind of revocation hearing a
probationer receives depends on the amount of money he has; if the probationer with sufficient funds can make the court listen to argument by
counsel, the poor probationer must not be forced to shift for himself.
The new Minnesota provision manifests the policy that a probationer
facing revocation "be given a chance to tell the court his disagreement
with these charges and to offer proof that they are unfounded."890 But
the indigent, where the fact situation is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has
8 97
a meaningful hearing.
ing. A third judge, in another county, takes the initiative. He makes it a practice, where there has been an alleged violation of probation (or even parole)
conditions, to notify the attorney who represented the indigent at the original
trial. "About half come, half won't." None of these attorneys have ever submitted a bill, but if one did "he would be inclined to honor it."
Prior to the passage of the new code, the Minnesota "practice" was not
running nearly as far ahead of the "law" as it is in New York, for example. Although state law does not impose an obligation on the court to infonn probationer of his right to counsel or to appoint counsel in his behalf, a recent questionnaire disclosed that 23 of the New York judges responding always assign
counsel, four usually do, seven usually do not, and only one never does. See
Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 COLum. L. Rsv. 311, 329
n.138 (1959).
393. 872 U.S. 353 (1963). See generally the discussion accompanying notes
27-69 supra.
394. Kadish 815-16 and cases collected therein. But see text accompanying
notes 403-05 infra.
395. COf.
372 U.S. at 355-58.
396. PROPOSED MInESOTA CRIMINAL CODE § 609.14, comment (1962).
397. Cf. Note, Freedom and Rehabilitationin Parole Revocation Hearings,
72 YA.m,LJ. 368, 374 (1962):
[T]he reasoning which supports the allowance of parolee's counsel [in
revocation hearings before the U.S. Board of Parole] also demands appointment of counsel for the indigent. If an "opportunity to appear"
means an effective opportunity, and effectiveness is geared to the concept of adequate presentation of the case, it would be unreasonable to
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More than legal symmetry may be involved. If "the real question
is to what extent procedures can be employed that will permit
probationers a greater degree of safeguards without defeating the
purposes of the probation system," 3 8 to permit the probationer
with sufficient funds to enjoy the assistance of counsel may well
supply the answer. Can it really be argued that assigned counselbut not retained counsel - would impede the revocation proceedings or conflict with the goals of the system?
2. Attitudes of Those Interviewed
The 22 trial judges, county attorneys and public defenders
questioned on this matter were evenly divided on the desirability
of furnishing counsel in probation revocation proceedings: nine
favored it in all cases, a tenth in some; ten opposed in all cases;
three were undecided. It is significant that seven of the twelve
judges who took a position on the issue favored the appointment
of counsel in all probation revocation hearings ("perhaps counsel
should be provided in all but the very clear cases," commented an
eighth), but only one prosecutor shared the view - the same lone
prosecutor who was inclined to appoint counsel in some misdemeanor cases 9 9 One prosecutor had "no comment"; the other
five were flatly opposed. The two public defenders split on the issue.
Two district judges who favored appointing counsel in all prohold that the standard of effectiveness is dependent upon the affluence
of the parolee. Since neither the needs of the Board nor those of the
convict vary an iota when an indigent parolee is involved, the EscocTate rationale, consistently applied, demands the same decision as to
counsel in his case.
The decisions referred to in the Note are Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490
(1935), where the Court, per Cardozo, J., construed a provision in a federal
probation statute that after arrest the probationer facing revocation "shall
forthwith be taken before the court" as requiring such notice and hearing as
will "enable an accused probationer to explain away the accusation," id. at
492-93; and Fleming v. Tate, 156 F-ad 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946), which ruled that
the requirement in the District of Columbia parole statute that a parolee arrested for violation of his parole "shall be given an opportunity to appear before . . .[the] Board" connotes an "effective appearance . . . and thus necessarily means the presence of [his retained] counsel" Id. at 849. Since the
Note was written, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting
en bane, ruled that neither the statute nor due process requires that indigent
parolees be assigned counsel in federal parole revocation hearings. Hyser v.
Reed, 318 F.ad 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963); id. at 255 (Bazelon, CJ., and Edgerton,

J., dissenting).
398. Rink, supranote 387, at 485.
399. See text accompanying note 289 supra. The mail questionnaire revealed that six of 14 district judges responding, but only 18 of 55 prosecutors
who replied, favored appointing counsel in probation revocation proceedings.
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bation revocation hearings stressed that such proceedings may
well be as important to the probationer as the original trial itself.
A third regarded the prospect that a person might be "deprived of
his liberty" at this stage the decisive factor.400 Other reasons advanced for providing counsel were that a trained spokesman for
the probationer should "test" the state's case for revocation; that
such a champion would "keep the probation officer honest." One
judge took the position that counsel should be provided "if it only
affects the outcome in one case out of ten." By implication, he
conceded that generally the result would be the same, whether or
not counsel appeared. But is it not fair to point to the high percentage of guilty pleas40 1 and ask: How often does counsel, assigned or not, "affect the outcome" of the original criminal proceeding?
Professor Sanford Kadish has felicitously articulated the posiwho would appoint counsel in revocation of those we interviewed
40 2
tion proceedings:
Given the character of the issue to be determined and the fact that the
continued liberty of a person depends on the outcome, it is difficult to
understand the view sometimes expressed that a lawyer has no proper
business in these matters. The central task of ascertaining whether the
prisoner has committed the acts alleged, and measuring the acts proven
against a standard to which he was obliged to conform is precisely the

business of the criminal trial itself where the right to the assistance of
counsel has been recognized as one of the "immutable principles of justice." Indeed, in many contested revocation proceedings, the conduct
charged actually constitutes the commission of a criminal act . .. [I]t
would seem patently at war with the central concept of procedural
justice to deny a person with his liberty at stake the opportunity to
hear and meet the specific charge against him with the benefit of counsel.

Several of those who were against the appointment of counsel
at this stage recalled that after all, probation is a "privilege," a
400.
[T]he freedom of action which a probationer enjoys prior to revocation
is sufficiently extensive that it should be considered "liberty" within
the meaning of a due process clause, either by viewing the granting of
probation as a restoration of a part of the liberty of which the offender
had duly been deprived by his conviction and by then viewing the
revocation of probation as a deprivation of the restored liberty, or by
theorizing that the offender was deprived of only part of his liberty
when his conviction resulted in his being put on probation and that
incarceration upon revocation of probation represents a further deprivation of liberty.
Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 CoLuM. L. REv. 311,
825--26 (1959).
401. See note 23 supra.
402. Kadish 833.
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"favor," and "act of grace." Professor Kadish has forcefully met
justification for the ostracism of the law and the
this "common
403

lawyer":

While the argument is repeatedly made, generally in supporting a denial of legal processes against constitutional attack, it is hard to believe
that anyone really believes it. First of all, even if it is solely the quality of mercy which is being dispensed, it is apparent that it is not a
personal act of grace by a reigning monarch, but a highly institutionalized system administered to tens of thousands of offenders each year
by hundreds of governmental officials. So administered in a democratic
community, even grace itself .. . must be dispensed and withdrawn
according to some sense of principle and order and with some respect
for the forms of procedural regularity associated with concepts of basic fairness. But more significantly, [parole and probation] ... are
not remotely charity, but an integral part of our system of criminal
law .. . and as such can hardly be viewed as being properly administered outside the frameworkc of the legal order appropriate to other
laws.

Moreover, the contention that because the state has the un-

controlled option to require convicted persons to remain imprisoned for the full length of their sentences, it also has the uncontrolled discretion, with or without cause, to revoke probation or
parole, collides with the rule that the power to prohibit does not
include the power to do so subject to unconstitutional conditions.04° "Recent Supreme Court decisions in other contexts [for
example, in the area of public employment] . . .cast increasing

doubt on the proposition that an interest is unprotected by the
because it was granted as a matter of
due process clause merely
405
grace or discretion.
Most of those opposed to providing counsel at this stage main403. Id. at 826--27.
404. See generally French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analy.i,, 50
GEO. LU. 2394 (1961); Note, 73 HARv.L. lRnv. 1595 (1900); Note, 28 IND. LJ.
520 (1953).
One commentator has argued, Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. 1 Ev. 702, 710 (1963):
The most persuasive analogy ... to support the proposition that the
Constitution applies to a parolee [or probationer], is the fact that substantive and procedural due process rights attach to the alien who has
entered the country although he has no initial right to enter our borders. The positions of the alien and the parolee [or probationer] are not
dissimilar. Neither has a right to join the society of free men; only by
the permission of the sovereign is either permitted to enter that society.
405. Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 CoLrh. L. REv.
311, 325 (1959). The Note refers to Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232 (1957) (admission to the bar); Slohower v. Board of Educ., 350 Us.
551 (1956) (public employment); Wieman v. Updegraf, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)

(same).
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tained that an attorney was "unnecessary," that, as one judge put
it, probation officers "lean over backwards" in the probationer's
behalf and generally are "more sympathetic" to his plight than
the judges. "It's too hard to revoke probation as it is," protested
one rural prosecutor.
If counsel is not "necessary," if probation officers are so slow to
institute proceedings to revoke that when they finally do so, attorneys cannot affect the outcome, one might ask why the State of
Minnesota has deemed it wise and just that a probationer be permitted to retain counsel at these proceedings? Has the legislature
simply empowered members of the bar to take money "under
where they acfalse pretences" in all those revocation proceedings
40 0
cept a retainer but cannot influence the result?
Two judges who would not provide counsel underscored the
great leeway they had in these proceedings. One prosecutor, who
labeled the idea of appointing counsel in revocation proceedings
"ridiculous," felt that the combined judgment of the trial judge,
county attorney and probation officer amply protected a man who
"has had enough 'breaks' already." Along these same lines, another prosecutor commented: "These people have been convicted
and have already been given a 'break.' We shouldn't have to 'try'
them a second time."
Much of the foregoing reasoning, however, would also support
the denial of counsel at sentencing - but it is too late in the day
to argue that the Constitution does not require the assistance of
counsel at this stage4 0 7 - to deny that
406.

Of. BANE,
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(1955).
True, it may be argued that counsel is helpful in probation revocation
proceedings, but that the cost of providing counsel for indigent probationers
is prohibitive. Only two of the ten interviewees who opposed appointing counsel at this stage, however, even mentioned the "cost factor." Nor is there any
indication that the expansion of the public defender office's duties in the state's
two largest counties to include representation at revocation hearings will rcquire an increase in staff or salaries.
407. In Townsend v. Burke, 384 U.S. 786 (1948), the Court appears to havo
equated the right to appointed counsel at the sentencing stage with the right
at the trial itself. Accordingly, Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 835 (1903)
would seem to render lack of counsel at the sentencing stage as conclusively
"prejudicial" or "unfair" as such absence is at the trial. To approach the problem from a somewhat different route: Prior to Gideon, the lower federal courts
had held that the sixth amendment right to assigned counsel extends to the
sentencing stage of the criminal process, see Kadish 807-09. As a result of
Gideon, it is fairly clear that fourteenth amendment due process now "incorporates" the sixth amendment right.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
There is then a real need for counsel ....
Then is the opportunity afforded for presentation to the Court of facts in extenuation of the offense, or in explanation of the defendant's conduct; to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's past record; and, in short,
to appeal to the equity of the Court in its administration and enforcement of penal laws. Any Judge with trial court experience must acknowledge that such disclosures frequently result in mitigation, or even suspension, of penalty.4 08

Yet, at this point the defendant has already been convicted. Here
too, it may be said that together, the trial judge, county attorney
and probation officer furnish sufficient protection. Here too, the
judge has great latitude.
The very fact that a sentencing judge "usually moves within a
large area of discretion and doubts' ' 09 would seem to augment,
rather than reduce, the need for counsel at this stage. It might be
forcefully argued that the sentencing stage is "the most important
step in the trial" because the sentencing procedure "gives the
court the widest latitude including placing the defendant on probation."!4 0

One district judge who favored providing counsel in revocation
proceedings relied heavily on the sentencing analogy:
After all, we provide an attorney for sentencing, even though there is
no doubt about the man's guilt. So here, even if there is a violation,
the dispositionis cruial. There are many things I can do short of sending the probationer back to prison. I might feel that something less than
commitment to prison is called for, that, for example, sending him to a
work farm for a few months is sufficient under the circumstances. A
lawyer, a spokesman, can be helpful in this connection.

V.

APPOINTED COUNSEL V. PUBLIC DEFENDER

For almost 50 years, Minnesota law has provided that the district judges in counties of certain population may appoint a public
defender for all impoverished criminal defendants in the coun-

ty.4 " To date only two counties- Hennepin (greater Minneapolis) and Ramsey (greater St. Paul) - have qualified. Both utilize
the public defender system4' 2 and both were included in the seven

408. Martin v. United States, 182 Fd 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1950).
409. Carter v. llinois, 829 U.S. 178, 178 (1946).
410. Kent v. Sanford, 121 F2ad 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1941) (Hutcheson, J.,
dissenting). This dissenting view later prevailed in the Fifth Circuit. See note
408 .sspraand accompanying text.
411. See Mnui. Sn.&T. §§ 611.12, 611.13 (1961).
412. In one of these counties, some judges will, on rare occasion, appoint
private counsel for an indigent. This might occur when the defendant flatly refuses, for some reason, to be represented by the public defender. Other judges
would just appoint another member of the public defender staff.

102
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counties surveyed. In the remaining counties the district judge appoints individual lawyers for indigent defendants on a case-bycase basis. Compensation for appointed lawyers, described in a recent comparative study as being "reasonably liberal,"4 1 is fixed
by statute.414 The cost is borne by the county.
41S. Note, 76 HAJv. L. REv. 579, 601 (196S).
414. "Compensation, not exceeding $25 per day for each counsel for the
number of days he is actually employed in the preparation of the case, and not
exceeding $50 per day for each day in court, together with all necessary and
reasonable costs and expenses incurred or paid in said defense, shall be fixed
by the court in each case." MwnN. STAT. § 611.07 (1901).
The general practice followed by all the district judges questioned is to
have the appointed lawyer submit an itemized statement showing time and expenses.
As to time, one judge reported that he automatically gives the maximum
statutory fee; another, that he awards between $35 and $75 for a guilty plea;
others commented that they "adjust" the statutory fees depending on how
much time they feel was spent on the case. One judge remarked that he had
reduced amounts claimed when he had felt that they were excessive.
The judges' responses varied considerably when asked whether they believed that the present rates of compensation were adequate. Three said yes:
"No one is complaining." "This is a public service and an opportunity for
young fellows to get experience." "Yes, except for the long, hard fought trial."
Another felt that it was "a little too low. You want them willing, but not too
eager." Several believed that the rates were too rigid: "It may be too little for
a full day and too much for just a quick appearance." One was of the opinion
that the minimum bar fee should be paid, "but more or less money will not
greatly remedy the defects of the system." The replies of the county attorneys
to this question fit almost into an identical pattern.
The replies to the mail questionnaire on this point were as follows:
Compensation

District Judges
County Attorneys
Adequate
7
31
Inadequate
3
17
Inadequate for difficult case
4
3
Eleven appointed lawyers responding by mail reported that the present system was fair to lawyers, but 12 disagreed; 15 felt that appointed lawyers should
be paid more for their services.
In several counties comments were received from those interviewed that
there was a great disparity among the various judges in the county as to
their awards of compensation.
As to expenses, all the judges reported that they either had provided or
would compensate for various types of expert witnesses. In one of the counties,
the approval of the prosecutor appears to be required. Several judges conceded
that "court appointed psychiatrists" reveal a good deal more to the court and
prosecution than do retained psychiatrists -a rather obvious "payment" made
by the indigent defendant. See United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 114
(7th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); cf. Wis.
STAT. § 165.04 (1) (1961) (which bars examination by the prosecution of evidence developed by the state crime laboratory for indigent felony defendants).
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In the five "appointed counsel" counties, the extent to which
an indigent's request for a named attorney should be taken into
account was the subject of considerable dispute. Inquiries about
the quality of representation in these counties also evoked wide
disagreement. In the "public defender" counties, on the other
hand, general satisfaction with the system was expressed. In all
the counties the question of the relative merit of the two systems
was a lively topic of discussion, particularly in the light of the contemplated expansion of aid to indigent defendants occasioned by
the recent Supreme Court decisions.

A. ApPOiNTm CouNs., Couxr-ms
1.

The Judges' Lists

With one exception,41 5 every judge interviewed in the "appointed counsel" counties reported that he encountered no serious
problem in getting lawyers to servesO One asserted that every
lawyer in the county takes his turn, although, as is true elsewhere,
postponements for cause will be granted. Two others, both from

the same county, observed that all serve willingly except the "older lawyers - and they have already done their job."4 11 Judges
from the remaining three counties ask only those whom they believe are willing to serve, one estimating that this included about
75 percent of the bar; another reporting that generally only
"younger men" were so willing.
Most appointments are made by the judge from a list of names
which he has compiled. Several have the clerk of court make the
appointment informally from a roster of almost all the attorneys
415. The judge who reported having some problem regularly appoints only
experienced lawyers. See discussion after note 419 infra. He has been on the
district bench for a short period and estimated that the lawyer he calls asks to
be excused about half of the time. "Criminal work is looked down upon. If
they have cases on the civil calendar they don't want to appear." (Of. Winters,
Preliminary Report on Counsel for the Indigent Accused in Wisconsin 8 (1903)
(unpublished preliminary report in Minnesota Law School Library): "It has
been rather generally surmised by respectable authority that there exists a lower class of lawyer who works among the criminal class using the protections supplied by law to keep his guilty clients out of jail as long as possible.") This
judge informs the lawyer that, if excused this time, no excuse will be accepted
the next, and therefore he should think carefully "about consuming his one
chance for postponement."
416. Eleven of twelve judges reporting by mail questionnaire encountered
no problem in getting lawyers to serve as appointed counsel. The twelfth said
that on occasion he had some difficulty.
417. These lawyers, comprising about 30% of the bar in this county, are
excused.
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in the county; 41s one has the prosecutor make an informal appointment when the judge is not sitting in the county.
To a large extent, of course, the quality of representation is dependent on the content of the judges' lists. Here, as already indicated, there is great diversity. One judge reported that his list is
comprised of younger men but that he appoints more experienced
lawyers for "very serious cases" and those in which there is real
] 01 Another judge in the same coundoubt of the defendant's guilt.
ty follows a markedly different approach. His "regular list" (18
lawyers) is made up of attorneys with criminal defense experience;
his "special list" (4 lawyers) of inexperienced lawyers is reserved
for "clearly guilty" cases.
Those judges, representing three different counties, who revealed that their roster is confined to "willing" lawyers pointed
out that almost every law office furnishes at least one such person.
In the fifth and final "appointed counsel" county, all active attorneys are on the list. All of these judges stressed that an experienced lawyer is specially selected for "more serious cases 4 20 one judge defining this to cover all criminal cases that go to
trial.4 21
Prima facie, indigent defendants would seem to be receiving
equitable treatment if their attorneys were appointed from a list
418. In one of the two counties in which this is done, the county attorney
in fact selects the lawyer to be appointed. In the other, there is an "understanding" between the judges and the clerk that "older lawyers" not be asked.
For further description of the "informal appointment" system, see text accompanying notes 159-60 supra.
419. When asked if he had a special system for very serious cases, he replied, "Whenever a man denies his guilt, it's a serious case." Does not any position contrary to this have the marked effect of prejudging the case and placing
the defendant at a distinct disadvantage from the outset?
420. One judge said that he personally (instead of the clerk of court) "hand
picks" the lawyer in a murder case; another, that the clerk of court makes a
special selection in a special case.
421. A special practice of one judge is to attempt to appoint counsel from
that town in the county in which the defendant resides.
In answer to the mail questionnaire, five judges reported that their list is
comprised of almost every attorney in the county; four - of "willing" lawyers; one - of a group of names furnished by the prosecutor; one - of lawyers
the judge knows; one - of "qualified" attorneys.
Every judge interviewed insisted that if there are two defendants whose interests conflict, separate lawyers are appointed. As to this matter in the two
"public defender" counties, one defender stated that his requests for special
appointment of counsel in "conflict" cases have been refused. In the other
county, although one judge reported that he has appointed private counsel in
such cases, the defender commented that, in several such cases, different defenders have represented the defendants.
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representing a cross section of the local bar.2 2 That not every
practitioner takes a turn representing indigents is balanced by the
fact that many lawyers will not undertake a criminal defense for
paying clients. Furthermore, economy of manpower may warrant
special selection for "different types of cases," especially if such
classifications are thoughtfully drawn.
Particular concern was expressed by one judge about the need
to instill the indigent with "confidence in his appointed lawyer.
After all, the rich man has confidence in his lawyer.' Accordingly,
this judge usually asks the indigent if he wishes to have a particular lawyer and, if one is named, appoints him unless the lawyer
has already been "overburdened." If so, the indigent is awarded a
second choice. If no specific attorney is requested, rather than act
on a simple rotation basis, the judge selects a lawyer from his list
"consistent with" the background of the indigent and the nature
of the offense.un
Request for Named Attorney
Whether the indigent's request for a specific attorney should be
honored was the subject of some dispute. Three judges confirmed
that they do appoint the named lawyer, although their experience

2.

4202. But statistics from 1962 reveal that, at least in some counties, a
rather small percentage of lawyers practicing in the county were appointed
to represent indigent defendants. It is also quite clear that certain lawyers are
doing the bulk of the work:
Number of
Lawyers
Maximum
Number of
Number of
Serving As
Number of
Indigent
Practicing
Appointed Appointments
County
Defendants
Lawyers
Counsel for one Lawyer
1
92
210
S4
11
2
54
20
16
14
8
25
31
13
4
4
23
89
11
7
5
8
4
4
3
Furthermore, seven of the appointed lawyers who answered the mail questionnaireHowever,
suggested that the selection system be improved.
whatever criticism may be leveled against the system in these
counties, it seems preferable to the "catch-as-catch-can" practice, employed in
some federal courts, of appointing lawyers who happen to be present in th"
courtroom when the indigents appear. See Note, '76 E[Anv. L. Rlv. 579, 581
(1963); BAn Ass'rw OF THE DismucT OF COLUOBAL, RuORT OF TlE ConmssioN ON EGAL Am 101 (1958).
423. For example, if the accused has a long record and will be likely to
"spot" an inexperienced lawyer, this judge, to insure a better rapport, will not.
appoint one, regardless of the seriousness of the felony involved.
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was that such a request rarely is made. 42 4 They also pointed out
that they would more or less automatically appoint a second lawyer if the defendant objected to the first appointment.42 5
However, four judges voiced strong resistance to complying

with an indigent's request for a named lawyer.420 Reasons ad-

vanced for this resistance were: (1) "They can't tell us what to
do!" (2) Honoring such a request "encourages" false claims of indigency since it results in the defendant getting the lawyer he
wants without charge. (3) It is unfair to the named lawyer since
"high-priced" attorneys with large overheads have cause to resent
7
frequent appointments.42

On the related matter of appointing another lawyer if the defendant objects to the first appointee, these four judges split. Two
someone else and two would require a
would routinely appoint
28
4
showing of good cause.

The approach of the "lenient" judges seems preferable. In the

first place, if the defendant's wishes may be fulfilled without placing an undue burden on any lawyer,429 any affront to the judicial
ego scarcely outweighs the desirability of doing so. As for the second matter, false claims of indigency, it should be met more di424. One judge commented that there is no objection to this from the bar
in his county because, generally, the lawyers named are "those who want the
business."
425. One judge commented that he interprets Mmiw. STAT. § 611.07 (1061),
which provides that the district judge shall appoint counsel for indigent defendants, "not exceeding two," as entitling the defendant to one rejection.
The judge wanted to cut off any chance of reversal. See discussion at note
153 supra.
426. One did remark, however, that he might honor such a request if there
were a special reason, such as that the lawyer had formerly represented the
defendant.
427. As one judge expressed it: "You can't take a $50,000 a year man and
give him $50 per day very often." He pointed out that, in such situations, an
appointment was undesirable from both the lawyer's and defendant's viewpoints: The lawyer may 'be prejudiced in his other cases (civil and criminal)
if the jury knows that the lawyer is also representing "this bum." The defendant may be prejudiced before the jury because the lawyer may give more enthusiastic representation to a paying client whom he believes to be innocent.
428. One of these judges felt that a change of lawyers should be permitted
sparingly because of "bad public reaction to this practice."
429. Cf. David, Institutional or Private Counsel: A Judge's View of the
Public Defender System, 45 Minw. L. Rav. 753, 755 (1961): "The defendant
without means .

.

. may also request that the court assign Jerry Geisler or

Grant Cooper, or some other lawyer whose publicized successes in criminal deThese requests will be forwarded, but
fense have inspired his confidence ....
it is obvious that the volume of such requests alone must defeat any general
plan to make such able men general public defenders.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
rectly. ° If there is reason to believe that a higher incidence of
mendacity exists among those few who seek a specific lawyer, perhaps the financial status of this small group merits closer attention. Finally, no lawyer need be overburdened. An indigent defendant may hardly complain if the lawyer he seeks is unavailable. Many nonindigent clients find themselves in a similar predicament.
3.

Performance of Appointed Counsel

How well do appointed lawyers perform? This is the crucial
question, transcending the manner of selection. Judicial reaction
in the five "appointed counsel" counties surveyed ranged from
great unhappiness to warm enthusiasm.
Two of the seven district judges in this group emphatically reported that appointed lawyers compared unfavorably with retained lawyers. 3 ' One said flatly that "many indigents do not receive adequate representation" ' - Both maintained that, with
some exceptions, the appointed lawyers "don't put as much into
investigation and preparation." However, they noted that most
appointed counsel did their best once they got into court: "Tuta
lawyer in front of a jury and it makes no difference whether he is
retained or appointed."
A third district judge acknowledged that appointed lawyers
430. See discussion at notes 99-1o0 supra.
431. One was very sharply critical: "When I was a prosecutor, I used to
love the way the system works. Many appointed counsel wanted to avoid a
trial; many didn't know how to conduct a trial. Thus, they were prone to plead
their clients guilty."
482. "Everything is wrong with the system," protested this judge. His major specific objection, also made by others, was to the widespread practice in

his county of almost exclusively appointing "new law graduates."
A judge in another county, acknowledging that this was the practice, explained, 'How else are these young lawyers ever going to get any experience?"
Professor Trebach's retort seems most persuasive:
A sink-or-swim philosophy for young attorneys in the criminal courts
(whereby if there is any "sinking" to be done, unfortunately, it is done
by the defendant) is fundamentally at odds with the concept of effective defense in an adversary system. The criminal courts cannot be considered an extension of the law school moot court system when the defendant happens to be indigent. ... Counsel assigned to the indigent
may gain experience in the process, but it would be an inverse set of
values indeed which emphasized this incidental benefit at the expense
of the primary function of defendant's counsel, that of providing a vigorous and professional defense.
Trebach, A Modem Defender System for New Jersey, 12 RuT r ns L. REY.
289, 996 (1957).
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He re-

ported that, until recently, too many appointed counsel were

"more concerned with their fee than with their client." Fortunately, this situation has now been remedied. 43 4 Three other judges
pointed out that quite often appointed and retained lawyers.. are
the same people and that generally they are equally conscientious."' The remaining judge, although acknowledging their rela-

tive inexperience, was enthusiastic about the quality of appointed
counsel: "Because of their 'sense of responsibility,' many of them

just 'work their hearts out.' They raise every conceivable issue.

48 7

The opinions of the prosecutors in the five "appointed counsel"
counties on this subject fell at about the same points on the spectrum, but the correlation between prosecutors and judges in the
same county was something less than perfect. Three found little to
choose between appointed and retained counsel. 43 3 A fourth noted
433. When this judge feels that appointed defense counsel is inexperienced,
he extensively questions the defendant to be sure that he has been properly
represented.
484. In the past, a former prosecutor (who handled most of the appointments) favored his friends who were neither competent nor interested. The
judges who sit in this county have corrected the situation by carefully instruct-

ing the newly elected county attorney.
435. Perhaps too often in one county. Here, charged both the county attorney and the resident judge, one law firm "solicited" indigent cases by getting many defendants to retain them and then, if the defendant is found to be
indigent, suggesting to the judge that they be appointed since they have already conferred with the defendant. The judge also stated that, in his opinion,
this firm's lawyers were "flashier" but less capable than many other local counsel.
436. Although one of these judges noted that most appointed lawyers were
"younger fellows," he stated that they were also most often retained counsel
in criminal cases. He did point out, however, that occasionally an experienced
lawyer from one of the metropolitan areas will be retained and that he will
probably be better than most local counsel.
437. He also suggested that appointed counsel are often particularly careful
because they know that the judge will interrogate the indigent defendant extensively as to whether counsel was "competent."
In contrast, consider Cuff, The Public Defender System: The Los Angeles
Story, 45 Mnr.L. Rv. 715, 723 (1961):
No amount of talk of "professional responsibilities" will ever succeed in
obscuring one hard fact: All a lawyer has to sell is his time! And it is no
answer to this dilemma to give the cases to those lawyers whose time
is not so valuable. No matter how eager and industrious a young lawyer
may be, he is seldom a match for the able, adroit, powerful and experienced prosecutor whom he is likely to meet in a criminal action.
438. "They are better than some retained lawyers who have no criminal experience but not as good as the criminal specialists," was the comment of one
of these.
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that appointed counsel were generally younger and less experienced. Finally, one prosecutor- disquieting to note, from the
same county in which the judge reported favorably- was most
critical 43 9
B.

PUBic DErmqDER CouwnT S

In contrast to the mixed reaction about the quality of appointed counsel, there was unanimous agreement as to the high calibre
of the present public defenders in Hennepin and Ramsey counties. " Five of the six judges interviewed, as well as one of the
439. Some of his comments: "They don't plead an innocent man guilty but
they don't do much else." "The defendants are really little better off then
they would be without a lawyer at all." "The whole job is done on a very
routine basis. They don't dig in." "They pick up $50 pretty easily." '"Maybe
they are afraid that if they do too much, they won't be appointed again." (As
a practical matter, the county attorney appoints counsel in this county.)
The answers received in the mail questionnaire to this query were as follows:
Appointed Counsel
District Judges
County Attorneys
Compare favorably with
retained counsel
10
39
Compare unfavorably with
retained counsel
5
8
Less experience than
retained counsel
2
Finally, only half of the appointed lawyers who replied to the mail questionnaire believed that indigents were being treated fairly under the present system.
440. In both counties, the defender is appointed by the district judges, a
unanimous vote being required in Hennepin County for the initial four year
appointment. See MIN. STAT. § 611.12 (1961). Although critics of the public
defender system have attacked this method of appointment because of the
defender's unfavorable "position to stand his ground before a tyrannical
judge," Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 AEms. L. REv. '37, 748 (1901);
cf. text at note 447 infra, there appears to be no credence to this in Hlennepin
or Ramsey counties. Nonetheless, appointment by some less interested body
is worthy of consideration, particularly if the defender system is to be extended to the smaller counties.
Neither defender devotes all of his time to his public defender's duties. See
note 442 infra. The present defender in Hennepin County took office on July 1,
1963, having been an assistant for a number of years previously. He has four
part-time assistants. His predecessor had served for over 20 years. The Ramsey County public defender is now serving his second two year term. This is
the first time in many years that the defender has been permitted to succeed
himself, thus there have been a number of defenders in that county. By the
time this Article appears, there will have been one part-time assistant appointed at an annual salary of $3500.
Some typical comments of the judges were: "Not only does he fight hard
when the case demands it but has good balance. He won't file trivial motions."
"They have heart for the defendants yet are very practical and sift out cases
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county attorneys, maintained that the public defender was superior to most retained criminal defense lawyers. They conceded
that the "top" criminal lawyers were probably better, 441 but added that there were very few criminal specialists in the state. They
pointed out that even many excellent trial lawyers have little or
no criminal experience and are thus no match for public defenders. 44 2 The other two people interviewed both regarded the defenders as good as - but no better than - most retained counsel.
The contrast between the quality of appointed counsel and the
public defender was even more sharply drawn when the judges
were asked to compare them with the county attorney's office.
Five of the six judges in the "public defender" counties felt that
the defender was probably better than many or most of the lawyers in the prosecutor's office. One stated that he was about equal.
On the other hand, three of the seven judges interviewed in the
"appointed counsel" counties believed that, due at least to the
county attorney's greater experience, he "had the edge" on the
majority of appointed lawyers. The other four felt that the quality of appointed lawyers was "about the same" as the county attorney.44
C.

GE -uL

APPRAIsAL OF PUBLIc DFNDER SYSTEM

A common objection to the public defender system voiced by
one - but only one - of the district judges in an "appointed
very well. Even in the clearly guilty cases, they make good recommendations

as to sentencing."
There were some scattered adverse comments regarding past public defenders: "One public defender was awful. He almost always pled guilty." "I had
to reprimand one once for inadequate representation." "One of the current
public defender's predecessors was not too good."
441. One judge explained this on the ground that the defender "has a tremendous workload and can't point for one or two cases."
442. Both public defenders are permitted to engage in private civil practice but estimate they spend over 30 hours per week in their public capacity.
Each has practiced criminal law for over ten years. The Ramsey defender estimated that he represented 170 defendants in 1962; the Hennepin defender
estimated that his office represented 600 in district court and 188 in juvenile
court -mostly dependency and neglect cases.
443. One of these pointed out that the prosecutor was often quite inexperienced himself. (Of the seven county attorneys interviewed, one had more
than 15 years criminal experience; two, more than 10 years; three more than
5 years; and one had little previous criminal experience but had been in practice over 10 years before being elected.) Another was of the opinion that the
county attorney usually came "from the middle of the ladder, as the quality
of the bar goes." A third judge in this group did feel that the county attorney
"got the jump" on the case. Interestingly, one prosecutor stated that if appointed lawyers were appointed at an earlier stage in the proceedings, their
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counser' county, is that due to the defender's frequent contact
with the county attorney's office, they would both get "too chummy." 444 This judge feared a "tendency on the part of the defender
to be less concerned with the individual case than with his overall
problems- thus perhaps sacrificing one case in order to get the
county attorney to accept pleas in others." 4" He voiced alarm
that the defender's office "might become an adjunct of the county
attorney's office."
Another judge, in an "appointed counsel" county, expressed
doubt about the part-time public defender. He speculated that
such an official might be tempted "to plead 'em guilty and get
back to the private practice."" 6
One of the public defenders specifically addressed himself to
this point sua sponte. He strenuously argued the merit of having
a part-time, rather than a full-time, defender. He maintained that
a full-timer, "because of lack of financial independence, would be
more subservient" to the judges who appointed him." 7 Thus, he
performance would be improved since they would be less disadvantaged and
more likely to "dig in.'
Replies received from district judges in the mail questionnaire were as fol
lows:
Appointed Counsel
No. of District Judges
Compare favorably with county attorney
10
Compare unfavorably with county attorney
1
Less experienced than county attorney
4
444. Edward Bennett Williams has voiced a similar feeling:
Another disadvantage is that the public defender and the prosecutor are
trying cases against each other every day. They begin to look at their
work like two Wrestlers who wrestle with each other in a different city
every night and in time get to be good friends. The biggest concern of
the wrestlers is to be sure they do not hurt each other too much. They
don't want to get hurt. They just want to make a living.
CENTER FOR TE STDy OF Dmioca&TTc INSTITUTIONS, THE LAW 10 (1962).
But 8ee text accompanying note 449 infra.
445. For further criticism of this "mass-production criminal justice," see
id. at 9.
446. Although most county attorneys in the state are also on a part-time
basis, the judge felt that the pressures from the press and public would be
greater on the county attorney not to shirk his duty; that the fact that the
county attorney is elected while the public defender would probably be appointed would cause the defender to be relatively unconcerned with his public
image.
It is undoubtedly true that the success of the defender system is dependent
on the ability and attitude of the appointee. But, as to the "public image"
point, it should be noted that the defender's "electorate" (the district judges)
is much more likely to critically evaluate the defender's work than would be
the case with the public and the county prosecutor.
447. See generally note 440 sulira.
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might feel inhibited about conducting a long trial before a judge
who was trying to complete his calendar, or he might feel intimidated by a judge who hesitated to provide a free transcript. This
defender also felt that a full-timer might well get depressed and
calloused because of the constant strain of this type of practice
and because of the paucity of innocent defendants to really get
excited about: "In my opinion, in all my years as public defender,
I've only represented three men who were really innocent."
In addition, the six district judges interviewed in the two
"public defender" counties, as well as the respective county attorneys, unanimously rejected the anti-defender arguments. 4 48
Their attitude was well summed up by one judge:
The public defender is zealous. The fact that the defender is paid out of
the public treasury is irrelevant. So are judges. That he may deal frequently with the prosecutor has no more significance than the fact
that personal injury specialists, who often meet in trial, may be good
friends. But this doesn't affect their courtroom performance. In a sense
it may make them even more competitive. They want the other fellow's
449
respect.

One judge doubted that "the defender is as desirous of victory
as private counsel since his future practice doesn't depend on it."
He took the position, when asked what a defender might do if he
consulted with his client shortly after arrest, that the defender
would probably not insist that the defendant remain silent as
much as retained counsel would. This viewpoint was vigorously
448. One judge did recall that many years ago, these arguments were true
of a particular public defender. However, several judges also pointed out that,
quite to the contrary, in one county, a public defender has been known to
have "feuded" with the county prosecutor and, in the opinion of one judge,
"that's all to the good." A judge from the other county said, "There's no love
lost here," and stated that the defender has complained that the prosecutors
overcharge and issue complaints too easily (to please the police), and then are
reluctant to dismiss.
449. One of the county attorneys related this story: A former public defender was a close friend of, and on the campaign committee for, a former
county attorney. Nonetheless, during the campaign, the defender beat the
prosecutor badly in some highly publicized cases.
One judge in an "appointed counsel" county who favored the public defender plan pointed out that if "dose friendship" was a defect of the defender
system then it was also a defect of the appointed counsel system because, due
to the small bar in his county, the county attorney was quite friendly with all
attorneys.

But see Dimock, The Public Defender: A Step Towards A Police State?,
42 A.B.A.T. 219 (1956), for an extremely critical view of the public defender
system.
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contested, not only by both defenders" 0 but by one county attorney as well. Indeed, the latter complained that the defender in his
county immediately cautions his clients to remain silent.5"'
More extensive investigatory facilities is one of the principle
advantages
claimed by supporters of the public defender system4 52 Not only does this allegedly provide the indigent accused
with a more adequate defense,45 3 but quite often, a thorough
investigation of the case will uncover evidence to persuade the
defendant of the hopelessness of the matter, thus avoiding a
needless and costly trial 4 5' Yet, unlike defender offices in other
jurisdictions, 4 15 neither Minnesota public defender has an investigator on his staff. And, although several judges felt that the
-defenders' investigatory funds were inadequate, only one of the
two defenders registered any complaint on this count.!" Whatever funds may be available for investigation, it would seem
desirable to enlarge the defender's access to "the prosecution's
records in order partially to redress the imbalance in investiga450. One stated that particularly in cases in which he is clearly convinced
that the defendant is guilty he is very careful not to "coerce" a guilty plea by
giving any assurances of the possibility of a lighter sentence. Thus, this defender complained that he-has ended up trying "worthless cases."
451. In fact, in one pending murder case, the public defender advised
strongly against confessing despite the fact that the defendant wanted toand, according to newspaper reports, did.
452. See, e.g., Cuff, supra note 437, at 721. See also SprcmLx CoinvaTT-r
To Srun DEFENDR SysTms, EQUAL JuSTICE FR TiE AccusED 56, 58-0
(1959). On the need for investigatory facilities in order to adequately prepare
a defense, see generally Cross, "The Assistance of Counsel for His Defense": Is
This Becoming a Meaningless Guarantee?,38 ABBAJ. 995 (1952); Frank, Today's Problems in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 15 FRLD. 93, 10001 (1953); Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psy~datrist and the
Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. R1v. 1061, 1086-90 (1962); Note, 58 CoLm.

L. Rv. 832, 837-38, 851-53 (1958); Note, 47 Am. L. RIzv. 1054 (1903).
453. The point has been made that many criminal cases are won by relatively inexperienced lawyers "because of an excellent marshaling of the facts
. . . by a trained investigator." STAF op Houss Comms. oN SmH JuDiCzARY,
86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPRESENTATION FOR INDIGENT

DEFN DANTS nr FEDERAL

29 (Comm. Print 1960).
454. See BLIss, DEFENSE INvEsTiGATioN 41 (1956).
455. For example, the Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia, established in 1960, has four investigators (for seven attorneys). Note, 76 Hlv.
L. REv. 579, 595 (1963). In 1961, the Los Angeles County Public Defender Of-flce had nine investigators (for 51 attorneys). Cuff, supra note 437, at 729 n.30.
456. This defender reported that he has no investigative funds whatever,
although one of the judges in the county was convinced that such funds would
be available on request.
The "satisfied" defender remarked that although he could retain an investigator when necessary, he did almost all of his investigative work personCRntInAL CASES
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tory facilities which normally exists in a criminal case. ''457
A large majority of those interviewed in the "appointed counsel" counties who addressed themselves to the issue, including a
number who were pleased with their present system, favored the
establishment of some sort of public defender system. A number
of reasons were given, 4 8 but one predominated: Because of his
greater experience 4 5 9 the defender would give indigent defendants
more diligent representation. 410 This view was supported by several judges in "public defender" counties who have had experience
with both systems. 46 ' It seems fair to conclude that the "Minnesota opinion," as evidenced by this survey, calls for a more extenally- "any attorney worth his salt goes out to the scene himself." He does
utilize both the prosecutor's staff and the police for such purposes as serving
subpoenas, getting witnesses to "cooperate," and for "protection in tough
neighborhoods."
As to funds for investigation in the "appointed counsel" counties, see note
414 supra.
457. Note, 76 HIlAv. L. Rav. 579, 590 (1963). See also INsrrr~um oF JUDImrimnas 14 (1956).
cL.L ADMimnsTRATioN, Puir~c D
458. Some of the "minor" reasons advanced were that it would relieve the
judges of the obligation of determining whom to appoint each time; that it
would bring client and lawyer together much more quickly; that the "local"
public defender might cooperate with a state-wide defender's office in handling
appeals. For a good summary of the arguments pro and con public defenders,
see Note, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 579, 602-03 (1963).
459. It should be noted that "experience" is a many-faceted concept:
It may well be true that the basic doctrines of the criminal law do not
torture the intellect. Under the protection that the law gives the defendant, however, there is a premium upon detailed knowledge of the statutes and upon adequate experience with criminal procedure; otherwise
the defense may overlook the weaknesses of the prosecution's case. This
involves far more than the statutes and the case law. It frequently involves knowledge of police operating procedures; knowledge of police
record systems; familiarity with the work of the local crime laboratories;
and acquaintanceship with the local experts in such things as narcotics,
ballistics, arson, forensic chemistry, handwriting, toxicology and criminal identification. This arsenal of information is available through a
specialized public or voluntary defender, and a private practitioner entering a criminal case may be unfamilar with it.
David, supra note 429, at 762-63.
460. One judge stated that he favored a public defender only for those
counties which have many inexperienced lawyers who often end up as appointed counsel. He noted that this would be true of two of the ten counties in his
judicial district.
461. Examination of the literature reveals that enthusiasm for the public
defender system is exhibited, throughout the country, by those having experience with it. See, e.g., Note, 76 H-lv. L. REv. 579, 606 (1963); David, supra
note 429, at 765, 769.
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sive utilization of public defenders 62
Which is more costly? A public defender or an appointed counsel
system? While there was speculation both ways by those interviewed, the statistics indicate that the defender system is significantly more economical 6 3 Perhaps this is because the "public defender expedites trials and disposition of cases and [eliminates]
unnecessary trials and [waives] jury trials where that can be legitimately done." 4 4 Perhaps, because of the relative inexperience
462. Chief Justice Oscar R. Knutson of the Minnesota Supreme Court,
pointing out that, "it is a known fact to those of us who have served on the
trial courts in the country areas ... that many of the attorneys appointed
are wholly unfamiliar with criminal practice," has "come to the conclusion
that some kind of public defender system is imperative." Knutson, The StateWide Public Defender Sy1stem, Bench &Bar of Minnesota, May, 1968, pp. 16,
17.

Furthermore, five of the appointed lawyers who responded to the mail questionnaire volunteered the suggestion that some sort of public defender system
be established.
463. The following table was composed from 1962 statistics:

Cost per

Number of Indi- Public Compensation Indigent
County gent Defendants
for Counsel
Defendant
Public Defender
1
735ft
$35,0b
8 48
Counties

2

170R

8,000?

47

Appointed
Counsel
Counties

1
2
3
4
5

8
25
92
23
54

1,150
2,462
8,523
1,325
2,680

144
98
93
58
50

a Estimate
b Chief Public Defender-$8,000; four assistants-

$6,000 each; general fund
available for all other expenses- $3,100.
S Public Defender-$7,500; no specific additional funds set aside so $500 estimated.
The 1954-1955 figures from nine California counties which utilize the public
defender system confirm this finding. The "cost -per indigent defendant" there
ran from $9 to $72, the median being $31. Cuff, supra note 437, at 724. An
average cost of less than $45 per indigent case was reported in 1962 by the
Legal Aid Agency in the District of Columbia. Murray, Defender System in
the District of Columbia, 21 LEGAL Am BRm CAsE 63, 72 (1962). On the other hand, in Detroit, where the appointed counsel system is used, the 1956 cost
per indigent defendant was $89. [1956] RuconREn's CouRT or Tim Crrr or Dramorr, MicmGauN ANx. REP. 11, cited in Willcox & Bloustein, Account of a
Field Study in a Rural Area of the Representation of Indigents Accused of
Crime, 59 COLum. L. Ruv. 551, 572 n.49 (1959).
464. STATE or CALiF oUA, [1960-1961] RPIORT o' Assm Ly B ,LTEam
Coxuarr
oN CaCiRnAL Pnocanunm 105 (Jan. 1961), cited in Cuff, mupra
note 437, at 724 n.23. See also note 440 supra. For a thoughtful questioning of

whether these courses of action by public defenders are consistent with the
fundamental philosophy of the adversary system, see Kadish & Kimball, Legal Representationof the Indigent in Criminal Cases in Utah, 4 UTAH L. REv.

198, 224-25 (1954).
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of appointed counsel, "they have called upon the court for the appointment of experts, at court expense, have prolonged trial by
more extensive cross-examination than necessary, and have generally obtained their quid pro quo in experience, without regard to
the fact that in the total context of the case the litigation did not
justify all of the expensive defensive actions taken."4 '
Is a public defender system feasible for the relatively small
counties? Would it be undesirable financially because "the economies of representation by a public defender are present only
where there is substantial business and where it is relatively even406
ly spread throughout the year?"
There was general agreement that no rural county could support a full-time public defender and that, due to the large geographical area of most judicial districts,it would not be practical
for one full-time defender to cover so much ground. However, several affirmative suggestions were made by officials in the smaller
counties: (1) A part-time defender -an
obvious counterpart to
the part-time prosecutor in these counties - was advanced as a
feasible solution.46 7 (2) Since a three-county probation officer system has worked out quite well, a similar arrangement for a public
defender seems practicable."
It should be noted that the same arrangement which might
prove quite workable for a multi-county probation officer might
break down in the case of a multi-county public defender. The
pressure to be at a particular place at a particular time is much
greater for the defender. Nonetheless, both proposals appear to
have substantial merit - enough to warrant a fair trial.
465. STAFF OF HOUSE CoI.Im. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPRESENTATION FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN FEDERAL CRLMINAL CASES S0
(Comm. Print 1960) (comment of a federal judge).
466. Note, 76 HARv. L. REv. 579, 611 (1963). See also Pollock, supra note
440, at 744.
467. A federal judge in a relatively small district has suggested the desirability of a part-time defender for his district, comparable to his present
part-time referee in bankruptcy; estimated cost - $4,000 per year. STAr OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPRESENTATION
FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 36 (Comm. Print

1960). See also Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 463, at 573.
468. A particularly apt example of where such a system could be instituted
may be found in one of the cities visited during this study. In St. Cloud, the
jurisdiction of the municipal court extends to three counties- Stearns, Sherburne, and Benton, all of which converge in St. Cloud.
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A FINAL REFLECTION
Through the years, the "wedge objection has been raised by
those resisting the expansion of the "right to counsel"; the
"horrors" - if the principles contended for were extended far
enough- have been paraded. Thus, 21 years ago, in seeking
to confine the indigent defendant's right to appointed counsel
to capital cases, the State of Maryland argued:4 0
Will it be contended that even where a person is given a preliminary
hearing before a committing magistrate or a United States Commissioner, such magistrate or commissioner must appoint counsel if the
prisoner is indigent and requests it? And yet, the right to be heard
by counsel as distinguished from the right to the appointment of counsel is guaranteed at every stage of the proceedings, even as to preliminary hearings ....
The logic of the Petitioner's argument certainly
compels the appointment of counsel at such preliminary hearings since
he makes no distinction between the right to such appointment and the
right to be heard by counsel ....

Somehow, this "horror" no longer seems very frightening. 70
Nor, we venture to say, will the "horrors" of today - such as
appointment of counsel even before preliminary hearings, or in
misdemeanor cases, post-conviction proceedings, probation and
parole hearings -strike terror in many hearts tomorrow.
469. Brief for Respondent, p. 21, Betts v. Brady, 316 US. 455 (1942).
470. As previously noted, since 1959, MAmesota law has entitled an indigent defendant to appointed counsel "prior to his preliminary examination by
a magistrate." See note 3 supra and accompanying text.

